How the India-Pakistan Crisis Could Spiral

Yahoo

04-05-2025

Paramilitary soldiers stand guard near Pahalgam in Anantnag, Indian-administered Kashmir after over 20 people, mainly tourists, were killed in a militant attack on Apr. 22, 2025 Credit - Waseem Andrabi—India and Pakistan are in their worst crisis in years after last week's deadly attack in the disputed Kashmir region. The heightened tensions are unlikely to lead to war, but the world should be worried about the serious escalation risks posed by two nuclear-armed foes.
On Apr. 22, militants attacked tourists picnicking in a picturesque meadow near the town of Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir. Some 26 people—25 Indians and one Nepali—were gunned down. New Delhi blamed Pakistan for sponsoring the massacre. Islamabad has denied any involvement. The Resistance Front, an outfit that New Delhi views as a proxy of Pakistani jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, initially claimed responsibility on Telegram, before retracting the claim.
Both India and Pakistan are on edge over the flare up in the Muslim-majority region, which is controlled in part by India and Pakistan, but both claim it in its entirety.
On Sunday, the Indian Express quoted an anonymous 'top source' in the Indian government who warned 'there will be military retaliation.' On Wednesday, Pakistan's information minister wrote on X in a rare late-night post that his government had 'credible intelligence' that India would take military action within 24 to 36 hours.
That deadline passed without incident. Senior Indian and Pakistani military officials have also reportedly communicated via hotline, suggesting that channels of communication are open. Meanwhile, key global capitals, including Washington and Beijing, have called for de-escalation. It's a posture that puts India, which wants a free hand to respond to the attack as it wishes, on the back foot.
Yet it would be a mistake to conclude the worst is over. The Pahalgam attack was exceptionally brutal, with many people shot in the head, execution-style. Civilians (much less tourists) are rarely targeted in Kashmir, and the Hindu victims were reportedly singled out for their religion. The tragedy has struck a nerve across India, from the general public to military officers and government officials.
For these reasons, Indian military action remains a strong possibility. India's Hindu nationalist government could suffer major political damage if it sits on its hands, especially after having repeatedly telegraphed its determination to strike back.
If India does pull the trigger, a Pakistani response is all but assured. Pakistanis are furious for being blamed for something horrific they believe their country had nothing to do with. (Pakistan has historically backed extremist actors in Kashmir, but New Delhi hasn't provided evidence of Pakistani complicity in the recent attack). The country would view any Indian strike as an unwarranted provocation. Also, Pakistan's civilian and military leadership is unpopular at home; an attack would give Islamabad an additional incentive to strike back, and rally citizens around the flag.
And diplomatic space between the two countries is shrinking. India and Pakistan have suspended two key bilateral agreements: the Indus Waters Treaty, a transboundary water accord; and the Simla Agreement, which calls for the peaceful resolution of disputes.
Fortunately, nuclear weapons still remain a deterrent. India and Pakistan fought all their hot wars before they became formal nuclear powers in 1998. But they've been perfectly comfortable using increasing levels of limited force against each other in recent years. In 2016, Indian commandos crossed into Pakistan-administered Kashmir to conduct 'surgical strikes' on militant targets. In 2019, after an attack in Indian-administered Kashmir claimed by the Pakistani jihadist group Jaish-e-Mohammed killed 40 Indian security forces, India carried out air strikes in Pakistani territory—a first since 1971. Pakistan scrambled fighter jets, and the two air forces engaged in a dogfight before the crisis ended.
Faced with these realities, New Delhi may choose to scale up covert activities—like targeted assassinations of militants in Pakistan—that enable it to achieve tactical objectives with plausible deniability. India may also take the stronger step of striking militant groups in Pakistan to satisfy the public's demand for action.
New Delhi certainly has no intention of sparking a hot war. But any missteps or miscalculations by either side could mean that all bets are off.
Write to Michael Kugelman at [e-mail].