
Removing Ombudsman's archive discredits gov't watchdog, deals blow to Hong Kong public accountability
On May 16, Ming Pao newspaper reported that the Ombudsman, the Hong Kong government watchdog, had removed years of investigation reports, annual reports, mediation examples, and press releases from its website.
In total, officials took down at least 230 investigation reports going back to 2013, which were still available as of mid-April, according to Ming Pao.
Currently, only investigation reports from 2023-24 onwards remain accessible online.
The cutoff date is arbitrary and unjustified. Removing the archive is a major blow to Hong Kong's system of public accountability and discredits the office of the Ombudsman.
Officials established the Ombudsman in 1989, then called the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints, mostly to examine public complaints of maladministration against public organisations, including government departments. In 2001, authorities made the Ombudsman relatively independent of government.
Removing the archive of Ombudsman reports impacts many stakeholders. First, the reports serve the government in its quest for efficient and effective policy delivery. For example, officials selected into new positions (e.g., administrative and executive officers) can quickly identify from the archive those long-standing issues of public concern and how officials have tried to manage them previously.
Second, the archive serves the Legislative Council (LegCo) in its quest to hold the government to account. Third, journalists use Ombudsman-generated data to investigate issues that matter to the public.
Fourth, academics use the archive to understand the behaviour of public officials and politicians: how they set agendas, address public problems, avoid blame, and so forth. Academics also use the archive to produce realistic teaching cases because the reports are thorough, reliable, relevant, and contain practical recommendations for improvement.
Finally, the public, which expects transparent and accountable government, relies on the reports to understand the extent to which and how authorities handle their complaints.
The reports affect the government's reputation. On the one hand, we see cases of shirking, exploiting loopholes, mismanaging unanticipated consequences, and the persistence of wicked problems.
On the other hand, as the government accepts the recommendations, we see officials' efforts to improve public services and the authorities living up to their commitment to be open and transparent.
Given so many stakeholders, we need easy and direct access to the complete corpus of Ombudsman reports, which should be accessible and provided on the Ombudsman's website. On this site, the reports have been easily searchable, which serves the public interest.
I have used the archive to draft public administration teaching cases. The cases mainly focus on problems of cross-departmental policy coordination, lack of enforcement, and legislative loopholes.
The issues involved may seem trivial: drying laundry in public places, obstructing roadside waste skips, haphazardly dumping construction, mismanaging market stalls, and ignoring illegal, potentially dangerous structures on village houses.
However, the reports point out how departments have passed the buck, not taken responsibility, and how officials and citizens both exploit legislative loopholes. The issues not only annoy residents but also cause frustration, dissatisfaction, and disputes both among citizens and between citizens and government departments.
From these reports, we can judge the extent to which government departments learn, improve, and become sensitive to problems previously ignored. Insofar as they do, these are good stories for Hong Kong.
With only reports from 2023-24 onwards available, neither the public nor LegCo may be aware that some recent problems have long histories.
Take tree management in Hong Kong. In a still available report, the Ombudsman reported that from 2018 to 2022, the government received 24,000 complaints about trees.
This is an astonishing number. Of these complaints, 3 to 5 per cent involved disputes among government departments over which agency was responsible.
No longer available are two reports completed in 2016 and another in 2019 on the same issue. These reports indicate that mismanaging trees has been a continuing public irritation.
Remember, falling trees have killed pedestrians in Hong Kong. Yet to understand what is going on now, this background is essential. Surely LegCo members, journalists, and the public need easy and direct access to the older reports.
As is now well known, officials in Hong Kong do not bind themselves by law to establishing and maintaining archives. Thus, whether to maintain archives at all is entirely discretionary. No other place in the world operates this way.
Public accountability and efficient, effective administration require the clarity, certainty, continuity, and stability of archives managed by law.
As late as 2018, the government declared that 'as far as possible' it sought to be publicly accountable, open and transparent.
So, here is an easy win for the authorities. Restore easy access to the archive of Ombudsman's reports and eliminate yet another source of dissatisfaction. And then, draft and implement an archives law to bring this part of public governance in Hong Kong into the 21st century.
