Britain has become the world's welfare state

Telegraph

a day ago

Imagine if almost a billion pounds in Universal Credit was being claimed each month by households containing foreign nationals.
What if more than three-quarters of a million foreign-born tenants were occupying social housing in this country, with almost half of London's social housing taken up by this group?
You don't need to imagine any of this. It's happening now.
Britain's welfare system was designed to support citizens in need. Instead, it has increasingly become a way for large numbers of immigrants to live among us at our expense.
For years, we were told migration was the price we had to pay for growth. Immigration can indeed be a benefit, but the low-skilled, non Western immigrants that actually arrived have overwhelmingly been a burden.
No serious country should put up with this. That's why I have now published a detailed plan to take foreign nationals off the benefit system and remove them from the country. That plan is laid out in full below, but here is an executive summary.
The first step is to establish a Public Benefit Test or PBT. Modelled on what Denmark does, the PBT would allow us to evaluate each migrant's net fiscal contributions over the previous five years (tax contributions minus welfare receipts and social housing costs). In order to pass the PBT, a working age adult will have to show that they have made a net contribution over time.
'But non-citizens' some will say 'are already barred from claiming benefits or living in social housing. A PBT would be pointless!'
If only that were so. In practice it happens, and one of the reasons it happens is that as soon as a non-UK national gets so-called Indefinite Leave to Remain, they are just as entitled to benefits as a UK citizen.
No one should be granted Leave to Remain or have their working visa extended without passing the PBT except in the most exceptional circumstances. Proposing to extend the period at which we grant Indefinite Leave to Remain from five to ten years, which is what both the Conservatives and Reform seem to suggest, merely pushes back the problem. Legislation is needed to make it explicitly illegal to give migrants welfare payments without them passing the PBT.
That would prevent future arrivals living at our expense, but steps are needed to take those already living here off our welfare system, remove them from social housing, and in many cases remove them from the country.
Legislation is needed to make it mandatory for every working-age non-UK citizen in receipt of any non-pension benefit to take the PBT, too. Working age non-citizen adults who have been living at public expense should not only lose their welfare payments. Legislation should make failure to pass the PBT grounds for non-EEA nationals to be required to leave the country.
What if countries refuse to take back their nationals? In April, South Sudan refused to accept someone being deported from America. The US government cancelled all visas for everyone from South Sudan. The South Sudanese soon backed down. Britain needs to do the same.
Of course, the biggest barrier to removing migrants will not be foreign governments, but our own judges.
Legislation will need to include so-called Ouster Clauses to limit judicial review, and derogation clauses to allow ministers to disapply the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Ministers will need to repeatedly point out that Denmark, also a signatory to the European Convention, has been able to deport foreigners who fail their PBT.
That will almost certainly not be enough. In order to begin large scale remigration separate legislation will be required to empower the Lord Chancellor to sack judges who defy statutory intent, and to give the Lord Chancellor oversight over judicial appointments. Merely pledging to leave the ECHR, as the Conservatives are gearing up to do, is not enough.
Here is my detailed plan.
A Public Benefit Test for Migrant Residency and Welfare
Britain's welfare system is a vital safety net designed to support UK citizens facing financial hardship. Programmes such as Universal Credit, Child Benefit, Personal Independence Payment (PIP), and Housing Benefit, alongside social housing, aim to assist the vulnerable.
These programmes were not intended to provide permanent support for newcomers living at public expense. Increasingly, however, significant numbers of people born overseas access these resources, straining public finances.
Here are six practical steps an incoming government might take to address this issue by restricting access to welfare and social housing and deporting those foreign nationals who have been a persistent net fiscal burden:
Introduce a Public Benefit Test (PBT): Implement a Danish-inspired model to assess net fiscal contributions over a defined period.
Restrict Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR): Grant ILR only to non-citizens demonstrating significant, sustained fiscal contributions via the PBT.
Prohibit Welfare and Social Housing Access: Bar non-UK citizens from accessing benefits or social housing, except in exceptional cases.
