Has there been a US policy shift on Myanmar in Trump 2.0?
The US's recent imposition of a complete travel ban affecting 12 countries, including Myanmar, among few other countries under partial ban, is becoming a contentious topic. Citing security concerns and high visa overstay rates, the travel ban itself is questionable, given that it imposed a travel ban on Myanmar where it was supporting the democratic forces, but not on Pakistan. This imposition of the travel ban has expanded its list which President Trump originally defined during his first term, but included Myanmar then as well. This article aims to explore whether the US policy is actually shifting sand or continuing to support the democratic forces in Myanmar. Time and again there has been a debate among scholars that the United States policy towards Myanmar, which involved sanctions and isolation of the military leaders and affiliated entities, has largely been ineffectual. The second term of the Trump administration has seemed to take cognisance of the same and there are conversations among the closed doors that may be US is re-considering its stand. US President Donald Trump (AFP)
With a history of a reactive and punitive policy towards the Myanmar military regime which ruled the country for the majority of the years since independence, the US adopted the same approach post the 2021 military coup. While the US policy aimed to support the democratic forces by providing them aid/support, especially through the BURMA Act, it continued with the policy of isolating the military through targeted sanctions, to pressure the regime and hold it accountable. This policy has had the unintended consequence of pushing Myanmar further into China's sphere of influence, which continues to multiple stakeholders and ensure its pertinent presence in the country. Adding to this, a few others have claimed that the US might be planning a proxy war in Myanmar, to challenge the military leaders as well as restrict China's operations in the country. Though there is no hard evidence, only narratives around the recent developments in Bangladesh and reports of British and American missionaries entering Myanmar.
Additionally, the evolving security concerns due to online scams and drug supply affecting US citizens has raised concerns among US policy makers to reconsider its policy towards Myanmar. Since coming to power for the second term, the Trump administration has deprioritised support for Myanmar's pro-democracy movement by terminating the funding for independent media, civil society, and refugee support on the Thai border. Even in the aftermath of the earthquake in March 2025, while the Trump administration announced that support of up to $2 million in humanitarian assistance was to be distributed through aid organisations. But it must be noted that during the same time, the US administration has done massive layoffs and cut in budgets of USAID, which thereby raised concerns about the implementation of such assistance. And the recent travel bans further questions the support to pro-democracy forces who are immigrating from a conflict-ridden State and the National Unity Government, which has even set up a representative office in Washington. UN's human rights chief, Volker Turk, said the ban "raises concerns from the perspective of international law."
There are a few others who are now questioning whether the US is considering initiating talks with the military leaders in Myanmar. The rationale for such a move could be that while the US was isolating the military and SAC, this has driven them further closer into China's orbit. Earlier this year, the Trump administration imposed 44% tariffs on Myanmar's already fragile economy, and exposed them to risk of excessive economic isolation. As a result of economic isolation, Myanmar leaders have been deepening their engagements with China and Russia, and seeking diplomatic support, financial support for various infrastructure projects and most importantly, arms deals. And Trump's ambition to be a peace breaker and his recent relations with Putin could just be a starting point where there could be the possibility of engagement between Trump and Min Hlaing.
Furthermore, Myanmar's strategic location—bordering China, India, Bangladesh and Thailand, and a direct access to the Bay of Bengal—makes it a key arena for influence for the major powers. Additionally, the ongoing civil war and the resulting cross-border movement of drugs, arms, and refugees has direct implications for the security and stability of the region and more importantly of India's northeastern states. India, too, is wary of China's growing presence in Myanmar, which could bring Chinese strategic interests uncomfortably close to its borders.
Given these overlapping challenges/issues, there are voices in Washington which are suggesting the US must work with regional partners, especially—India, Bangladesh, and Thailand. Along with the need to provide humanitarian aid, the US can explore opportunities for regional dialogue and cooperation, aiming to include all stakeholders and provide the stage for inclusive elections, which the military is promising to conduct by the end of the year. Further, it might be a far possibility, but the US should think of options to conditionally engage with the military in exchange for concrete steps toward immediate cessation of violence, ensure dialogue and inclusive political processes and most importantly provide humanitarian aid. While there are uncertainties involved, and the prospects for a shift in US policy toward Myanmar lacks any conclusive evidence, the evolving regional dynamics and the risk of ceding the country entirely to Chinese influence, may eventually prompt Washington to reconsider its current approach.
Additionally, the US must use all its sources to continue its support for the pro-democratic forces via providing aid, funding as well as engaging in dialogue to restore normalcy in the country. While many would argue that overthrowing the military regime and isolating will be the solution to the crisis, the real politic lies in engaging with the military as well as including the National Unity Government (NUG) and ethnic armed organisations in the political process. The military has ruled the country for decades, its involvement cannot be put down to zero, but strategic alignment with democratic principles could be the beginning of a new era in Myanmar.
This article is authored by Cchavi Vasisht, associate fellow, Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi.
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'India needs to engage more actively with West Asian civil society to have more balanced relations beyond states.' Aishwarya Khosla is a journalist currently serving as Deputy Copy Editor at The Indian Express. Her writings examine the interplay of culture, identity, and politics. She began her career at the Hindustan Times, where she covered books, theatre, culture, and the Punjabi diaspora. Her editorial expertise spans the Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Chandigarh, Punjab and Online desks. She was the recipient of the The Nehru Fellowship in Politics and Elections, where she studied political campaigns, policy research, political strategy and communications for a year. She pens The Indian Express newsletter, Meanwhile, Back Home. Write to her at or You can follow her on Instagram: @ink_and_ideology, and X: @KhoslaAishwarya. ... Read More
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