French veterans demand disclosure on Ukraine involvement
A group of high-ranking French veterans has sent an open letter to the heads of both houses of Parliament calling for increased oversight of France's military involvement in Ukraine.
The veterans are urging lawmakers to hold a formal debate on weapons supplies and the deployment and continued presence of French troops in Ukraine.
The letter, titled the 'Citizen Resolution', was published earlier this week on Place d'Armes, a platform for current and former service members to express views on national policy. It included a public call for citizens to sign the resolution in support.
The authors argued that France's military involvement in Ukraine without a parliamentary mandate, and arms deliveries without public debate, violate the French Constitution and Criminal Code. They claimed that no clear communication has been made to Parliament about the possible presence of French troops in Ukraine since 2022, despite the legal obligation to inform lawmakers of any 'military intervention.'
The letter has urged the parliament to publish 'all information' about troop presence in the Journal Officiel, the country's official gazette, and to 'organize a debate with a vote on the continuation of this intervention' within 15 days of receiving the letter.
The document also noted that the French-Ukrainian security pact signed last year – which included €3 billion in aid and multi-year military support – has not been ratified by Parliament, despite the Constitution requiring such ratification for treaties having major financial implications for the state.
'The lack of regular parliamentary ratification raises the question of the legality of the supply of weapons from the French army reserves to Ukraine for use against Russia, with which our country is not at war,' the letter states.
The letter also highlighted President Emmanuel Macron's recent remarks about potentially deploying troops to Ukraine and sharing nuclear capabilities with European partners. The authors argued that such decisions require parliamentary debate to ensure legitimacy.
Commenting on the letter, the head of the Place d'Armes association, Jean-Pierre Fabre-Bernadac, told Sud Radio it reflects heightened public concern about the country's involvement in Ukraine.
'Is it a fable? Is there a reality of French troops on Ukrainian soil? This will be clarified by the National Assembly and the Senate,' he said. 'The army is at the service of the nation. It is not at the service of a man or a regime.' He noted that his association did not write the text but that it was instead prepared by military professionals, including 26 former army generals.
The heads of the Senate and National Assembly have not yet publicly responded to the letter, while the mainstream French media has largely been quiet about its existence. However, the document has been signed by over 14,000 people since its release.
Despite numerous reports of Western troops in Ukraine, Kiev's backers have avoided confirming any official deployments. Russia has repeatedly opposed the presence of Western forces under any pretext in the combat zone, warning that such a move would be treated as direct involvement in the conflict.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Russia Today
9 hours ago
- Russia Today
France can't afford military spending splurge
France may not be able to afford to ramp up defense spending under a broader EU militarization drive, the Financial Times reported on Saturday, citing experts. The country's growing national debt and large budget deficit present major obstacles to its rearmament goals, the newspaper noted. President Emmanuel Macron earlier proposed raising defense spending to 3-3.5% of GDP by 2030 – nearly double the current level – which would require an extra €30 billion ($34 billion) annually. However, experts told the FT that France's fiscal position is too precarious to go through with the plan. They noted that debt-to-GDP ratio hit 113% in 2024, one of the highest in the EU, while the budget deficit reached 5.8%, almost twice the EU's 3% cap. Interest payments on debt totaled €59 billion last year and are expected to reach €62 billion in 2025 – roughly the combined annual cost of defense and education. Experts also noted that the government is struggling to pass a deficit-reduction package, which reportedly features unpopular moves such as cuts to social spending, including pension tax breaks and healthcare subsidies. 'In France, and this is probably different than elsewhere, we cannot go back on our deficit reduction goals, nor can we raise taxes since they are already very high,' Clement Beaune, a former minister for Europe and Macron ally, who heads a government think tank, the told FT. Experts said France could apply for the EU's 'escape clause,' which allows countries to exceed deficit caps to boost defense budgets by 1.5% of GDP. However, they warned that the move is unlikely, as it could spook bond markets and drive up borrowing costs. Paris could also join another EU scheme offering loans for joint arms purchases. Experts, however, said that rising costs and inflation could mean France would end up with fewer weapons even if it boosts spending. Some described it as a 'bonsai army' – broad in scope, but limited in scale. France's rearmament plans come as the EU pushes for more spending and less reliance on US weapons, citing a supposed Russian threat. Moscow has repeatedly dismissed the claims as 'nonsense,' accusing the West of using fear to justify funneling public funds into arms. Russian officials have warned the EU's buildup risks wider conflict. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova recently said the bloc 'has degraded into an openly militarized entity.'