Mandate PBT Assessments: Require all working-age non-citizens receiving benefits or living in social housing to undergo PBT evaluation.
Deport Non-Citizens that Have Been Persistent Fiscal Burdens: Deport non-UK citizens identified as net fiscal burdens, barring extraordinary circumstances.
Counter Judicial Resistance: Implement safeguards to prevent judicial challenges from obstructing the policy.
Some might criticise this policy framework because it would lead to large-scale remigration. That is not a criticism; it is the intention.
The Fiscal Burden of Migrant Welfare Claims
Migrants' access to welfare and social housing places a significant strain on public resources. According to 2023 Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) data, 16 per cent of Universal Credit payments – £941 million monthly – are disbursed to households with at least one foreign national. This trend has accelerated because non-UK nationals with ILR or refugee status gain equal benefit entitlements to British citizens, bypassing nationality-based restrictions under the habitual residence test.
While data on other benefits like Child Benefit and PIP is less granular, migrant uptake appears substantial. Office for National Statistics (ONS) data shows that 31.8 per cent of 2023 live births in England and Wales were to non-UK-born mothers. With 6.9 million families receiving Child Benefit, approximately 2 million foreign-born parents may be claimants. Certain ethnic groups, such as Bangladeshi (34 per cent) and Pakistani (30 per cent) households, claim Child Benefit at nearly double the rate of white British households (17 per cent), per 2022 DWP data, reflecting higher uptake among non-UK-born communities.
Social housing data reveals similar trends. The 2021 Census indicates that 47.6 per cent of London's social housing was occupied by foreign-born lead tenants. These patterns, coupled with London's demographic shift (the white British population declining to just 36.8 per cent in 2021), underscore the fiscal and social impact of non-citizen reliance on public resources.
Unprecedented Immigration and Its Costs
The UK is experiencing a historic immigration surge. ONS data reports net migration of 906,000 in the year ending June 2023, moderating to 728,000 by June 2024. This wave, driven by relaxed visa policies like the 2021 social care and graduate visa expansions, saw 144,000 care worker visas issued between 2021 and Q1 2024, despite the £24,000 median salary for those on health and care worker visas falling below the UK median of £28,000. Notably, only 15 per cent of the 2.01 million net inflow of non-EU migrants from 2018 to 2023 entered on work visas, per the Centre for Policy Studies, indicating limited economic contribution.
Office for Budget Responsibility data suggests that low-skilled immigrants cost the UK nearly £465,000 each by the age of 81, drawing more in benefits than they pay in taxes. Migration Watch UK has argued that immigration imposes a significant net financial burden on the UK, estimating costs ranging from £4 billion to £17 billion annually, with specific figures of £13 billion in 2014/15 and £4.3 billion in 2016/17 based on government data.
According to a 2013 University College London study, non-Western immigrants cost the public £118 billion between 1995 and 2011. A 2025 Centre for Policy Studies report warns that if recent, largely non-Western 'Boris wave' immigrants gain Indefinite Leave to Remain and access benefits, costs could rise by an additional £234 billion.
International studies reinforce the idea that recent immigrants, particularly non-Western ones, are likely to be a net drain. A 2021 Dutch study (Borderless Welfare State) found that non-Western migrants, particularly asylum seekers and family reunification cases, impose substantial lifetime costs of hundreds of thousands of euros per migrant. A 2005 Danish study (Immigration, Integration and Fiscal Sustainability) similarly concluded that immigration undermines fiscal sustainability due to weak labour market integration and welfare reliance.
What Is to Be Done?
1. Establishing a Public Benefit Test (PBT)
An Immigration and Fiscal Contribution Act is needed to establish a Public Benefit Test (PBT), modelled on Denmark's approach, to evaluate non-citizens' net fiscal contributions over five years. The PBT will calculate:
Contributions: Income tax, National Insurance, VAT, and other taxes.