HKFP is an impartial platform & does not necessarily share the views of opinion writers or advertisers. HKFP presents a diversity of views & regularly invites figures across the political spectrum to write for us. Press freedom is guaranteed under the Basic Law, security law, Bill of Rights and Chinese constitution. Opinion pieces aim to point out errors or defects in the government, law or policies, or aim to suggest ideas or alterations via legal means without an intention of hatred, discontent or hostility against the authorities or other communities.

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HKFP
5 days ago
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In deleted Ombudsman reports saga, silencing legislators hinders their ability to hold authorities to account
The saga of the deleted reports on the Ombudsman's website continues. So far, he has apparently refused to restore digital copies of pre-2023 investigation reports, annual reports, and other data for easy public access. The reasons provided for removing them (data overload, they're dated, government departments have accepted their recommendations, etc.) are generally unconvincing. In many cases, the problems that necessitated the investigations continue. Chief Executive John Lee pointed out that the Ombudsman is independent of the government. He 'expressed confidence that the Office of the Ombudsman will do its work effectively and address public concerns,' RTHK reported. The deleted reports saga raises significant issues about Hong Kong's constitutional system of dual accountability. According to Basic Law Article 43, the chief executive, who is the head of the government, is accountable both to the central government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). 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One report identified six LegCo members who spoke out or raised questions: Michael Tien, Doreen Kong, Tik Chi-yuen, Tang Ka-piu, Eunice Yung, and Tommy Cheung. These are mainly pro-establishment patriots. Subsequently, the local media reported that authorities silenced LegCo on this issue. Authorities sent out 'warm reminders' that LegCo members should not 'follow up' or 'comment' on the Ombudsman saga. This gives the impression that LegCo is simply an extension of the government, speaking for the government only. What of its checking role? If, as Chen and Yap write, accountability to the HKSAR means accountability to the interests of Hong Kong as perceived by a majority of Hong Kong's population, why did the authorities silence LegCo? Perhaps they believe that silencing criticism is in the interests of the Hong Kong people, or authorities perceive that LegCo is insufficiently representative of the Hong Kong people and therefore should have no right to speak. This seems unlikely given the efforts the government made during the 2021 legislative elections to convince us that LegCo was representative. When authorities silence LegCo, who speaks for the interests of Hong Kong as perceived by a majority of the people? In the past, Hong Kongers have valued accountability, openness and transparency. Indeed, that is one reason why 55 to 60 per cent of voters consistently supported pan-democrats in elections when they had the opportunity. As late as 2018, the HKSAR government also declared that it supported these values. The Ombudsman's action seems to undermine them, arguably not in the interests of Hong Kong. An unanticipated consequence of the saga may be to boost the role and credibility of civil society in Hong Kong. The deleted reports are of considerable value to all those interested in public policy. Digital copies of all the Ombudsman's pre-2022 reports are available on the Wayback Machine. Non-government organisations may download them, provide searchable catalogues and make them publicly available. Would an alternative Ombudsman's website be in the interests of Hong Kong? Is this really what the authorities want? The Ombudsman's deleted reports saga tells us that Legco has lost some capacity to hold authorities to account. It tells us that officials expect Legco to speak for the government and not for the people of Hong Kong. Yet, LegCo members should be able to speak out on issues such as this. Authorities should understand that speaking out is not 'attacking' the government but trying to improve local governance. LegCo members' constitutional role includes checking the government. Authorities should relax the gag order on LegCo members so that they can better serve the people. This will build trust in our institutions, which is in everyone's interest. HKFP is an impartial platform & does not necessarily share the views of opinion writers or advertisers. HKFP presents a diversity of views & regularly invites figures across the political spectrum to write for us. Press freedom is guaranteed under the Basic Law, security law, Bill of Rights and Chinese constitution. Opinion pieces aim to point out errors or defects in the government, law or policies, or aim to suggest ideas or alterations via legal means without an intention of hatred, discontent or hostility against the authorities or other communities.


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