28 dead in South Korean plane crash
Published: 9:18am, 29 Dec 2024
An aircraft drove off the runway and crashed at Muan International Airport in South Korea, with 23 casualties confirmed, the Yonhap news agency reported on Sunday.
The Jeju Air plane, which was carrying 175 passengers and six flight attendants, was flying back from Thailand and the accident took place while it was landing, the report said. The airport is in southern South Korea.
Photos shared by local media showed smoke coming out of the plane.
One person was found alive as the rescue mission was continuing, according to Yonhap.
A plane caught fire Sunday at a southern South Korean airport after its landing gear
Yonhap news agency reported the Jeju Air flight plane veered off the runway and collided with a fence. It said the plane was returning from Bangkok.
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Asia Times
4 days ago
- Asia Times
Now the hard part: Lee Jae-myung and S Korea's quest for balance
This article was originally published by Pacific Forum. It is republished with permission. When Lee Jae-myung last ran for the South Korean presidency in 2022 he campaigned for balance in Seoul's foreign relations. At a time when the Biden administration pushed for not just closer bilateral but trilateral cooperation with Japan on the security issues of the day and Lee found himself in a tight contest with a conservative candidate happy to accede to Biden's wishes, this meant stressing an open hand to China and a willingness to say no to the United States. Three years later, Korea has just finished a snap election following an aborted martial law declaration and impeachment process. Lee, in his now-successful campaign to win the presidency again, stressed balance. However, the circumstances around him and around the Korean Peninsula have shifted starkly – as has the meaning of 'balance.' Instead of a Biden administration eager to deepen cooperation with Seoul at all levels, Lee will have a counterpart in Washington who demands to see results in keeping with the US administration's goals. And while the US administration clearly does have its eyes on the Indo-Pacific and seeks to contain China's ambitions there, US-Korea ties have not flourished during Seoul's leadership vacuum over the past several months. Supporters of the alliance have been holding their breath to see how Korea's next president will gel with President Donald Trump on a personal level. Most recently, rumors of a US troop drawdown have set off fears of a decreased US commitment to South Korea, especially regarding the deterrence of North Korea. It is in light of these developments that some of Lee's recent remarks, including his praise of Trump's dealmaking skill and of the role of US Forces Korea in ensuring regional stability should be read. While such remarks may have surprised those who remember the foreign policy planks of Lee's last campaign for the presidency, they make sense under current conditions: North Korea remains a looming and unpredictable security threat. China – with its ambitions of regional hegemony – hovers over all, and not everyone in Washington is convinced of Seoul's indispensability. Whatever else is true of Lee, he seemingly recognizes that balance will not be achieved if the US role diminishes and China's grows unabated. Furthermore, Lee's previous stances on China, the US, Japan and other foreign policy matters, when coupled with his domestic policy proposals – such as supporting a universal basic income during the 2022 campaign – suggested that he would govern firmly from the left. Once Yoon Suk Yeol was removed over his ill-fated martial law declaration and Lee became the clear favorite, Lee has scaled back previous promises and even tried to rebrand himself as 'centrist-conservative.' All of which is to say that, ultimately, Lee Jae-myung is a less a progressive ideologue than a politician – for both good and ill. Yes, his policy proposals have in the past earned comparisons to Bernie Sanders; they've also earned him the sobriquet of 'Korea's Trump.' And now he has the presidency, a massive majority in the National Assembly and a fragmented opposition. Assuming he establishes a rapport with President Trump, he would enjoy broad room to maneuver over the next five years, including in the security sphere. There are some things to ponder in the meantime. First, will Lee's elevation and the Democratic Party's return to power mean more inter-Korean talks? The odds for such talks are certainly better than they were under Yoon, but not necessarily good. With Kim Jong Un officially swearing off unification with the South and enjoying ties with Russia, North Korea may be in no hurry to cozy up to Washington for sanctions relief. Even if he does, one lesson he appears to have learned from the Moon Jae-in years is that South Korea is irrelevant to his goals: Kim wants sanctions reduction and only the US is necessary for that. If North Korea bypasses South Korea entirely to achieve its diplomatic objectives over the next five years, Seoul may actually have a weaker hand in dealing with Pyongyang and its regional partnerships may become even more important. Second, 'balance' between China and the US may not be up to Lee. Enjoying the security benefits that come with being a US ally and the economic boon of partnering with China would be a difficult posture under any circumstances. It will prove especially challenging if the rumors of US troop withdrawal prove true, leaving Lee to convince the US to increase its engagement in other ways, whether economically, in terms of intelligence-sharing, or in bolstering defense through weapons acquisition. But Beijing presents other problems: China remains deeply unpopular in Korea, and not all governments that have shifted in the direction of the US since the Covid-19 pandemic did so voluntarily. Should Seoul's decisions in the security, trade, or tech spheres displease Beijing, the measures China takes in response