Russia Today
03-06-2025
- Russia Today
China is building a power triangle to change the world
The final week of May marked a significant political development with the potential to reshape Asia's geopolitical landscape. Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia, hosted the inaugural summit involving China, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). While signs of deepening engagement among these three actors had surfaced in preceding years, the establishment of a formal trilateral cooperation mechanism is a recent development. This event did not occur in a geopolitical vacuum. The region is increasingly exposed to intensifying rivalry among China, the US, and other global powers. In April, Chinese President Xi Jinping embarked on a Southeast Asian tour – visiting Cambodia, Malaysia, and Vietnam – to consolidate Beijing's influence. Almost simultaneously, an envoy dispatched by US President Donald Trump toured Cambodia and Vietnam and met with representatives from all ASEAN member states in an effort to repair relations damaged by Trump's tariffs and to reaffirm the commitment to a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific'. Meanwhile, the US president visited three Gulf states, making new deals and publicly denouncing the longstanding American policy of mentorship and interference in regional affairs. By the end of May, French President Emmanuel Macron also entered the scene, visiting Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam to remind Southeast Asian counterparts that the EU still exists and remains a potential alternative to both Beijing and Washington. It is no coincidence that the China-ASEAN-GCC summit was convened in Malaysia. As the current chair of ASEAN, Malaysia plays a pivotal role, and its prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, is a vocal proponent of regional integration and innovative partnerships. Ahead of the trilateral summit, ASEAN members gathered in Kuala Lumpur to chart their future course. On this occasion, the ten member states adopted ASEAN's first 20-year vision – ASEAN 2045 – articulating the ambition to position Southeast Asia as a global growth engine aligned with other dynamic actors. Among them, China and the GCC member states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – stand out prominently. Together, they represent a quarter of the world's population and contribute nearly the same proportion to global GDP. Their economic linkages are already well-established: China is the top trading partner for both ASEAN and the GCC. ASEAN has surpassed the EU as China's foremost economic partner, and Beijing imports over one-third of its crude oil from GCC states. The summit in Kuala Lumpur brought together the world's second- and fifth-largest economies – China and ASEAN – along with key suppliers of energy and raw materials. The leaders did not conceal their optimism. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim advanced a vision of intercultural dialogue between Confucian and Islamic civilizations, aligning with China's Global Civilization Initiative. Chinese Premier Li Qiang envisaged a 'big triangle' as a pillar of global security and prosperity, invoking the 'shared Asian values' of openness, cooperation, and integration in contrast to perceived Western norms. Notably, Beijing's official discourse increasingly emphasizes these 'Asian values'. This narrative underpins a renewed focus on neighboring states. In April, Xi convened a rare high-level conference on relations with the 'near abroad', characterizing it as essential to China's development, security, and diplomatic priorities. Among other regional actors, this recalibration may evoke concerns about a resurgence of a modern-day 'Pax Sinica'. However, Beijing refutes these interpretations, instead invoking alternative historical models such as the Silk Road, which emphasized connectivity, integration, and equality. The China-ASEAN-GCC summit was no exception: Beijing proposed extending the existing China-ASEAN Free Trade Area to include the GCC, a suggestion welcomed by Southeast Asian leaders. This could accelerate China's bid for trade liberalization and amplify the benefits of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership – the world's largest free trade zone, which includes all ASEAN nations. The summit's agenda focused heavily on economic issues, reflecting ASEAN's strategic orientation and the interests of Gulf states. Over the past decade, China has launched numerous projects with ASEAN members under the Belt and Road Initiative. Cooperation with the GCC is also expanding beyond traditional sectors such as raw materials to cutting-edge areas including artificial intelligence, the digital economy, and 5G technology. This economic emphasis is