SC stays Calcutta High Court's suo motu contempt proceedings against police officials
New Delhi, June 16 (UNI) The Supreme Court today stayed the Calcutta High Court's order initiating suo motu criminal contempt proceedings against several West Bengal police officials in connection with the alleged assault on lawyers at the Howrah District Court complex in April 2019.
A bench comprising Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Manmohan was hearing special leave petitions (SLPs) filed by the implicated police personnel and a connected plea by the State of West Bengal challenging the maintainability of the High Court's suo motu contempt action after a five-year delay.
Senior Advocate Chander Uday Singh, appearing for the petitioners, questioned the legality of the High Court's decision, arguing that under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, a one-year limitation applies even to suo motu contempt proceedings.
He relied on the Supreme Court's precedent in Maheshwar Peri v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (2016), which held that the limitation period applies uniformly, whether contempt is brought to court by a private party or taken up on the court's own motion.
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The apex court, after hearing preliminary submissions, issued notice and ordered that a notice be issued, returnable in six weeks.
"In the meanwhile, further proceedings pursuant to the order dated May 2, 2025, shall remain stayed," the judges said.
The case pertains to the incident of April 24, 2019, when lawyers at the Howrah District Sadar Court were allegedly assaulted by police personnel who reportedly entered the court premises without authorisation.
Following public outcry, the Calcutta High Court took suo motu cognisance of the incident and, in May 2019, appointed former judge Justice K. J. Sengupta as a one-man commission to conduct an inquiry.
However, the High Court revived the matter only recently, based on the findings of the Sengupta Commission. In its May 2, 2025 order, the High Court proceeded to initiate contempt action against the concerned police officials.
The petitioners argued that the contempt proceedings were barred by limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. However, the Calcutta High Court, in its order, took a different view.
It stated, 'The bar of limitation as in Section 20 of the 1971 Act, according to us, is in respect of proceedings initiated by individuals bringing to the notice of the Court an act of contempt. The whole object of such limitation is to ensure diligence on the part of the complainant. But the powers under Article 215 of the Constitution, where the Court itself initiates suo motu proceedings, cannot be curtailed by Section 20, particularly in view of the Court's inherent powers.'
Despite this interpretation by the High Court, the Supreme Court has now intervened and stayed the operation of the May 2 order, pending further consideration.
The case will be heard next after six weeks. UNI SNG SSP
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