Surging prices: govt lawyer seeks time to submit reply
The Lahore High Court (LHC) has adjourned proceedings on a petition challenging the surge in prices of essential food items during Ramazan after the provincial government's lawyer requested time to submit a response.
The petition, filed by Munir Ahmad through Advocate Azhar Siddique, argues that despite repeated concerns, authorities have failed to stabilize prices, leaving the public struggling to afford basic commodities.
The petitioner urged the court to take strict action against hoarders and profiteers who are selling essential goods at inflated rates in violation of officially fixed prices.
He pointed out that while Ramazan is a sacred and eagerly awaited month, it is marred each year by soaring prices of food items, making it difficult for peopleespecially the underprivilegedto afford necessities for breaking their fast.
The petition highlighted that inflation, already a persistent issue, worsens during Ramazan, depriving low-income families of access to essential food items such as fruits and staple goods.
With Ramazan set to begin in March 2025 and the upcoming budget for the fiscal year 2025-26 approaching, the petitioner alleged that black marketers and hoarders have once again driven prices to exorbitant levels.
He criticised the authorities for failing to implement a policy or strategy to curb this annual price surge, allowing profiteers to exploit the public unchecked.
The petition also cited reports from the national press highlighting public distress over the rising cost of daily essentials. The LHC will resume hearing the case once the government submits its reply.
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