On the UN Peace Conference in New York

Asharq Al-Awsat

6 hours ago

In the lead-up to the UN conference on a two-state solution — scheduled for June 17–20 and co-chaired by Saudi Arabia and France — efforts to ensure its success have been intensifying. Ministerial meetings took place in Paris and Brussels late last month, alongside intensified efforts at the UN, with working groups set up and tasked with developing ideas and proposals that address all aspects of the conflict. These efforts have been met, however, with positions that hinder the conference, which is meant to 'lay the course for real change,' not merely adopt positions whose impact never extends beyond the conference.
One such obstructive position is the United States' decision to use its veto power against a resolution that had been supported by the rest of the Security Council and called for an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the unrestricted delivery of humanitarian aid. Vetoing the resolution effectively encourages Israel to maintain its position on the current negotiations, which remain open-ended and obstructed by Israel's terms. These negotiations aim to achieve what Israel has failed to achieve militarily on the ground: displacement of Gaza's population and Israel's reassertion of control over the Strip.
This goal has been repeatedly stressed by Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, who has called for using extreme violence to take control of the Strip. In the same vein, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz commented on the upcoming New York conference saying: 'They will recognize a Palestinian state on paper, and we will establish the Jewish Israeli state in the West Bank.' Several Israel watchers have said that a ceasefire would mean the 'collapse of the government.' The biggest loser would be Benjamin Netanyahu. Not only would he lose out politically, but he would also face legal prosecution regarding an array of domestic cases raised against him.
All of these factors pose major challenges to launching the peaceful settlement process that the New York conference seeks to achieve. Yet these challenges are neither new nor unexpected for the architects, sponsors, and supporters of the conference. The history of 'conflict diplomacy' is rich with examples, lessons, and insights, even as circumstances evolve. What is primarily expected of the conference is to expand recognition of the State of Palestine, which already enjoys broad international recognition, particularly among European countries that still hesitate on the matter. Such recognition would lend greater credibility to the process that the conference aims to initiate and accompany.
Moreover, contrary to the claims of those who oppose it or call for its postponement, this conference also reinforces the credibility of a comprehensive negotiation framework through an 'integrated solution package' that ties all elements together, even if the conflicting parties have divergent priorities. Legally and practically, this package amounts to the ultimate goal of the negotiation process, regardless of the difficulties, which the conference is at least seeking to address by launching the negotiation process.
A holistic rather than discretionary approach must be a pillar of the 'roadmap' of the negotiations once they begin. It should be recalled, that there are many roadblocks along this path, particularly from the Israeli side. The conference must lay a 'triangular foundation' for the process: a binding negotiation reference framework, a roadmap (despite the many challenges it faces), and a timeline that strengthens the credibility of the negotiation process.
Many observers believe that despite the American veto mentioned earlier, this 'dynamic diplomacy' that approaches issues case-by-case rather than sticking to rigid alliances, which we have seen under the Trump administration, leaves a possibility for shifts in US positions. Even if its movement is limited, there is a possibility that Washington could become convinced such shifts truly serve its interests.
The New York conference is also expected to establish an open committee composed of active, influential, and committed parties working on achieving the conference's goals. This committee would supervise, facilitate, and support this effort during the preparatory phase, which is expected to begin the morning after the conference concludes, and eventually during the negotiation phase when the time comes, which is not likely anytime soon.
One of the conference's primary responsibilities is to ensure that decisions are not merely statements. It must ensure that they are translated into effective diplomatic action despite the many barriers. That should begin with reinvigorated efforts in the Security Council to secure an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and to prevent Israel's annexation and Judaization efforts, which constitute blatant violations of Security Council Resolutions.
Of course, these goals will not be easy to attain, as many episodes from our recent and distant history show. Nonetheless, they are more than necessary for the credibility, and thus the success, of the conference. Despite the many challenges ahead, this track remains the only path that can lead to meaningful security and stability in the region.