War in Middle East: what next

Indian Express

9 hours ago

As of June 15, Israel and Iran have exchanged four waves of strikes. Among a number of targets hit by either side, Israel's assassination of key Iranian generals on June 13 remains the most prominent outcome thus far.
Also, Israel targeted the Iranian Supreme Leader's office by assassinating Ali Shamkhani, political adviser to Ali Khamenei and key overseer of the US-Iran nuclear talks. Israel is expected to continue its escalation, as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on Sunday afternoon issued warnings in Persian to Iranian civilians to leave military weapons production facilities.
What does Israel look to achieve?
Israel's June 13 attack on Iran was unprecedented in scale and scope relative to any attack on Iran since the Iran-Iraq war. However, as far as Israel's long-term objective of dismantling Iran's nuclear programme is concerned, its attacks have been limited.
In a silo, Israel's actions technically reinforce US President Donald Trump's immediate bargaining position vis-à-vis Iran in the nuclear deal negotiations, by hindering short-term progress on Iran's nuclear programme. Consequently, the US President has demanded that Iran resume talks to prevent further conflict, especially since Iranian 'hardliners' relevant to the nuclear negotiations are now dead.
Trump continues to maintain that Israel's actions were unilateral, despite admittedly knowing Israel's war plans.
But Israel is yet to effectively hit Iran's Fordow and Khondab nuclear sites; Fordow is fully underground and central to Iran's nuclear programme. While Israel's strike on the Natanz enrichment facility was its first overt action at this scale, the plant has long been subject to Israeli sabotage operations. Israeli experts, such as former Israeli PM Ehud Barak, continually assert that neither Israeli nor American military action can eliminate Iran's nuclear programme.
Israel's claims of Iran's closeness to a nuclear weapon have been repeated across the decades and contradict both American and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assessments. Hence, Israel's two other objectives — as an assessment by British think tank Chatham House also shows — are to degrade Iranian defences and take out its operational leadership. While Israel will arguably need greater US involvement to effectively hit sites such as Fordow, its focus on Iranian personnel and conventional assets reveal that it is prepared for a slow-burn war with Iran.
Israel's actions seem to be based on two assumptions — that all Iranian retaliation can be successfully absorbed, and that with each hit, Iran becomes weaker.
What does this mean for Iran?
Tactically and objectively, Israel's assessment of Iran's weaknesses has been vindicated insofar as the security of key Iranian personnel is concerned. However, notwithstanding Iran's broader conventional inferiority to Israel, Tehran has shown an ability to reciprocate Israeli attacks at a smaller scale. For instance, after Israel's attack on Iran's Asaluyeh refinery and South Pars gas fields, Iran successfully targeted the Bazan oil refinery (Israel's largest) in Haifa — crucial to the IDF's fuel needs.
Iran moved to the negotiating table with the US under moderate President Masoud Pezeshkian to give its economy relief from crippling sanctions, something that hardline leaders only acquiesced to. Now, the nature and scale of the Israeli attack would allow the conservative leaders, who dominate the Iranian Parliament, to create fresh pressures on any reformist action. Also, the attack coming in the midst of US-Iran negotiations will reinforce a core constituency that views the US as a duplicitous negotiator.
Calls for regime change in Iran by Israeli and American leaders deepens the mistrust that has grown since the CIA's removal of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953. It will also be a mistake to assume that Iranian hardliners have lost influence over the nuclear deal. Key hardline leaders like Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (Speaker of the Iranian Parliament) remain influential in matters of national security.
Washington's openness to continuing negotiations is immaterial to Iran, which also remains in favour of resuming talks, but only after Israel halts its attacks. For Iran, Israel's assassination of a senior leader involved with the negotiations — Ali Shamkhani — further betrays Israel's intentions to sabotage the talks, and not merely act as Washington's force multiplier.
What are Iran's choices?
International reactions to Israel's aggression have varied. European and American reactions have focused on the dangers of Iran's nuclear programme, while not acknowledging Israel's provocations.
On the other hand, regional reactions from the Gulf have shown an evolution. Iran's Gulf Arab neighbours have shifted from forming an integral part of Israel's air defence net against Iranian missiles to condemning Israeli aggression and demanding respect for Iranian sovereignty. In fact, arch regional rival Riyadh has expressed 'strong condemnation' of Israeli action, which it views as an aggression against a 'brotherly Islamic Republic'.
However, Israel's attack has pushed Iran towards an impasse. On one hand, it increases Iran's need to resuscitate its pursuit of a nuclear weapon — renewed learning from contemporary conflicts is that the absence of a nuclear deterrent invites military adventurism from adversaries.
On the other hand, Iran's lack of sufficient modern arms, Israel's degradation of its existing capabilities, its increasing leadership losses (both at home and in the Axis of Resistance), and the worsening of its economic health force a pragmatic approach.
Even if Iran is capable of nuclear break-out, it would be difficult to achieve amid the evidently high level of intelligence penetration in the country.
Significantly, Iran has still not targeted US diplomatic and military infrastructure, directly or through its proxies. The most prominent among these continue their pre-June modus vivendi — the Houthis maintain their ceasefire with the United States (while continuing attacks on Israel), Hezbollah adheres to its ceasefire, and the Hashd in Iraq refrains from substantially attacking the Green Zone in Baghdad, where US diplomats and officials are concentrated. While this could change in the future, Iran has also likely engaged regional interlocutors to press for an end to the war.
Israel has the capacity to continue strikes on Iran for as long as it deems necessary. However, its maximal objectives cannot be met without a full-scale war involving the United States, which would be in stark contrast to Trump's stated objectives and reinforce his failure to strike a peace deal both in Europe and the Middle East.
For Iran, absorbing a few large holes in the dam is better than a complete breach. Tehran can also look to counter Israel's objectives by continuing its engagement with the US for a nuclear deal and making voluntary concessions, instead of those forced on it militarily.
Given that Israel's casus belli is unclear and that its objectives remain maximal, it is difficult to ascertain Tel Aviv's future course of action, making Iran's consequent choices similarly unpredictable.
However, amidst these choices, what is highly unlikely is Iran's forced closure of the Strait of Hormuz (33 km wide at its narrowest point). While Iran has the capacity to enforce a very limited blockade (as it has threatened in 2011, 2012, and 2018), disrupting the 20 million barrels-per-day flow through the Strait will rupture Tehran's partnerships, end its rapprochement with Arab states, and draw in the US military. The US is likeliest to act militarily when protecting shipping and oil supply, as it did during the Iran-Iraq War historically, and in the Red Sea more recently, after the Houthi-led disruption of shipping in the region.
Bashir Ali Abbas is a Senior Research Associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi