No Rational Aid Distribution System Should Work This Way

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The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation is presiding over an unmitigated disaster, and everything about the U.S.- and Israel-backed group's failure was entirely predictable. After lifting a blockade on relief supplies to the Gaza Strip, Israeli authorities tapped GHF, which is barely months old, as the principal aid-delivery system for starving Palestinian residents. Since its operations began last week, dozens of civilians have been killed by gunfire while seeking to access the food-distribution centers. At least twice this week, GHF suspended its relief efforts in an attempt to improve security.
Whatever you think of Israel's conduct during its war against Hamas in Gaza, you should understand that its delivery system for aid was doomed to fail. Israeli authorities and GHF had no realistic plan for what the logistics industry calls 'the last mile'—the process of getting goods from a distribution center to the customer, so to speak.
GHF was founded in February and is already on its second leader, a Trump-supporting evangelical Christian public-relations executive. Among the firms that Israel engaged to provide security for distribution sites in southern Gaza is Safe Reach Solutions, a firm led by a former CIA official and staffed by former U.S. military and security contractors that was formed only in January. GHF and SRS are both mysterious, controversial entities whose financial backing is unclear.
The organization has defended its work, claiming in a statement yesterday that 'almost 8.5 million meals have been delivered so far—without incident.' GHF also said it is still scaling up. 'Our top priority remains protecting the safety and dignity of those receiving aid,' the statement continued, 'especially as we continue to serve as the only reliable provider of humanitarian assistance to the people of Gaza.'
It's true that established aid agencies that have previously worked in Gaza's difficult conditions are not involved in the current effort. Israel cut ties with the UN Relief and Works Agency amid allegations that some of its staff had been involved with the October 7, 2023, terror attack by Hamas; the UN's World Food Program continues to work there but depleted all of its resources in late April. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has clashed with the International Committee of the Red Cross, which lost two of its personnel in an Israeli bombing in May. (The group's leader has called conditions in Gaza 'worse than hell.') World Central Kitchen, which lost seven people in an Israeli strike in Gaza in 2024, closed its soup kitchen in April because it could not deliver food there. With relief agencies either sidelined or unable to deliver resources because of Israel's blockade, Netanyahu then chose, with American backing, the new GHF. But its first leader resigned after a few weeks, citing a lack of 'humanitarian principles' in the Gaza relief effort.
[Julie Beck: It should not be controversial to plead for Gaza's children]
Perhaps to help solve logistical questions—and perhaps to add reputational gloss to its efforts—GHF hired the Boston Consulting Group. But after violence broke out, that company withdrew from the contract. Later that same day, GHF appointed its new executive chairman, Johnnie Moore, who insisted that his agency was 'demonstrating that it is possible to move vast quantities of food to people who need it most.'
In all cases, an organization delivering goods must optimize distribution routes that align with the community it's delivering to. Israel's lack of trust for experienced relief groups doesn't justify ignoring what those operations learned about moving supplies. Many distribution systems rely on what are known as micro-fulfillment centers—local warehouses, delivery hubs, temporary facilities—to provide goods closer to where the community is. This is why, a few years ago, the COVID-vaccine-distribution efforts that drew so heavily on local doctors and pharmacies were prioritized over larger-scale efforts.
Employing many small distribution sites promotes flexibility; the system can adapt to changes in demand. The GHF has provided only four distribution centers, presumably for security reasons, in all of Gaza, down from the 400 that the UN once managed; many Palestinians must now walk hours to have any hope of picking up a food package. No rational system of distribution, under any circumstances, would work this way. GHF increased the security risk by having fewer, not more, distribution sites.
The organization also seemed unprepared when tens of thousands of people converged on those sites. Forgive the comparison, but American retail stores planning for Black Friday sales have come to understand—in some cases because of past tragedies at a 'crush point'—the need for information systems that collect data on where the demand is coming from and that help organizations meet that demand quickly. Surely Israel could have anticipated the sheer desperation of Gaza's Palestinians after it cut off relief efforts for months.
Especially in hard circumstances, how the last mile will work must be clearly explained to those on the receiving end. In large-scale logistics efforts, the mechanics of how delivery will occur—who needs the information, when they need it, and through which communications channels it will be delivered—are all integral parts of the process. Whole systems of real-time tracking, delivery windows, and notifications are there for Israel to use, even against what it perceives as a hostile population. But information about food availability has been scarce by all accounts. Al Jazeera reported that some announcements last Sunday came from speakers mounted on military drones. The shortage of information led to a rush to the limited number of distribution sites.
Business analogies only go so far. An aid site is not a Costco. Palestinian civilians are not retail customers. But perhaps if the Israeli government and its newly chosen relief entity had thought through any of the logistical matters that preoccupy established companies and experienced aid agencies alike, many more Palestinians would be receiving the food aid they badly need, faster and more safely.
Article originally published at The Atlantic