Chinese university recruits South Korean semiconductor expert Lee Young-hee
South Korean
semiconductor researcher Lee Young-hee has left his home country to take the helm of a research centre in central China.
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Lee, a foreign member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences since 2021, has established a low-dimensional quantum materials research centre at Hubei University of Technology in the city of Wuhan.
The university said the centre was meant to promote development of 'new materials, new energy, optoelectronics, information technology, biomedical fields and related industries in Hubei province'.
The university welcomed him as a full-time appointment in November, according to a Chinese-language education information platform.
Lee was quoted as saying that he hoped the centre would bring scientific expertise together, share resources with local and overseas universities, and nurture young talent.
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US proposes new round of tariffs on China in latest trade war escalation
US proposes new round of tariffs on China in latest trade war escalation
Seoul-based news outlet the JoongAng reported last week that Lee chose to continue his research in China after he retired in South Korea and could not find a suitable research position in the country.
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