Costs: Welfare benefits (e.g., Universal Credit, Child Benefit), social housing subsidies, NHS usage, and education costs for dependants.
A passing threshold of £5,000 net annual contribution (inflation-adjusted) will be set, reflecting OBR data on low-wage migrant costs. The Act will mandate annual fiscal reports for non-citizens, with visa curtailment for non-compliance. Minors and retirees will be exempt.
How the Danes do it
The Danish public benefit test assesses immigrants' reliance on welfare benefits, aiming to limit access to public funds and encourage self-sufficiency. In practice, the Danish public benefit test restricts non-EU immigrants' access to welfare benefits like social assistance, unemployment benefits, and child benefits by tying eligibility to specific criteria, such as:
Residence and Employment Requirements: Immigrants must typically reside in Denmark for a set period, and lose payments if they do not work and make net fiscal contributions through the tax system.
Integration Conditions: Benefits are removed from those that fail to speak Danish.
Deportation Risk: Immigrants who remain heavily reliant on public benefits for extended periods are subject to face deportation proceedings.
The Danes are able to do this notwithstanding that Denmark is a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, and the European Convention on Human Rights.
Should the UK's Public Benefit Test focus solely on fiscal contributions, or should it, like Denmark's model, also include integration criteria, such as English language proficiency?
A PBT implemented by Whitehall civil servants risks becoming an ambiguous requirement to learn English. To avoid this, the PBT should initially be a clear, objective assessment of an individual's tax contributions minus their welfare costs.
2. Restricting Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR)
ILR grants non-citizens full benefit access, currently conferred after 5 years' residency. The ILR rules will be amended to:
Require a PBT pass for ILR eligibility.
Extend the ILR qualifying period to 10 years, with PBT assessments at 5 and 10 years.
Deny visa extensions or grant limited leave (e.g., 12 months) for PBT failures, facilitating departure.
Given the extent to which non EEA immigrants have tended overwhelmingly to be a net burden, this measure is likely to reduce the number of people granted ILR very substantially.
3. Prohibiting Non-Citizen Access to Welfare and Social Housing
Despite existing eligibility rules (e.g., Housing Act 1996), non-citizens access benefits and social housing post-ILR. Two laws are needed to address this:
Welfare Access Restriction Act: Bar non-UK citizens from Universal Credit, Child Benefit, PIP, and social housing unless they hold PBT-passed ILR or British citizenship. This expands the 'no recourse to public funds' list under the Immigration Act 2014, removing exceptions like Child Benefit for maintenance undertakings.
Social Housing Eligibility Act: Amend the Housing Act 1996 and Housing (Wales) Act 2014 to prioritize UK citizens and PBT-passed ILR holders, barring foreign-born, non-UK nationals from social housing except in rare cases (e.g., imminent risk to life, approved by the Secretary of State or Welsh Ministers).
4. Mandatory Public Benefit Test for Non-Citizens
The Immigration and Fiscal Contribution Act will introduce a mandatory PBT for all working-age non-citizens receiving non-pension welfare benefits or residing in social housing.
This is to target the existing cohort of non-citizens who are a long-term fiscal burden. Those that have been a net burden, without any exonerating circumstances such as chronic health conditions, will be subject to deportation proceedings. Non-compliance will trigger deportation proceedings.
5. Deporting Those That Are A Persistent Fiscal Drain
Non-citizens without ILR who fail the PBT will face remigration under ordinary circumstances. The proposed Remigration of Non-UK Nationals Act will amend the existing legislation to:
Make PBT failure grounds for residency revocation for non-EEA nationals.
Establish a process with notification, a 3-month appeal period via an independent panel, and Home Office-led remigration.
Prioritise remigrations for those with negative PBT scores exceeding £10,000 annually, using an integrated DWP-HMRC-Home Office database.
What if countries refuse to take back their nationals?
In April 2025, South Sudan declined to repatriate a migrant from the United States. The US promptly cancelled all visas for South Sudanese passport holders and restricted future visas. Although there was a question about the migrant's true nationality, South Sudan eventually accepted the individual, and the migrant was deported from the US.
