Ukraine brings back 7 more children from Russia and occupied territories
Seven more children have been brought back from Russia and the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.
Source: Dariia Zarivna, Adviser to the Head of the President's Office of Ukraine, on Telegram
Quote: "Among them is a boy who lived under occupation with his parents for a long time, endured forced passportisation, psychological pressure at school and fear for his own future. His parents, wishing to give him a chance for education in a free country, decided to take him to the territory controlled by Ukraine.
We also managed to evacuate a mother and daughter who had long been under the supervision of the occupation authorities due to the family's pro-Ukrainian stance. After the father's detention, the mother understood that any delay could become dangerous."
Details: Zarivna noted that the children were brought back within the framework of the Ukrainian president's initiative Bring Kids Back UA.
She thanked the Office of the Ombudsman of Ukraine and the State of Qatar for their assistance in organising the rescue missions and helping to bring Ukrainian children back.
Background: On 11 February, four children aged 10 to 17 were rescued from occupied Kherson Oblast and brought back to Ukrainian-controlled territory. Some of them had been threatened by the Russians with forcible removal from their families.
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