Is Donald Trump right to believe that Iran's nuclear facilities have been 'completely obliterated'?
07:32
22/06/2025
Why did Donald Trump insert the US in Israel's war with Iran?
Middle East
22/06/2025
How do Israelis feel about the US' strikes on Iran?
Middle East
22/06/2025
Iran says all options are open to defend itself after US strikes
Middle East
22/06/2025
Several Iranian missiles get through Israeli air defense, striking Tel-Aviv
Middle East
22/06/2025
US strikes on Iran: what reactions on the international stage?
Middle East
22/06/2025
US strikes on Iran: Tehran warns of everlasting consequences
Middle East
22/06/2025
At least 430 Iranian civilians killed this week according to the health ministry
Middle East
22/06/2025
Israel kills 3 top Iranian officers in Shiraz strike before US bombing
Middle East
22/06/2025
The US had been moving B-2 planes to Guam for several days before striking Iran
Middle East
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LeMonde
26 minutes ago
- LeMonde
Once, Israel and Iran were allies – even under the ayatollahs
If there is one talent that even Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's outspoken opponents recognize he has, it is his mastery of communication and memorable phrasing. By naming the offensive he launched against Iran on Friday, June 13, "Rising Lion," the Israeli prime minister not only echoed a verse from the Bible ("The people shall rise up as a great lion"), but also referenced the lion symbol that had adorned the imperial Persian flag from the 16 th century onwards, and, later, that of Iran under the shah's rule in the 20 th century. Indeed, Israel's campaign has not only targeted Iran's nuclear program but has also aimed to topple the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was established in Tehran by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini after the fall of the shah's regime in 1979. It is all the more worth revisiting the long history of Israeli-Iranian cooperation, both before and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who ruled in Tehran from 1941 to 1979, de facto recognized Israel in 1950, two years after it was established. He made that recognition official and public in 1960. The Iranian monarch thus broke with Islamic solidarity due to his staunch anti-communism, at a time when the Cold War between Washington and Moscow was increasingly driving Arab nationalist movements into the Soviet camp. An anti-Arab alliance of convenience Israel's founder, David Ben-Gurion, who served as prime minister from 1948 to 1954, and again from 1955 to 1963, sought to develop a strategic partnership with Iran as an anti-Arab alliance of convenience, even if it meant encouraging the shah's ambitions in the Persian Gulf. Relations between the two flourished after Ben-Gurion visited Tehran in 1961, based on a transfer of military expertise shared by Israel in exchange for Iranian oil deliveries. This dynamic confirmed its importance over the following decade, as the shah aimed to assert himself as the "policeman of the Gulf," at the expense of his Arab neighbors.
Euronews
an hour ago
- Euronews
Will Russia stand up for its ally Iran and how can Moscow benefit?
Russia's foreign ministry slammed on Sunday the overnight US air strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, calling it 'an irresponsible decision to subject the territory of a sovereign state to missile and bomb strikes, no matter what arguments it is presented with' — all the while Moscow itself is intensifying its attacks on Ukraine. The Kremlin says the US attack 'blatantly violates international law, the UN Charter, and the resolutions of the UN Security Council, which has previously unambiguously qualified such actions as inadmissible' adding that 'It is particularly alarming that the strikes were carried out by a country that is a permanent member of the UN Security Council'. Russia, the permanent member of the UN Security Council itself, has been waging its unprovoked all-out war against Ukraine since February 2022, bombing Ukrainian cities and attacking Ukraine on the ground. 'We urge to stop the aggression, to step up efforts to create conditions for returning the situation to the political and diplomatic track,' the Moscow statement said, referring to the US strikes. At the St Petersburg forum before Washington's strike, Vladimir Putin said that Iran had not asked for help since the beginning of Israel's air campaign. The Russian president added that the comprehensive partnership treaty between Moscow and Tehran has no articles related to the military sphere, which is ironic, given Russian production of Iranian developed Shahed-136 drones (aka the Geranium-2). Euronews spoke with Nikita Smagin, an orientalist and author of the book "All Iran. The paradoxes of life in an autocracy under sanctions" about what is at stake for the Kremlin. Smagin says the Russian side has previously emphasised that its alliance with Iran is not a 'military one' and Moscow is therefore not obliged to provide it with military assistance. "It is logical to expect that Russia will not interfere in what is happening, because it does not want to risk for the sake of Iran the aggravation of the situation with Israel and the United States," the expert says. Smagin notes that Tehran's decision not to request military intervention from Moscow before the US strikes is not surprising. "The Islamic Republic was built from the very beginning on the ideas of sovereignty," he says, adding that one of the driving ideas behind the restructuring of the Iranian state was to put an end to the interference of foreign players, primarily the US and the UK, in Iran's internal affairs. "In this sense, Iran has never turned to Russia for help and is not turning to Russia now because it is afraid of losing some sovereignty, of giving up some of its sovereignty to Russia, as was the case with Bashar al-Assad," Smagin says. But the situation could change. "If only because Putin drew attention to the fact that he does not even want to think about the assassination, the destruction of Khamenei, it is obvious that these issues are somewhat disturbing to him," the expert explains. 'The fate of authoritarian leaders hurts Russia' According to US President Donald Trump, Washington knows "exactly" where Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is "hiding". Trump also said that the Iranian leader is "an easy target, but they will not kill him, at least not yet". If the Islamic Republic's regime falls or if it comes to physically destroying the Ayatollah, how will the Kremlin react to this? What would it mean for the Russian authorities? "In general, we see that the deaths in revolutionary processes, the destruction of heads of authoritarian states in general hurts the Russian side. We remember how Putin reacted to the assassination of Gaddafi," notes Nikita Smagin. The rebels were primarily operating there, but not without the assistance of foreign forces, including British intelligence and the Emirates. But nevertheless, all this looked like a serious "wake-up call" for Putin. And, apparently, this was one of the reasons why he began to change his positioning in the international arena. According to the analyst, if the Islamic Republic collapses, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei may well be granted asylum in Russia. "This is already an established practice. I think it is not that it is excluded. But if Khamenei is eliminated, it will not cause any joy in the Kremlin. They believe that killing leaders is a red line, beyond which in fact Israel has already crossed. It has already eliminated Hezbollah leaders, for example," he says. 'It will be easier to draw up the budget' The new crisis in the Middle East may hit Russia's influence in the region, but the sudden escalation has brought the Kremlin some good news. At the G7 summit in Canada, for example, it was decided not to lower the price threshold for Russian oil so as not to further destabilise the market. Since the end of 2022, one of the key aspects of leverage on Moscow has been the establishment of price ceilings for Russian oil at $60 per barrel. Three and a half years into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU has proposed lowering the price ceiling to $45 per barrel, but it will have to wait for now. "If we take disintegration in Iran as a whole, or rather regime change, because disintegration (of the country) is already a concomitant, then, of course, it threatens Russia's interests in the long term," says Nikita Smagin. "The Kremlin, of course, expects to benefit from this in the short term: oil prices will go up very seriously. The worse the situation gets, the higher the prices will be and the easier it will be for the [Russian] budget to be drawn up - this year, by the looks of it, there could be problems with it," the analyst explains. According to Smagin, Russia will benefit in the current moment, but in the longer term, regime change and "turning Iran into some permanent point of instability threatens, of course, Russia's strategy in the Middle East, because a lot of effort has been invested in Iran." "Iran has been a reliable partner of the Kremlin on many fronts, " he says. "A lot of projects, and strategically important ones at that, were planned to be conducted through Iran, for example, the [transport corridor] North-South project, a possible gas hub. This, of course, is all for the future, but nevertheless, in the event [of the regime's collapse] there will be no possibility of realising it. In the long term, it will be a loss and a setback for the Russian side." 'The peak of Russia's military cooperation with Iran has long passed' In more than three years of full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has succeeded in "localising" the production of Iranian-designed drones. According to Nikita Smagin, Iran's importance as a supplier of Shahed-136 drones is in the past. The peak of military co-operation between the two countries came in 2022. As the expert notes, at the beginning of last year, up to 90% of components were not Iranian. "Only the engines were supplied from Iran. Everything else was made by Russia," he adds. "Even if localisation is not 100 percent now, it is very close to that. I think Russia will find ways to replace that, not to mention that the Shaheds don't play as big a role as they used to." "Still, there is a huge amount of in-house development. Russia has been investing in drones during this time," Smagin explains. "Moreover: even if we're talking about the Shahed specifically, it's not even strongly Iranian anymore. The Geran-1 and Geran-2 drones are very much redesigned, because the Iranian version was not as effective as many expected," he notes. In an interview with Kommersant, Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, describes the Shaheds' flight characteristics as "primitive" and "allowing them to be shot down en masse even with 7.62 mm anti-aircraft machine guns." He also writes of the "moped" engine sound, "alerting the entire neighbourhood to the drone's arrival." 