A rejuvenated Pakistan likely to collude with China, plan a conflict with India in 5-10 years

The Print

a day ago

It is empirical wisdom that since World War 2, wars of annihilation and decisive victories are passé, least of all between states armed with nuclear weapons. Hence, it is prudent to measure the outcome of wars and conflicts in psychological terms. No matter the overt rhetoric in the countries involved, their political and military leadership takes note of the outcome, which shapes their future national security strategy.
As the dust settles on Operation Sindoor—a high–technology conflict between two nuclear powers with near-conventional parity—there is an intense debate on 'who won?' Both India and Pakistan have declared victory. Fired by nationalistic fervour, the public and media in both countries are in a frenzy to prove their victory in terms of the material and human cost inflicted on the other.
Who won the conflict?
India's political aim was to reimpose its deterrent. In other words, it sought to force compellence on Pakistan and prevent it from waging a terrorism–driven proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir or anywhere else in India. The aim was to be achieved through calibrated military operations short of a limited war and, more importantly, without violating Pakistan's nuclear thresholds, which have been formally declared.
India's military aim was to conduct controlled escalatory (action-response-action) kinetic military operations—without physically violating Pakistan's ground and air space—to impose a psychological defeat by creating conditions that made the enemy's response cost-prohibitive. This strategy was to be primarily executed by the IAF to selectively destroy terrorist and military targets in Pakistan from within Indian territory. The army's air defence and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) would supplement the IAF's resources.
Pakistan's political aim was to prevent India's imposition of compellence and retain its strategic autonomy. In doing so, it hoped to re-hyphenate itself with India and also bring the Kashmir 'dispute' back into international focus. Its military aim was to stalemate India by using its limited high-end military technology to defeat India's escalatory offensive operations by launching ripostes of higher intensity to make further operations cost-prohibitive.
Both countries were aware of the escalatory matrix and international aversion to a conflict between nuclear powers. India's intent was to delay international intervention, and Pakistan's intent was to invite it at the earliest to stalemate India.
It is clear that both sides were trying to create a situation in which the other could not respond without prohibitive losses. Both were keen to do faster cycles of 'quid pro quo plus' to achieve their political and military aims. At the same time, both sides wanted to avoid inflicting large–scale material cost and steer clear of a steep escalation.
In such an environment, the side that can repeatedly and speedily complete the OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) Cycle can bring about strategic psychological paralysis—a situation in which the adversary, despite the availability of resources, cannot or fails to respond.
In my previous article, I have covered the sequence and conduct of operations in detail. In a nutshell, the IAF, supplemented by the army's air defence and UAS, was able to carry out faster OODA cycles, and was successful in bringing about strategic psychological paralysis. This included precision but symbolic air/drone strikes on nine terror camps on the night of 6/7 May; absorbing Pakistan's counter air action and diagnosing the causes of the unspecified aircraft losses suffered in the air battle; successfully suppressing enemy air defence on 8/9 May; and neutralising the Pakistani UAS and missile strikes with the Integrated Air Defence Command and Control System on the three nights from 7 to 9 May.
With enemy air defence suppressed, the PAF was blinded and forced to keep out of the range of S–400 and air–to–air missiles. With repeated and faster OODA Cycles, the stage had been set for the coup de grace. In the early hours of 10 May, the IAF targeted 11 airbases/radars/command and control centres across the length and breadth of Pakistan with impunity. Pakistan has now revealed that seven more targets were hit during the operation.
In tune with India's political and military aims, the strikes were more about demonstrating capability than about causing material destruction or inflicting casualties. The strategic psychological paralysis was so profound that the PAF and its air defence systems failed to interfere with the operation in any manner and Pakistan's military and economic infrastructure was at the mercy of the IAF. This was the reason that Islamabad sought a cessation of hostilities.
In view of the above, the damage to personnel and material was inconsequential. A crushing strategic psychological defeat had been inflicted on Pakistan. It is important to recall that in 1971, its army in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was virtually intact when it surrendered in Dhaka on 16 December. The victory was achieved by bringing about a strategic psychological collapse.
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Has compellence been imposed?
It is clear to Pakistan's military leadership that there is space below its nuclear threshold for a technology–driven conflict. You cannot have missiles pockmarking the area around your capital city and strategic assets, and on military targets all across the hinterland, and yet believe that you have not been compelled to fall in line. Yes, compellence has been imposed on Pakistan through a strategic psychological defeat. But its longevity is contingent on India maintaining an overwhelming technological military edge, which is out of reach for Pakistan.
Since the strategic psychological defeat has left its defence potential intact due to nuclear thresholds, Pakistan will always be tempted to technologically upgrade and create the capability to challenge India again. What stands in the way is its niggardly economy. With a GDP of $373 billion, this ambition will remain a pipe dream. China is unlikely to give Pakistan anything for free. It does not do so even in the case of North Korea. However, given the primordial nature of the conflict, the probability of Pakistan defying the odds remains high.
There would be a serious review by Pakistan of its strategy of using terrorism as an instrument of policy. However, it is pertinent to mention that terrorism as a concept has never been deterred. Pakistan is a master of running with hares and hunting with hounds, as it did with the US from 2001 to 2021. There is also the possibility of terrorists turning rogue and operating independently. Henceforth, Pakistan is likely to carefully calibrate its proxy war to only keep the pot simmering. It may also revert to placing greater reliance on local terrorists.
It is pertinent to mention that I have assessed the political and military aims discussed above based on military theory. The declared political and military aims have focused on punishing the terrorists and their backers (implying Pakistan's military). And if these were indeed the aims, then it is a cause of serious concern as, by implication, it means that the strategic outcome was by default and not by design.
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What India must do
China is India's principal adversary in the long term, and Pakistan, a mere irritant. With China only providing indirect support and selling weaponry, India barely managed to inflict a strategic psychological defeat on Pakistan. 'By the skin of its teeth,' as I said. Imagine a situation when the collusion is more direct.
India needs to formalise its National Security Strategy and the contingent National Defence Policy to rapidly transform its armed forces. This will pave the way for a military strategy that caters to threats across the spectrum of conflict. Political security doctrine, spelled out in public speeches of the leadership, has to be translated into a rational security strategy. No nation can afford to be involved in 'forever conflicts' based on the actions of a handful of terrorists.
The transformation of the armed forces is an inescapable necessity to establish an overwhelming technological military edge over Pakistan and to stalemate China, that too for a conflict when both adversaries are in collusion. And for this transformation to happen, we need to first double our defence budget to 4 per cent of the GDP. The USSR beggared itself in trying to militarily compete with the US and its allies, and so will Pakistan.
In Jammu and Kashmir, India must refine its 'deterrence by denial' strategy against terrorism. Both the counter–infiltration and the counter–terrorism grids in the hinterland require refinement. A limited number of terrorists are dominating the forests and the upper mountainous regions. There is no option but to extend the counter–terrorism grid to these areas. Even a cursory look at statistics tells us that India is winning in Jammu and Kashmir. The degree of violence is at its lowest. The terrorists have the initiative and can always trigger a major black swan incident. However, it must not lead to high–handedness, which would re-alienate the population. Political reconciliation must not be allowed to be held to ransom by odd terrorist incidents. Restoring statehood will go a long way in winning the hearts and minds of the locals.
The probability of another conflict with a rejuvenated Pakistan with coercive collusion of China remains high. I assess that the minimum time this could take is 5 years, and the maximum, 10 years. However, if India creates the military capacity and the capability to more emphatically defeat Pakistan and simultaneously stalemate China, the conflict will be deterred.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)