Cosatu: assessing the SANDF's capacity to fulfil its constitutional mandate
In a few weeks, Cosatu along with many other South Africans celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Freedom Charter drafted at the historic Congress of the People in Kliptown by the African National Congress led Alliance.
This visionary document, that declared boldly, that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, provided the foundation for our internationally respected Constitution and much of what government seeks to achieve.
A discussion needs to be held on whether the South African National Defence Force is able to fulfill its constitutionally mandated role today of defending the Constitution?
The worrying answer that has been appearing over many years is that it may struggle.
All nations require the capacity to defend themselves not only from other nations' governments' adventurism but increasingly from non-state threats.
These may come in the form of foreign terrorists using South Africa as a training base as was seen with some Libyans in Mpumalanga or Isis or Al-Shabab elements utilising South Africa for money laundering, to foreign vessels looting fishing stock from South African waters.
It takes years to build a coherent defence capacity. Having an internationally respected defence capability is equally key to deterring such threats to our sovereignty.
South Africa has a long history of being one of the most formidable military powers in the continent, including playing its role in defeating Nazi Germany in North Africa and Italy in World War Two to since the democratic breakthrough playing a leading role in peace keeping missions in Africa.
It was natural for government since 1994 to drastically reduce funding spent on defence. Military conscription ended for white men and there was a new democratic state committed to peace with the region and the brutal apartheid regime was over.
Equally there were pressing socioeconomic challenges inherited from three and a half centuries of systemic neglect of 90% of the population that needed to be prioritised.
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Mistakes were made when the arms deal package were the focus was on arming the SANDF for conventional war and less for peacekeeping missions. As is well ventilated, corruption seeped in.
Today the price of those mistakes has become painfully clear, and they pose a real threat to workers, not only those employed in the SANDF but across the economy.
The conditions of the SANDF's bases, both at home and abroad, leave much to be desired with buildings falling apart, soldiers living in over cramped and unhygienic conditions, security lax at best and enabling criminals to enter secure premises.
Training is often inadequate and more critically, too little is provided. Machinery and vehicles are deteriorating with no funds to maintain or repair them.
Air Force pilots are not being provided with the number of flying hours required to remain top of their game, and even placing their flying certification at risk.
The air fleet, in particular the Gripens, suited for conventional warfare is barely functioning.
the SANDF lacks the airlift capacity to deploy and collect peacekeeping forces in remote locations. Army personnel in these remote areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique and elsewhere are unprotected with little if any, helicopter assault or deployment capacity.
A similar depressing picture exists with the SA Navy where mistakes were made to purchase a fleet better suited for conventional warfare but with little capacity to protect our waters from the mass pilfering of fishing stock by foreign trawlers, and also by local criminal syndicates for endangered species.
The spread of Somali pirates to the Mozambique Channel in the past decade, highlighted the need for a navy with rapid deployment capacity.
The tragic loss of three sailors in a training exercise off Simonstown in 2024, was a painful reminder of the real cost in life to SANDF personnel and their families for the neglect of the SANDF.
A discussion needs to be held about the age profile of the SANDF. SANDF personnel need to be young and fit to state the obvious.
It is not an institution where one goes to retire.
Yet over the years, its age profile has risen well past 35 years and has become increasingly top heavy.
During the Mandela Administration dedicated programmes were put in place to equip SANDF personnel with the training and skills they would need to find decent jobs in the economy upon exiting, e.g. as mechanics, finance managers, law enforcement etc.
The SANDF has begun to revive this programme and also announced its intention to help train unemployed youth as part of its contribution to the economy.
The situation is salvageable.
The members of the SANDF are patriots and committed to serving the nation. But we need to give them the tools needed to fulfill their mandate.
Equally we need to agree on what is that mandate.
The SANDF has several fundamental tasks.
The first is ensure the security of the state against foreign and domestic enemies. Then we need to give it the funds necessary to train our pilots, to have working planes, radars etc.
Second is to support the police as needed.
This requires fit and well trained army personnel with working and secure transport.
They need to be trained specifically in law enforcement as maintaining peace during riots at home is different from dealing with enemy combatants overseas.
This support includes its role in assisting in domestic disaster management, e.g. floods, fires.
Third is to secure our borders in collaboration with the Border Management Authority and the SAPS.
We have over 4400 kilometres of land borders and even larger territorial waters.
They need working vehicles, drones and field bases as well as a coast guard fleet and radar capacity.
Fourth is to support peacekeeping across the continent.
This requires extensive training, fit personnel, airlift and defence capabilities, armoured and mobile land transport amongst others.
The SANDF has a critical role to play. Its personnel represent the best of us. It is time that we give them our support and the resources they need to fulfill their constitutional mandates.
Solly Phetoe is the general secretary of Cosatu.
Solly Phetoe is the general secretary of Cosatu.
Image: File
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