Can India rely on Russia to diplomatically isolate Pakistan? It seems unlikely

Indian Express

15-05-2025

Written by Aleksei Zakharov
The status of India-Russia relations as a 'strategic and privileged partnership' has always imposed additional expectations on how the relationship should progress and how the two sides should support each other in difficult times. Contrary to this logic, there has been a gradual erosion of the convergence of geopolitical views between Moscow and New Delhi, with fewer signs of alignment on global, regional and strategic issues. This has led to their stance towards each other being subject to more diverse interpretations. The Russian official response to the Pahalgam terrorist attack and Operation Sindoor is a case in point.
At first glance, it looks as though Moscow ticked all the right boxes in its response. Russian President Vladimir Putin quickly condemned the terrorist attack as a 'brutal crime' with 'no justification whatsoever' and expressed hope that the perpetrators would face a 'deserved punishment'. Subsequently, he reached out to Prime Minister Narendra Modi to reiterate his condemnation of the 'barbaric terrorist attack in Pahalgam' and emphasise the need to 'uncompromisingly fight terrorism in all its forms'. This strong language from the Russian leader is unsurprising, given that Russia itself has fallen victim to major terrorist attacks in the past, such as the Crocus City Hall attack in the Moscow region in March 2024.
When India launched Operation Sindoor, Russia called on New Delhi and Islamabad 'to exercise restraint' and 'resolve their differences through peaceful, political and diplomatic means on a bilateral basis'. While the Russian response was generally perceived as an act of solidarity with India, there are some nuances that require further scrutiny.
Firstly, while Indian diplomats were engaged in a series of phone calls with various foreign partners, it took over 10 days for the Russian and Indian foreign ministers to hold a telephone conversation. This delay stood in contrast with New Delhi's many other diplomatic engagements in the days following the Pahalgam attack.
Secondly, as with the reaction to the 2019 Pulwama terrorist attack, Moscow once again attempted to strike a balance between New Delhi and Islamabad, offering 'to contribute to a political settlement' if both sides 'are mutually willing'. Despite being well aware that Delhi rejects third-party mediation and insists that Kashmir is a bilateral issue, Moscow continues to offer its services as a crisis broker, which obviously plays into Pakistan's hands.
Thirdly, since Moscow and Islamabad have expanded their areas and levels of cooperation over the last decade, Russia is no longer in a position to put pressure on Pakistan regarding cross-border terrorism. With Russian and Pakistani special forces now conducting annual anti-terrorist exercises and foreign ministry officials highlighting the 'positive dynamics' and prospects of counter-terrorism cooperation, it is unlikely that Moscow would publicly call out Islamabad, even if it does suspect the Pakistani intelligence services of having links to terrorist groups operating in Kashmir.
Russia's pragmatic stance following the Pahalgam attack also stems from its continued reliance on the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in its broader strategy for Eurasia. Despite the organisation failing to bring about any tangible changes to the regional security situation and not leading to the improvement of India-Pakistan relations as some in Russia had expected, Moscow still sees the SCO as a key mechanism for Eurasian integration. This approach means Russian diplomacy is forced to tread carefully between New Delhi and Islamabad, both of which have been SCO members since 2017.
Despite the common wisdom that Russia's foreign policy, including its shifting approach to South Asia, may be under Chinese sway, there is no solid evidence to confirm this. Indeed, there have been instances of trilateral coordination between China, Pakistan and Russia, such as their consultations on Afghanistan, which have recently evolved into a quadrilateral format with the inclusion of Iran. Furthermore, in late April 2025, Moscow and Beijing discussed the security situation in South Asia, which undoubtedly included the rising tensions between India and Pakistan. However, Russia has not bought into the China-Pakistan narrative of holding 'a fair and just investigation' into the Pahalgam attack; instead, it has advocated a joint 'fight against the global terrorist threat' together with India.
The level of cooperation between Russia and Pakistan is nowhere near that of India and Russia. While India and Russia have a long-standing partnership spanning various sectors that has weathered many storms, Moscow's engagement with Islamabad is still in its infancy and is hampered by Pakistan's cash-strapped economy and unstable domestic politics. Whereas Russia has shared with India its cutting-edge defence systems, such as the S-400, which have proven instrumental in bolstering India's defence against Pakistan's air strikes. There is nothing as substantial in sight in Russia's dealings with Pakistan.
That said, Russia has acted as a neutral party in the recent India-Pakistan conflict. While India can still rely on Russia's emotional diplomacy, Moscow seems to stop halfway when it comes to providing political support for Delhi's case, steering clear of making any critical remarks towards Islamabad and Rawalpindi. India must take this into account when preparing for a future crisis.
The writer is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation