Delays in Trident renewal put our deterrent in peril

Telegraph

05-03-2025

In 2016 the House of Commons voted overwhelmingly in favour of renewing the UK's nuclear deterrent. Then hardly a second thought was given to undertaking the upgrade programme without the full involvement of the US military.
Ever since the British government first opted to introduce the Continuous at Sea Deterrent (CASD) model to deliver our nuclear weapons capability – replacing the Royal Air Force's airborne Vulcan system – it has been an article of faith that the project should be a joint US-UK undertaking.
From the initial Polaris programme, through to the current Trident system, the deterrent is regarded as a key pillar of the transatlantic partnership. It is on a par with the importance of the joint intelligence-sharing set-up between Washington and London involving key institutions such as Cheltenham's GCHQ listening post.
Given the size and scale of the US military, it is perhaps unsurprising that a great deal of the technology and hardware involved in the British deterrent is American, including the Trident II D5 missile systems that carry up to eight warheads each.
While some of our Trident missiles are stored at Royal Naval Armaments Depot Coulport, they are maintained at the US Strategic Weapons Facility at Kings Bay, Georgia. The Ministry of Defence leases them from the US.
More recently there have been discussions about forging closer US-UK cooperation on developing the next generation of nuclear warheads.
The need for closer collaboration on building new warheads has been prompted by US plans to upgrade the missile systems, raising concerns that they could no longer be compatible with the UK-made warheads.
Despite the long-standing cooperation between Washington and London on developing the UK's nuclear deterrent, Whitehall insists that the British government retains full control over their use.
As Armed Forces Minister Luke Pollard told the Commons in November: 'The United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent is completely operationally independent. Only the Prime Minister can authorise the use of our nuclear weapons, even if they are to be employed as part of a Nato response.'
Nevertheless, the tumult caused by US President Donald Trump's return to the White House has inevitably raised concerns both about the wisdom of relying so heavily on US support for our own nuclear deterrent, especially in the wake of Trump's less-than-friendly treatment of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky when he visited the White House last week.
If the leader of the free world can treat someone like Zelensky, who is supposed to be one of Washington's key allies, with such studied contempt, then why not other allies, such as the UK?
Zelensky's miserable visit to the Oval Office was quickly compounded by Trump's decision to suspend all US military support for Ukraine, a move that could ultimately have a disastrous impact on Ukraine's ability to continue its war against Russian aggression.
This has raised concerns that Trump, who has been a vocal critic of the failure of Nato's European members to pay their fair share towards the continent's defence, could make a similarly capricious move by terminating Washington's membership of the alliance. This would have implications for the future effectiveness of the UK's independent nuclear deterrent, especially if it disrupted the supply of Trident missiles to the nuclear submarine patrols.
It may well be that such concerns are far-fetched, especially as any attempt by Trump to disrupt such a vital pillar of the transatlantic alliance would constitute an egregious act of self-harm on the part of the US.
US-UK cooperation on key capabilities such as nuclear deterrence, together with other key areas of transatlantic cooperation, such as intelligence-sharing, is undertaken as much to protect American interests as those of Britain. Any attempt by the Trump administration to interfere with the operational integrity of the UK's nuclear deterrent could compromise Washington's ability to protect its own interests in northern Europe and beyond.
That said, the likelihood of Trump disrupting the UK's nuclear defence arrangements remains unlikely, especially as he is so keen to undertake his second state visit.
Of more concern should be the profound lack of urgency that appears to have settled over the Trident renewal programme which, despite being signed off 10 years ago, is being implemented at a snail's pace.
Despite the government committing an estimated £31 billion to replacing the Vanguard submarines with four new Dreadnought-class boats, as well as upgrading the warheads and delivery systems, progress has been painfully slow. The first Dreadnought is not due to enter service until the early 2030s at the earliest. Moreover, despite constant delays to the nuclear deterrent upgrade programme, Whitehall remains seemingly oblivious to the increased global threat environment created by rogue states like Russia.
At this rate, rather than worrying about Trump undermining the UK's nuclear deterrent, a more valid concern is that the Trump administration will conclude it is not worth bothering with British support to protect the transatlantic alliance, and decides to go its own way.