The UK should adopt a similar no-nonsense approach. Beyond cancelling visas for their citizens, the UK can leverage its significant foreign aid contributions to countries like Pakistan and Nigeria, which have substantial numbers of their nationals living in the UK.
The main barrier to removing non-UK nationals from the UK is not that other countries might not accept them; it is that activist judges will prevent their removal. UK judges have consistently acted to block deportation policies.
Judicial Activists: how courts have tried to block efforts to remove illegal immigrants
UK judges have long sought to frustrate deportation efforts, citing human rights and international law, particularly the ECHR and Refugee Convention.
Faced with tens of thousands of immigrants crossing the English Channel, the UK government attempted to introduce the Rwanda scheme, whereby those entering the UK, but entitled to claim refuge, would be flown to Rwanda to have their case heard.
In June 2022, judicial activists issued an injunction to stop the first Rwanda flight, citing risks of 'irreversible harm.' The 2023 Court of Appeal and Supreme Court rulings declared the scheme unlawful due to Rwanda's unsafe asylum system and risk of refoulement (returning refugees to persecution).
The 2024 Northern Ireland High Court further limited the Illegal Migration Act's application, citing breaches of human rights laws and the Windsor Framework. These rulings prevented mass deportations, with only four voluntary relocations to Rwanda occurring at a cost of £700 million. This is one reason the cross Channel migrants keep coming.
In 2017, the UK Supreme Court ruled (R (Kiarie and Byndloss) v Secretary of State for the Home Department) plans to have appeals against removal heard in third countries to be a violation of Article 8 limiting the Home Office's ability to expedite deportations without appeal opportunities.
In 2020, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that a Nigerian man with a criminal record but whose children lived in the UK, could not be deported, effectively making having a family life grounds not to remove someone.
In the wake of that ruling, immigration tribunals now routinely rule against removal on the basis of the foreign national having a family life in the UK.
6. Countering Judicial Activism
The UK judiciary will challenge this framework, citing the Human Rights Act 1998 (e.g., Article 8, Article 14, Article 3 of the ECHR) or granting judicial review of the proposed acts. To ensure implementation, the following measures will neutralise judicial overreach:
Legislative Clarity and Ouster Clauses: Define terms precisely (e.g., 'net fiscal burden' as a £5,000+ annual deficit) and include clauses barring judicial review of PBT, ILR, benefit, and remigration decisions, except for procedural fraud.
Parliamentary Supremacy Clause: Embed a provision in the proposed Immigration and Fiscal Contribution Act affirming Parliament's ultimate authority over judicial interpretation.
Human Rights Act Amendment: Allow ministers to disapply ECHR provisions (e.g., Article 8) for PBT-related decisions via Statutory Instruments.
ECHR Derogation Clause: Permit the Home Secretary to derogate from ECHR obligations for 'national economic security,' encompassing fiscal and immigration control.
Even with the most carefully drafted legislation, and even if the ECHR was either disapplied in part, or in full by leaving it, activist judges would almost certainly continue to rule against deportation.
Recent history suggests judges are ruling not on the basis of a valid interpretation of the law, but as an expression of their personal subjective policy preferences. In light of this, the following sanctions against judges are almost certainly needed:
Judicial Accountability Act: Empower the Lord Chancellor to review and discipline judges who defy statutory intent, with sanctions including dismissal. This should be done as emergency legislation in the first few hours of a new administration being formed.
Judicial Appointment Reform: Amend the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 to enhance the Lord Chancellor's role in appointing judges who uphold parliamentary sovereignty, reducing the Judicial Appointments Commission's influence.
With over a million foreign citizens living at public expense and immigration surging, these measures are critical to safeguard the UK's economic stability.
This paper is part of a series by Douglas Carswell to offer an incoming government the policies needed to restore Britain. The first, Milestones, which provides an overarching blueprint, was published by The Telegraph in April.