Video shows the arrest of Mahmoud Khalil, pro-Palestinian Columbia University activist
New video shows the arrest of Columbia University pro-Palestinian activist Mahmoud Khalil by Immigrations and Custom Enforcement agents.
The video says was taken by his wife Noor Abdalla, who is eight months pregnant, the ACLU said.
The arrest happened Saturday night at their home in Columbia University campus housing.
The video, which is more than eight minutes long, was released by the ACLU with the faces of the people arresting Khalil blurred.
Khalil's arrest on video
The video shows apparent ICE agents confront Khalil in the lobby of his building, asking him to turn around and telling him to stop resisting.
Khalil can be seen standing with his hands behind his back as he is handcuffed.
"He's not resisting," Abdalla can be heard saying on the video.
"I am coming with you, don't worry," Khalil says. "Baby, it's fine."
Khalil is then escorted out of the building as his wife can be heard on the phone, apparently talking with Khalil's attorney Amy Greer.
"They just handcuffed him and took him, I don't know what to do," Abdalla can be heard saying. "What should I do? I don't know."
Outside the building, Abdalla asks the agents to identify themselves, and an agent can be heard telling her that he's being taken into immigration custody at 26 Federal Plaza.
Abdalla can then be heard asking for one of the agents to talk to the attorney on the phone.
"The lawyer would like to speak with somebody," she said.
Attorneys say Khalil was brought to a detention center in New Jersey and then flown to another site in Louisiana. On Wednesday, a judge ruled Khalil will remain detained in Louisiana for now.
Mahmoud Khalil's arrest sparks protests
Khalil's arrest sparked protests around New York City. On Thursday, a group of approximately 150 protesters entered Trump Tower and staged a sit-in, the NYPD said. They chanted "Free Mahmoud." Ninety eight were arrested.
Khalil graduated from Columbia University in December with a master's degree. The 30-year-old was born in Syria to Palestinian parents. He is a citizen of Algeria, according to a Department of Homeland Security document obtained by CBS News.
Check back soon for more on this developing story.
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