may force South Korea down the path of Australia, India and the Philippines, whose domestic discontent with Chinese actions pushed them into Washington's arms. If that happens popular sentiment could force Lee into a more hawkish position than he is comfortable with, and into a confrontation with his own party. No one expects Lee to be as friendly to Japan as his predecessor, who made unprecedented (and unpopular) gestures toward Tokyo in the name of trilateral security cooperation. But just because Lee is not another Yoon Suk Yeol does not mean he has to be another Moon Jae-in, who regularly inveighed against the 'collaborators,' abrogated the 2015 comfort women agreement with Japan to the delight of activists but not defense specialists, and threatened more serious steps like ending South Korea's involvement in the GSOMIA. Even if Lee declines to meet the Japanese prime minister for a summit, stable ties – marked by continued dialogues in the bilateral and trilateral formats – are in Korea's best interests. It's one thing for Lee to request sincere contrition from Japan regarding its imperial past; it's another thing entirely to throw away those ties to the benefit of China's hegemonic present. For a non-movement conservative to bolster bilateral Japan ties, even incrementally, will do wonders for the relationship over the long term. Lee has come under fire for saying that his reaction to a China-Taiwan contingency would be to say ' xie xie ' to both sides and otherwise steer clear. One can certainly decry such indifference. While Lee has sought to frame this as seeking good relations with both Taipei and Beijing, for an autocratic power to attempt the forcible absorption of a liberal democracy would have serious repercussions for all free societies and for US security guarantees, across the Indo-Pacific. Neutrality is not good enough. However, the ambiguity of Korea's response to a Taiwan contingency did not begin with Lee and it is not up to him to solve alone. The United States must play a role in determining the parameters of Seoul's engagement, including by organizing discussions with Seoul at the track 2 level and above to help decide what Seoul's response to a Taiwan Strait emergency would be. A good first step would be for a US-ROK summit to include a statement opposing any effort to change the status quo by force. Given recent Chinese diplomatic initiatives, even that might count as a bold step from Seoul. Again, the key word is 'balance' – and not just in foreign affairs. In addition to the personal differences compared with his predecessor that Lee brings to the presidency, his party's base will have different demands. How he manages those expectations in the face of a rapidly changing security climate will determine his legacy, and maybe South Korea's future. Rob York ( rob@ ) is director for regional affairs at Pacific Forum International. He is the editor of Pacific Forum publications and spearheads Pacific Forum outreach to the Korean Peninsula and South Asia. He earned his PhD in Korean history in December 2023.
Asia Times
4 days ago
- Asia Times
Lee Jae-myung takes the helm of a fractured and unmoored Korea
As Lee Jae-myung assumes South Korea's presidency after a decisive electoral victory, the left-leaning leader inherits not just a nation beset by economic distress and political fatigue but a region tilting precariously toward geostrategic recalibration. North Korea, often the most volatile player in this theater, has reason to quietly celebrate. For Pyongyang, the return of a progressive president in the Blue House is the best possible outcome short of Korean reunification on its own terms. Under conservative administrations—especially the now-impeached Yoon Suk Yeol—the North faced a hardline security posture, expanded joint military drills between the US and South Korea, and the near-collapse of any meaningful diplomatic dialogue. Yoon's flirtation with Japan on trilateral military coordination, his vocal hawkishness and alignment with Washington's China containment strategy further agitated the North. Lee, while no apologist for the North, has signaled an openness to resuming inter-Korean dialogue, humanitarian aid and economic cooperation projects. These preferences echo the Sunshine Policy-era instincts of earlier progressive leaders like Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, under whom North Korea was able to leverage peace overtures for both material gain and diplomatic legitimacy. For North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Lee's victory is not just breathing space—it is a new strategic opening. Even modest overtures from Seoul could be used to pressure Washington into easing sanctions, to portray the North as a willing partner in peace and to sow division between the US and South Korea on policy direction. North Korea thrives not in alignment, but in asymmetry. Lee's presidency, therefore, offers precisely that: a fragmented strategic environment ripe for manipulation. China, too, has reasons to be quietly pleased. While Beijing publicly maintains a policy of non-interference, its preference for left-leaning South Korean governments is no secret. The conservative Yoon administration had drawn South Korea deeper into Washington's Indo-Pacific strategy, even hinting at South Korea's involvement in supply chain 'friend-shoring' that would exclude China. Lee, by contrast, has voiced skepticism about the over-militarization of regional diplomacy and hinted at recalibrating Seoul's strategic autonomy. His emphasis on economic revival, job creation and technological innovation aligns with Beijing's vision of a less confrontational regional order. Additionally, Lee's expected moderation on issues like Taiwan and the South China Sea—compared to Yoon's vocally pro-US stance—will make him more acceptable to Chinese policymakers. From Beijing's perspective, the best scenario is a South Korea that remains allied to the US in security terms but is economically interdependent with China and politically wary of strategic entrapment. Lee's presidency will likely fit that mold. Still, Lee's mandate is far from stable in a deeply polarized South Korea. Yoon's impeachment followed months of unrest, accusations of executive overreach and the final misstep of invoking martial law, which many South Koreans interpreted as a grave assault on democracy. Lee's victory represents a public demand for change, but not necessarily a blank check. His own reputation is under scrutiny. Accusations of corruption during his tenure as mayor of Seongnam and governor of Gyeonggi province still linger despite his denials. Legal proceedings will continue, casting a shadow over his presidency. The economy, too, is teetering. South Korea's projected 0.8% GDP growth in 2025 is alarming for a nation that once epitomized go-go economic development. A toxic mix of youth unemployment, housing unaffordability and stagnant wages has bred cynicism among younger voters—many of whom backed Lee not out of loyalty, but frustration. And then there is the healthcare crisis. The mass resignation of junior doctors over medical school reform—aimed at solving a looming doctor shortage—has left hospitals understaffed. Lee must broker a truce between a defiant medical establishment and a public desperate for accessible care. If mishandled, this issue could unravel his domestic credibility faster than any foreign policy stumble. Lee's most treacherous challenge will be in foreign affairs. His task is nothing less than redefining South Korea's role in a region fractured by US-China rivalry, destabilized by a bellicose North Korea and overshadowed by global economic fragmentation. Lee must recalibrate Seoul's policy toward Pyongyang without undermining deterrence. Missile provocations, cyberattacks and nuclear brinkmanship by the North will not abate simply because of Lee's willingness to engage. Any dialogue must be carefully constructed within the framework of UN Security Council sanctions and regional consensus. Kim Jong Un is likely to test Lee early—perhaps with a missile launch or a cyber operation—to assess whether conciliatory rhetoric translates into policy leniency. Lee must respond decisively enough to preserve domestic confidence, yet not so aggressively that he forecloses future dialogue. To be sure, President Donald Trump's return to power complicates Lee's balancing act. Trump has already demanded greater defense spending from allies and suggested reducing America's 28,500-strong troop presence in South Korea unless Seoul pays more. These transactional instincts run counter to the institutionalism that undergirds the US-ROK alliance. Lee must navigate these pressures without appearing submissive to Washington or vulnerable to Pyongyang. Managing the Combined Forces Command relationship and the extended deterrence commitment—especially nuclear—will require cool-headed and consistent diplomacy. Lee must also resist any impulse by Trump to weaponize trade, tariffs or technology against South Korea's economy. China, while economically vital, is diplomatically assertive. South Korea's THAAD deployment in 2016 led to punitive economic retaliation by Beijing, a wound still felt in the Korean tourism, retail and entertainment sectors. Mostly, Lee must avoid being drawn into a binary US-China choice. Instead, his administration should promote a 'strategic pivotal power diplomacy'—partnering more actively with ASEAN, with which Seoul enjoys a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, allowing it to join minilateral forums such as the Mekong-Korea, and supporting multilateral digital governance that reduces dependence on either pole. These moves will signal autonomy without antagonism. Lee enters the Blue House with high expectations but little margin for error. His presidency must be one of pragmatism without paralysis, engagement without appeasement and reform without rupture. For Pyongyang, Lee's rise represents an opportunity. For Beijing, it marks a welcome shift. But for Lee himself, this is a moment of great peril disguised as promise. His legacy will ultimately be judged not by rhetoric but by his ability to stabilize a wounded nation, navigate great-power rivalries and restore the democratic spirit South Koreans so recently took to the streets to protect. Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is professor of ASEAN Studies at the International Islamic University of Malaysia and a senior visiting fellow at the University of Cambridge.
RTHK
4 days ago
- RTHK
Lee Jae-myung wins South Korean presidential election
Lee Jae-myung wins South Korean presidential election Lee Jae-myung, of the Democratic Party of Korea, celebrates after his victory was confirmed. Photo: AFP South Korea's liberal party candidate, Lee Jae-myung, was elected president in Tuesday's snap election, six months to the day after he evaded military cordons to vote against a shock martial law decree imposed by his ousted predecessor. Lee's victory stands to usher in a political sea change in Asia's fourth-largest economy, after the backlash against the martial law brought down Yoon Suk Yeol, the conservative outsider who narrowly beat Lee in the 2022 election. Nearly 80 percent of South Korea's 44.39 million eligible voters cast their ballots, the highest turnout for a presidential election in the country since 1997, with Lee terming the polls "judgment day" against Yoon's martial law and the People Power Party's failure to distance itself from that decision. With more than 99 percent of the votes counted, the Democratic Party's Lee stood at 49.3 percent to PPP candidate Kim Moon-soo's 41.3 percent, according to National Election Commission data. A subdued Kim conceded the race and congratulated Lee in brief remarks to reporters. Lee had long been favoured to win, and his supporters erupted in cheers as exit polls by the country's major broadcasters showed him defeating Kim by wide margins. (Reuters)
