Libya's PM says eliminating militias is ‘ongoing project' as ceasefire holds
TRIPOLI: Libyan Prime Minister Abdulhamid Al-Dbeibah said on Saturday that eliminating militias is an 'ongoing project,' as a ceasefire after deadly clashes this week remained in place.
'We will not spare anyone who continues to engage in corruption or extortion. Our goal is to create a Libya free of militias and corruption,' Dbeibah said in a televised speech.
Dbeibah is the country's internationally recognized leader in the west, based in Tripoli.
After Dbeibah on Tuesday ordered the armed groups to be dismantled, Tripoli was rocked by its fiercest clashes in years between two armed groups. The clashes killed at least eight civilians, according to the United Nations.
The government announced a ceasefire on Wednesday.
It followed Monday's killing of major militia chief Abdulghani Kikli, widely known as Ghaniwa, and the sudden defeat of his Stabilization Support Apparatus group by factions aligned with Dbeibah.
SSA is under the Presidential Council that came to power in 2021 with the Government of National Unity of Dbeibah through a United Nations-backed process.
SSA was based in the densely populated Abu Salim neighborhood.
GNU's Interior Ministry said in a statement that nine decomposed corpses were found in a morgue refrigerator in Abu Salim-based Al-Khadra hospital. It said SSA never reported them to authorities. The PM's media office posted a video of Dbeibah greeting the security force protecting the Prime Ministry Building. It said he later received delegations from elders to discuss Tripoli's situation and what he called 'successful security operation in Abu Salim.'
'The Prime Minister stressed that this operation falls within the state's fixed vision to eliminate armed formations outside the police and army institutions,' the media office said.
On Friday, at least three ministers resigned in sympathy with hundreds of protesters who took to the streets calling for Dbeibah's ouster.
Dbeibah did not comment on their resignations. 'The protests are annoying, but I've put up with them. I know some of them are real, but a lot of them are paid,' he said.
The United Nations Support Mission in Libya expressed concern on Friday about the escalation of violence in Tripoli, calling on parties to protect civilians and public property.
Libya has had little stability since a 2011 NATO-backed uprising ousted longtime autocrat Muammar Qaddafi. The country split in 2014 between rival eastern and western factions, though an outbreak of major warfare paused with a truce in 2020.
While eastern Libya has been dominated for a decade by commander Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army, control in Tripoli and western Libya has been splintered among numerous armed factions.
A major energy exporter, Libya is also an important way station for migrants heading to Europe, while its conflict has drawn in foreign powers including Turkiye, Russia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.
State-oil firm NOC said on Friday that its operations at oil facilities are proceeding as normal, with oil and gas exports operating regularly.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Asharq Al-Awsat
5 hours ago
- Asharq Al-Awsat
The Invisible Enemy in the Sudan War
Sudan's new Prime Minister, Dr. Kamel Idris, faces formidable challenges as he navigates the most complex and critical moment in the country's history. Sudan has been ravaged by a devastating war, its economy has been enfeebled, its infrastructure is crumbling, its institutions are decaying, and its resilient population is suffering. In his inaugural address after being sworn in, Prime Minister Idris acknowledged the weight of the responsibility on his shoulders and promised to realize the vision that he laid out in the two books and presented publicly on camera. While the government has a long agenda. Its gravest challenges may not be its visible tasks, though they are many. An 'invisible enemy' that has been hollowing out the state from within for years: is corruption. Although corruption has long weighed on this wounded nation, it has acquired new and more dangerous dimensions during the war. Indeed, in times of conflict, state institutions are weakened, effective oversight disappears, and individuals exploit dire security and economic conditions to abuse their power and loot both public and private resources. Since the war began, numerous accounts of rampant corruption have surfaced everywhere: from humanitarian aid and government appointments to public funds and even the moral fabric of society. These are not merely rumors. Officials have publicly addressed the issue. Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has criticized fraud in the civil service and nepotism, while Vice President of the Sovereignty Council Malik Agar acknowledged that corruption had been deeply entrenched. The reality is that corruption in Sudan is no longer a problem of isolated incidents or the product of individual misconduct; it has become a 'way of life.' Not only does it harm the economy, it also presents an existential threat to the state. That is why Sudan today needs to wage a serious and relentless battle against corruption, going beyond statement and rhetoric to deliver results through structural reforms of state institutions. Fighting corruption under these conditions is not just a demand of the masses or institutional idealism; it is a national imperative- a requisite for reform, reconstruction, attracting investment, and rebuilding trust between the government and its citizens. Clear political determination is not enough. Sudan needs a fully-fledged campaign armed with effective tools and actionable plans. Where Do We Begin? The government of Dr. Kamel Idris can take different approaches to open horizons in the fight against corruption. To succeed, it will need the full backing of all other state actors. Among the steps the state can take are: Establishing an independent national anti-corruption commission with real authority. Creating a specialized court for corruption-related crimes that combines efficiency with speed, ensures that cases are not trapped into bureaucratic limbo. Passing a strict financial disclosure and asset declaration law that applies to senior officials and all public sector employees. Expanding the digitization of public services to reduce direct contact and curb bribery, building a single online portal for customs, taxation, procurement, licensing, and more. Launching a nationwide media campaign under the banner of 'Fighting Corruption.' It must raise compelling and relatable slogans that speak directly to the public and are repeated enough times to become catchphrases that resonate even in the halls of government. In parallel with efforts to raise awareness, protecting journalists is essential for allowing them to expose corruption through investigative reporting. A whistleblower protection system must also be established. Reform will remain incomplete before a purge in sensitive posts in the judiciary, police, customs, taxation, ports, and border control. Civil society must also be empowered so that it can contribute to public oversight and help ensure transparency and accountability. There are many successful examples of countries that have tackled corruption through their determination and bold reforms, and they demonstrate that change is possible when there is political will. Take Rwanda, for instance: following the genocide of the 1990s, it was a failed state crippled by violence and corruption. However, it chose the path of reform and reconstruction, adopting a zero-tolerance policy on corruption. It strengthened the Office of the Auditor General, created a dedicated anti-corruption body and specialized courts, and prosecuted high-profile offenders. Another example is Singapore, which had been a poor country with limited resources and rampant corruption until the 1960s. It embarked on a path toward reform and revival, enforcing robust oversight mechanisms and ensuring judicial independence, as well as passing strict anti-corruption laws. It also offered competitive salaries to civil servants and law enforcement officials (in the judiciary, police, customs, and tax agencies) to reduce the temptation of bribes, while simultaneously imposing strict systems of oversight, accountability, and prosecution. If Dr. Kamel Idris's government appeases the corrupt, it will only add to the frustration. However, if it governs like it is the country's "last chance" and receives the support of other officials, this government's tenure could become a turning point for Sudan. However, the battle will not be easy. It requires political courage, a moral revolution, and a conviction that corruption is not inevitable and that this a battle that must be won if Sudan is to recover and rise.
Asharq Al-Awsat
5 hours ago
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Turkish Prosecutors Investigate Main Opposition Leader in Crackdown
Prosecutors have opened an investigation into the leader of Türkiye's main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) on charges of threatening and insulting Istanbul's chief prosecutor, adding to a broad crackdown on the opposition. The clampdown is centred on Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, who is President Tayyip Erdogan's main political rival and leads him in some opinion polls. The CHP's Imamoglu was jailed in March pending trial on corruption charges, which he denies, according to Reuters. The Istanbul prosecutor's office said in a statement that it had launched the probe into CHP leader Ozgur Ozel over comments he made about the chief prosecutor at a rally in Istanbul on Wednesday, criticising the targeting of the opposition. CHP spokesman Deniz Yucel criticised the decision to open the investigation. "We will not succumb to this system of lawlessness that you have created," he said on X, addressing the authorities. In another step, Türkiye's Interior Ministry dismissed three Istanbul district mayors who were arrested this week as part of the corruption investigations at the municipality, state media said on Thursday. The ministry also removed from their posts two mayors who were arrested under the same investigations in the southern province of Adana, state-owned Anadolu news agency reported. All five of these mayors are from the CHP. Imamoglu's arrest in March triggered mass protests, economic turmoil and broad accusations of government influence over the judiciary and anti-democratic applications. The government denies the accusations and says the judiciary is independent. Since his arrest, authorities have detained dozens of CHP members, officials from the Istanbul municipality, and other CHP-run municipalities. Access to Imamoglu's X account was also blocked in Türkiye this month.
Asharq Al-Awsat
9 hours ago
- Asharq Al-Awsat
From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya
Libya, once held together under the iron grip of Muammar Gaddafi, exploded into chaos after his ouster in 2011. Fourteen years later, the country remains fractured, yet a new map of military, political, and territorial control has emerged. It reflects not stability but shifting alliances, entrenched divisions, and the tug-of-war between rival powers vying for supremacy, from Khalifa Haftar in the east to Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in the west. In 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi-era officer, launched a campaign to rebuild Libya's disbanded army. As Tripoli and other western cities welcomed Islamist factions and extremist militias, Haftar began consolidating forces under a new banner -the Libyan National Army. Backed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, he was formally appointed commander-in-chief in 2015 by Speaker Aguila Saleh and was promoted to Field Marshal the following year. Haftar's supporters, such as Khaled Al-Turjuman, view this effort as a revival of the national military. What began as a force of just over 300 personnel has reportedly grown to more than 120,000 officers and soldiers. A recent military parade in Benghazi put this strength on full display, showcasing a broad arsenal of advanced weaponry. Haftar took the opportunity to issue a warning to rivals: 'In the critical moment, the army will have the final word.' Haftar's influence extends beyond eastern Libya. His forces have consolidated control from Benghazi through Sirte and Jufra in the center, down to the southern borders with Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Algeria. One of the most strategically vital areas under his command is the oil crescent along the northeastern coast, encompassing Ras Lanuf, Sidra, Brega, and Zueitina, essential hubs for Libya's oil exports. Since 2019, Haftar has shifted his focus further south, targeting key cities such as Sabha, Brak al-Shati, and Ubari, and extending his reach to the far southwest in Ghat. He also controls southeastern border areas like Kufra, Al-Jawf, Al-Uwaynat, and the Tibesti Mountains near Chad. This southern push, some analysts argue, is part of a calculated strategy to project power beyond the traditional east-west divide. While Tripoli remains home to key sovereign institutions such as the Central Bank and National Oil Corporation, Haftar's growing territorial grip has led critics to accuse him of attempting to militarize the state. Military analyst Adel Abdul Kafi notes that most of Libya's southern borders are now under Haftar's effective control. He also points to a US-backed initiative involving joint forces from the east and west to secure Libya's frontiers and coastlines. Control over Libya's energy resources remains a central pillar of Haftar's power. Beyond the oil ports along the coast, he oversees several major oilfields in the south. The Sharara field in Ubari, producing approximately 315,000 barrels per day, and the El Feel (Elephant) field, with around 70,000 barrels daily, are among the most significant. Though these fields are managed by the National Oil Corporation headquartered in Tripoli, protection on the ground often comes from a patchwork of facility guards and local militias -- some loyal to Haftar, others to Dbeibah, and some switching sides as needed. Haftar commands a network of military bases that support his campaigns in the east, center, and south. These include the Jufra Airbase, used as a launchpad during his failed 2019 offensive on Tripoli; Al-Khadim (also known as Al-Kharouba), where drone operations have been reported; Al-Abrag and Gamal Abdel Nasser airbases in the east; the Tamanhent base near Sabha; and Brak Al-Shati, which secures critical southern supply lines. Another strategic base, Ma'tan al-Sarra near Kufra, is rumored to host Russian forces, giving Moscow a potential gateway to the African Sahel. Haftar's military strength is matched by political clout. Though the eastern-based government of Osama Hammad is not internationally recognized, it operates with Haftar's backing and funds development projects through the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, headed by Qassem Haftar, the commander's son. Despite their expired mandates, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State continue to pass legislation and negotiate over the formation of a new government—deepening Libya's institutional deadlock. The Presidential Council, headed by Mohamed al-Menfi, was established under the 2020 Geneva agreement and holds formal international legitimacy. However, its actual power is limited. Though it is nominally the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, internal divisions and political agreements strip it of much of its authority. Even in the west, where it is based, the Council is overshadowed by the Government of National Unity under Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. Dbeibah's legitimacy has come under increasing scrutiny, especially after violent clashes erupted in Tripoli in May, sparked by the killing of militia leader Abdul Ghani Al-Kikli (Ghneiwa). These confrontations exposed the fragility of the security landscape in the capital and significantly weakened Dbeibah's position. Though his term officially ended after being appointed in early 2021, he refuses to step down without elections, leaning on continued international support. Despite controlling public spending and state institutions, Dbeibah's grip on security is largely dependent on a volatile network of militias. Previously aligned with powerful groups like the Stability Support Apparatus and the Special Deterrence Force, Dbeibah has since fallen out with many of these factions. Following Ghneiwa's death, he disbanded the SSA and entered into open conflict with Abdul Rauf Kara's Deterrence Force, escalating tensions across Tripoli. Today, Dbeibah relies primarily on the 444th Combat Brigade, led by Major General Mahmoud Hamza, who also heads Military Intelligence in western Libya. He is supported by the Joint Operations Force in Misrata and other militia groups, including Battalion 55 under Muammar Al-Dawi. These forces benefit from extensive support from Türkiye, which provides Bayraktar TB2 drones, limited radar systems, and military training facilities under prior agreements signed with former Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. Western Libya's military infrastructure includes several important bases. Al-Watiya Airbase, southwest of Tripoli near the Tunisian border, is vital for control over the western region. Mitiga Airbase in Tripoli, currently controlled by the Deterrence Force, serves as a civilian and military airport. Abu Sitta Naval Base in Tripoli functions as the headquarters of the General Staff, with strong Turkish naval ties. Misrata Airbase, among the country's most fortified, hosts Turkish personnel and hardware. Other key sites include Yarmouk Camp in Tripoli -- now reportedly housing Syrian mercenaries --April 7 Camp in Bab Ben Ghashir, and the Khums Naval Base near the city of Khums. Tripoli remains the nerve center of Libya's institutional framework, hosting the Unity Government, the Presidential Council, the High Council of State, the Central Bank, and the National Oil Corporation. Yet, control over western Libya's border regions with Tunisia, Algeria, and Niger remains tenuous. In areas like Ubari, Ghat, and Murzuq -home to Tuareg and Tebu communities - authority shifts frequently among competing forces. The frontline between the rival eastern and western coalitions lies just west of Sirte. Haftar's forces control the city, while Dbeibah's militias are stationed in its outskirts, near Misrata. Buwairat al-Husun marks the main demarcation line. Periodic troop mobilizations and skirmishes in the area fuel ongoing fears of a new confrontation.