strategic, enabling stakeholders to bypass contentious political and security matters. And these contentious issues abound. While China maintains robust ties with both ASEAN and GCC members, bilateral frictions persist. Within ASEAN, territorial disputes and sovereignty concerns – particularly in the South China Sea – complicate trust-building. China's disputes with Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam are longstanding and strain regional relations. Perceptions of Chinese assertiveness also fuel anxieties over economic overdependence, potential 'debt traps', and Beijing's political leverage. These factors have prompted leaders such as Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to move closer to the US in recent years. The broader China-US rivalry remains a defining dynamic. Both ASEAN and GCC nations have historically strong ties to the US. The US remains ASEAN's largest export market and top foreign investor. GCC countries, long aligned with Washington, now face the challenge of navigating a careful balance between American and Chinese interests, particularly on sensitive technologies and security cooperation. Washington opposes the adoption of Chinese 5G and AI technologies by Saudi Arabia, and similar concerns have led to the suspension of military agreements between the US and UAE. Additionally, discussions about conducting oil trade in the yuan challenge the petrodollar system and attract Western scrutiny. These geopolitical complexities could undermine trilateral collaboration, exposing fault lines and structural vulnerabilities. While sectors such as trade, energy, infrastructure, and advanced technology offer natural areas of convergence, geopolitical competition and cultural divergence present serious obstacles. Moreover, there is a pronounced asymmetry among the actors: Smaller ASEAN economies may lack the institutional and financial capacity to engage fully in this trilateral format. Nonetheless, the China-ASEAN-GCC platform represents a novel configuration within an emerging multipolar world order. It reflects the accelerating momentum of South-South cooperation, which integrates multipolarity with multilateralism and economic globalization. Trump's tariff storm served as a wake-up call for many US partners across ASEAN and the Gulf, underscoring the imperative of diversifying partnerships and embracing pragmatic alternatives. Closer ties with Beijing do not necessarily indicate a wholesale shift from one hegemon to another. Rather, ASEAN and the GCC are striving to engage both China and the US where feasible. Yet, recent developments suggest that Washington's strategy of pressuring states to reduce ties with China in exchange for benefits is losing traction. The key questions now are whether ASEAN can effectively balance great power rivalries to become an autonomous pole in a multipolar world; whether regional actors can sustain this delicate equilibrium and avoid the formation of military blocs in Asia-Pacific and beyond; and whether the trilateral framework itself can endure amid mounting geopolitical tensions. These remain open-ended questions – and the answers will emerge only with time.
Russia Today
01-06-2025
- Russia Today
China rejects comparing Ukraine conflict to Taiwan
Drawing parallels between Taiwan and the Ukraine conflict is 'unacceptible,' the Chinese Embassy in Singapore said in response to remarks by French President Emmanuel Macron. 'Comparing the Taiwan question with the Ukraine issue is unacceptable. The two are different in nature, and not comparable at all,' the embassy said on Facebook on Saturday, reiterating that the issue of Taiwan is 'entirely China's internal affair.' The statement was released shortly after Macron delivered a speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on Friday. 'If we consider that Russia could be allowed to take a part of the territory of Ukraine without any restriction… What could happen in Taiwan?' he said. Crimea voted to join Russia shortly after the 2014 US-backed coup in Kiev, and four other former Ukrainian regions did the same following referendums in 2022. Moscow has demanded that, for a viable peace deal, Ukraine must recognize Russia's new borders and withdraw its troops from Russian territory. Taiwan has had a separate government since 1949, when nationalists retreated to the island after losing a war with the Communists in mainland China. Beijing maintains that it will achieve 'national reunification' and has warned the authorities in Taipei against formally declaring independence. Only a handful of countries recognize Taiwan as an independent country, while most states, including the US and Russia, adhere to the 'One-China' principle. Nevertheless, multiple Western countries maintain informal ties with Taiwan.