'In Israel, Russia's role as a mediator is looked upon with no apparent antipathy' As Hannah Notte, a political scientist and expert at the James Martin Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, writes, Russia has always had limitations on how far it can go in supporting Iran. "The Kremlin's obsessive anti-Western agenda has raised the Islamic republic's profile as a partner, but Putin has other interests in the region - such as a long-standing, albeit complicated, relationship with Israel and the need to coordinate oil prices with OPEC - so he has been mindful of Israel's and the Gulf states' red lines when it comes to defence cooperation with Tehran," Notte wrote in a column for US outlet The Atlantic. Nikita Smagin believes that in the current conflict between Iran and Israel, Russia is no longer an "indispensable" mediator. "When the nuclear negotiations were going on, when Trump was trying to sign a nuclear deal with Iran, here Russia could act as an indispensable mediator," he says. "It was actually the only party that had the technical capability and was ready to export surplus uranium from Iran, pre-weapons grade or enriched beyond the required minimum per cent. Now, apparently, this issue is off the agenda". At the same time, despite the fact that relations between Israel and Russia, which became the first country in the world to receive a Hamas delegation after the 7 October attacks officially, have deteriorated, according to Smagin, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem look at Russia's role as a mediator "without any obvious antipathy". As Smagin notes, even after Moscow's invasion of 2022 and the subsequent wave of immigration in an attempt to avoid mobilisation, "a large number of agents of anti-Russian influence have appeared in the Jewish state, people who moved from Russia and have a very negative attitude to the Russian authorities and are obviously the backbone of anti-Russian sentiments in Israel."
Euronews
an hour ago
- Euronews
What is Iran's Kheibar Shekan missile, carrying ideological payload?
The IRGC today announced it had deployed the Kheibar Shekan, Iran's latest long-range solid-fuel ballistic missile, indicating that the attack did not include "all armed capabilities yet", signalling the possibility of future escalation. According to IRNA, the Kheibar Shekan missile belongs to the fourth generation of the Khorramshahr family of ballistic missiles, with a range of 1,450 kilometres. It is considered one of the most prominent technical developments in the Iranian missile system, as it has a degree of accuracy thanks to a satellite guidance system, in addition to manoeuvrable warheads. The high-explosive warhead weighs about 1,500 kilograms and is up to four metres long, while the missile has a speed of more than 19,500 km/h outside the atmosphere and nearly 9,800 km/h inside it, making it very difficult to intercept even for advanced defence systems such as Patriot and David's Sling. Sequential development The first version of the missile dates back to 2017, when Tehran unveiled the Khorramshahr-1, which was 13 metres long and 1.5 metres in diameter, at a military parade on the occasion of "Holy Defence Week". The second generation "Khorramshahr-2" appeared in 2019, with guided warheads and a total weight of 20 tonnes, followed by the fourth generation "Khorramshahr-4" in May 2023, without Iran revealing the details of the third generation "Khorramshahr-3", although military sources confirmed that it exists and has advanced capabilities that have not been disclosed for security reasons. The Kheibar Shekan is characterised by design features that reduce its ability to be monitored or intercepted, most notably the absence of ailerons, which reduces the area of friction and increases its speed and accuracy. The missile relies on a local engine called "Arond", which was integrated inside the fuel tank to reduce the length and increase camouflage, and is launched from a mobile platform and prepared for launch in less than 15 minutes. The missile operates in three operational phases: take-off and flight, then guiding the warhead with rear engines after separation, and ending with entering the atmosphere where the final guidance engines are activated while maintaining a speed of more than Mach 8. Symbolic and ideological significance The Kheibar Shekan missile derives Its name from Arabic meaning "Breaker of Khyber", a reference to the historical battle of Khyber between Muslims and Jews in Arabia. Imam Ali bin Abi Talib played a prominent role in the batle, which gives the name special religious significance among the Shiite community, and reinforces the Iranian narratives couching the conflict with Israel in a "historical and ideological" context. The Kheibar Shekan was previously used in the "Sadiq Promise 1" attacks in April 2024 and "Sadiq Promise 2" in October of the same year, according to Western media reports, reflecting Iran's increasing reliance on this model in its long-range operations.
