Why Europe is not taken seriously on the world stage

Arab News

06-03-2025

https://arab.news/jqt96
UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky each visited the White House for discussions with US President Donald Trump last week. European security and the war in Ukraine were at the top of the agenda. While Starmer and Macron's visits were marked with strained smiles, Zelensky's visit was heated. As a Middle Easterner, I cannot help but link them all together.
Whether the cards were badly played or not, the main outcome of these visits has been an increased conversation surrounding putting forward a French-UK nuclear umbrella to protect Europe and to replace the US. This is a European reaction to what they consider to be America's abandonment of the old continent. Trump has set out a clear path to US protection: it can no longer be granted, it will have to be deserved. In short, there will be no free ride. It is blunt and tough, but clear and fair.
It has been entertaining to see Europe's reaction to this new US rule, especially as it has been very similar to its reaction to the UK's Brexit. London and Paris bickered through that bad breakup but are now once again cozying up as if it never happened. And this probably should be the lesson to learn. The overreaction of Europe to Brexit should not be repeated in the situation between Europe and the US. To misquote a play, Europe should not once again act as a 'woman scorned.'
It is not a bad thing for Europe to seek to mutualize and strengthen its defense and security. Funnily enough, this is exactly what Trump has been requesting since his first presidency, especially when it comes to military budgets. Beyond the rhetoric, there is a core difference in what losing to Russia would mean for the US and Europe. Washington sees it the same way as its exit from Afghanistan or any other theater, while Europe sees it as the beginning of its invasion and war. Who is right? And can Europe be protected by the UK and France's nuclear umbrella instead of America's?
France's nuclear arsenal is estimated at about 290 warheads, with approximately 280 operational. Since the time of Charles de Gaulle, it has maintained a 'strict sufficiency' policy in terms of its sovereign deterrence. If we go into a little more detail, its capabilities are divided between four Triomphant-class submarines, each capable of carrying 16 ballistic missiles. At least one of these submarines is always on patrol to provide a continuous maritime deterrence. However, the bulk is the 40 nuclear-capable Rafale jets. France is actively modernizing its forces, upgrading submarines while researching a new air-launched missile.
The UK has an estimated 225 warheads, yet it relies solely on a sea-based nuclear deterrent. It has four Vanguard-class submarines that can each carry up to 12 nuclear warheads. Just like France, the UK consistently has at least one submarine at sea. It is also looking to transition to a new class of submarines in the 2030s.
The Lancaster House Treaties, signed in 2010, deepened the military collaboration between the UK and France. They established close defense and security cooperation between the two countries. Nuclear collaboration is a part of these treaties and includes cooperation on nuclear warhead testing and aircraft carriers.
This is undoubtedly the point from which any collaboration could be extended. And while European defense comes to mind, this framework allows Paris and London to maintain their national sovereignty and has not mutualized it.
The joint UK-France nuclear deterrence is modest but still credible, even when compared to Russia.
Khaled Abou Zahr
This joint nuclear deterrence is modest but still credible, even when compared to Russia, which has an arsenal of some 5,580 warheads. It is also close to China's stockpile of about 500, although Beijing's is growing. Even under the UK and France's umbrella, Europe has a much less clear-cut deterrent without the support of America's 5,044 warheads. Yet, with nuclear power, it is more about the will to act than the numbers that create the deterrence. So, when and how would this capability be used? How clear can they make it to any aggressor that any attack on European soil would lead to strong military action? And how credible would it be to the aggressor?
Any European enemy will look to play on its disunity. It will look to divide. Hence, it will convey messages that powerful countries will be spared from any attack. It will look to minimize the threat of its aggression. It will look to play one country off against the other.
Europe's first test will be to bypass bureaucracy. Indeed, integrating France's nuclear power into a broader European framework would require immense policy shifts and a new legal framework. Moreover, the UK's nuclear weapons are integrated within NATO. This all complicates any unilateral European initiative and is a true test of Europe's resolve. In short, if the will is there, there is a way.
And so, here lies the European dilemma. It has united against the US, or more precisely against Trump. In reality, if Europe believes, as all its leaders now state, that it needs to build up its own defense, then it should have done so before the war in Ukraine reached this stage. This is why Europe is not taken seriously. It is indeed acting like a woman scorned, but unfortunately its wrath is far from 'hell hath no fury.'