Foreigners flock to China's Shenzhen as visa-free entries surge 160%
Shenzhen, China's southern tech hub, has reported a swell of overseas visitors this year, an influx attributed to the country's expansion of visa-free entry and its integration of the Greater Bay Area, a region that incorporates Guangdong province, Hong Kong and Macau.
In addition to visitors from China's two special administrative regions, many travellers to Shenzhen have come from farther afield, with Malaysia, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam and Singapore ranking among the top sources of
overseas tourists , state broadcaster CCTV reported on Wednesday.
The city's international airport has recorded over 152,000 visa-free entries by foreign nationals in 2025, a year-on-year surge of 160.3 per cent. Total foreign passenger entries rose by 54.6 per cent year-on-year to reach 531,000.
To keep pace with demand, a direct flight to Dubai from the city is scheduled to start in July, and multiple international routes were added this year to urban centres like Vientiane, Osaka, Singapore, Tokyo, Bangkok and Hanoi.
Shenzhen, home to tech giants Tencent and Huawei, is attractive to travellers because of its status as a
trade and manufacturing nerve centre, its proximity to Hong Kong and relatively low cost of living.
'Shenzhen is very fun, more modern, less expensive, so I love going there on weekends, both for leisure and business,' said Marc Guyon, founder of Hong Kong-based Club France International.
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