
CB apprised of past case of military trial
ISLAMABAD:
The Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court was informed on Thursday that the trial of an accused in the 2009 General Headquarters (GHQ) attack case had been conducted in a military court, even before the enactment of the 21st Constitutional Amendment.
A seven-member bench, led by Justice Aminuddin Khan, heard the intra-court appeals against the Supreme Court's decision that declared the military trial of civilians involved in the May 9 incidents as null and void.
During the hearing, Khawaja Haris, the lawyer for the defence ministry, completed his arguments and then lawyer for former chief justice Jawwad S Khawaja, one of the petitioners in case, advanced his arguments.
At the outset, Justice Jamal Khan Mandokhail told the court his remarks during a hearing on Wednesday about "not accepting" the decision had created some confusion, adding that he wanted to clarify that he did not mention judges, but meant some individuals.
Justice Hassan Azhar Rizvi wondered whether crimes committed during violent nationwide riots on May 9, 2023, were more serious than terrorist incidents.
Justice Rizvi remarked that the Mehran base and Kamra base attacks were mentioned in the 21st Amendment. "Where was the trial of those who attacked GHQ (General Headquarters)?" he asked. "Two Orion aircraft worth billions of rupees were destroyed [in the Mehran base attack]; is the crime of May 9 more serious than these incidents?"
Advocate Haris said that all perpetrators of the Mehran base attack were killed.
"So after they died was there no investigation as to who they were, where they came from and how they came? Was the file of the Mehran base attack closed after the terrorists were killed?" Justice Rizvi asked.
Advocate Haris replied saying an investigation must have been conducted. "The case of the GHQ attack happened in military courts and took place before the 21st Amendment."
Justice Rizvi remarked that the amendments were made based on these attacks and asked: "What happened to the accused in the attack on Kamra base? When did they have a trial?"
Advocate Haris said he would inform the court after taking instructions and completed his arguments.
Justice Rizvi said that the decision on the 21st Amendment had mentioned 16,000 different attacks from 2002 till the enactment of the amendment, in which personnel posted at sensitive places were martyred. Were all such incidents tried in military courts or in anti-terrorism courts, he asked.
Haris replied that the trial of the GHQ attack case was held in military court. He added that all the terrorists who attacked Mehran Air Base were killed on the spot; therefore, there was no need for a military trial there.
Additional Attorney General Aamir Rehman, and the lawyer for the Balochistan government adopted the arguments presented by the defence ministry's lawyer. After that Khawaja Ahmed Hussain, the lawyer for former chief justice Jawad S Khawaja began his arguments.
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Business Recorder
11 hours ago
- Business Recorder
Amendments to orders for accuracy: Commissioner IR has powers under Sec 221(1) of IT law: SC
ISLAMABAD: The Supreme Court ruled that the Commissioner Inland Revenue has jurisdiction under Section 221(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to amend the orders by rectifying any mistake apparent from the record. The 24-page judgment, authored by Justice Munib Akhtar, set aside the impugned judgments of the Lahore High Court (LHC) and the Islamabad High Court (IHC). It held; 'the tax references out of which these matters arise shall be deemed pending in the respective High Courts and the questions of law raised therein decided in accordance with law and consistently with this judgment.' Section 122 (5A) ITO: Power granted to IR commissioners is not without boundaries: ATIR 'CPLA 431-L/2023 involves questions of law other than the one decided by this judgment. This leave petition is returned to the office to be fixed in the ordinary course before an appropriate Bench,' it also said. A three-judge bench, headed by Justice Munib Akhtar, and comprising Justice Ayesha A Malik and Justice Shahid Waheed heard the department (FBR) petitions against the LHC and IHC decisions. Babar Bilal appeared in CPLA Nos.4583 to 4585/2023. The judgment noted that the matters relating to the deemed assessment order (and indeed, the deemed amended assessment order) fall only and always within the first part (of Mehreen Zaibun Nisa), with all ensuing 'inevitable corollaries' applying accordingly. One of these is that the deemed orders of both kinds must be regarded as orders 'passed' by the Commissioner within the meaning, and for the purposes of, Section 221(1). 'The Commissioner therefore has the jurisdiction to amend the orders by rectifying any mistake apparent from the record'. The judgment decided the question; 'Whether the Commissioner has jurisdiction under subsection (1) of Section 221 of the 2001 Ordinance to amend, in exercise of the power thereby conferred and, in the manner, and to the extent therein stated, what is known as a deemed assessment order under s. 120 to rectify a mistake apparent from the record?', in favour of the Commissioner and against the taxpayers. The High Courts had answered the question in the negative. The Department urged that both the courts erred materially in this regard. The taxpayers pray that the impugned judgments be upheld as having reached the correct conclusion in law. The judgment confirmed that the error made by the High Courts was to conflate the two deeming provisions into one. It was on account of this mistake that both judgments, whose reasoning run in parallel, concluded that there was no application of mind by the Commissioner and that the mistake always lay where, and by whom, in fact made, i.e., the taxpayer. However, once this unfortunate fusing is unpacked, and what the subsection actually does and require is realized, the mistake becomes apparent. Had the subsection only contained the deeming required by clause (b), then there could be merit to what the learned High Courts concluded. In such a situation, the only 'state of affairs' required to be imagined would be the deemed issuance of an assessment order. It could perhaps then be said that the deeming did not reach or touch any mistake to be found as a matter of fact in the return, and hence the deemed assessment order did not deal with any such thing. In this situation the attribution of the mistake, being outside the scope (or beyond the limit) of the legal fiction could be said to lie where, and by whom, actually made as a matter of fact. But that of course is not the case. There is also the (precedent) deeming required by clause (a). Once that is kept in mind then the inevitable conclusion is that there was, as a matter of law, a (deemed) application of mind by the Commissioner. Since it operated (as it could only) on the return, an inevitable corollary is that it is the whole of it, mistakes and all, that is the assessment (deemed) to have been made. And it is the (deemed) assessment so made that then results in the (deemed) issuance of the assessment order. In our view, it is only in terms of this bifurcation that subsection (1) can be properly understood and applied. A rolling up of the two clauses into one, with respect, led to the error into which both the learned High Courts fell. Thus, in the principal LHC judgment much emphasis was placed on s. 221(1) requiring that the order be 'passed' by the Commissioner. The matters before the Supreme Court arose under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 in relation to the jurisdiction, under subsection (1) of Section 221, of the Commissioner to rectify any mistake apparent on the face of the record and thereby amend what is known as a deemed assessment order under s. Most of these matters come from the Lahore High Court, where the principal judgment is dated 27.04.2022. That decision disposed of eight tax references that had been filed by the Commissioner and was followed in all the other matters in the said High Court by various orders of different dates. Islamabad High Court, where the principal judgment is dated 20.09.2023 which disposed of tax references filed by the Department. Both High Courts reached the same conclusion on the question now before the Court and therefore, all these matters were heard together and are being decided by this judgment. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025


Express Tribune
11 hours ago
- Express Tribune
Our grief is not justice
Another woman gone – and we are still playing the same old song and dance. Photo: File They say history is a great teacher. Unless, of course, we are talking about the treatment of women in Pakistan. In that case, the lessons rarely seem to stick. It is not that we forget what happened. In fact, on May 20 when the Supreme Court upheld Zahir Jaffer's death sentence, we proudly reposted '#JusticeForNoor'. We like the same photo of Zainab Ansari that makes the rounds on social media on her death anniversary, as many still comment that her killer should have been publicly hanged. We even speak of Qandeel Baloch's name with bated breath, recounting how unfortunate it was every time we see her picture make it back to our timeline. And now, we chant for 17-year-old Sana Yousaf. We demand the harshest punishment for her killer, calling for his swift execution, insisting that he be made an example of. We post her pictures with teary captions, share videos of her smiling, and ask: how a girl so young could be taken so violently. Outrage, by now, is a choreography we have learned by heart. And we really do mean it. And still, there is always another girl. And then another. And then another. And make no mistake, there always will be. Because ours is not a history of lessons learned – it is rot that keeps returning, like a cancer that festers in any corner it can find. 'Jaisi karni, waisi bharni' Allow us to demonstrate. On June 3, just hours after it was confirmed that Sana's murder was an act of hatred by Umar Hayat for rejecting his "friendship" proposal, social media was flooded with supportive comments. However, as the story goes, the sceptics eventually began to creep. One comment appeared. Then another. Then a third. But why was she on TikTok to begin with? Where are her parents? She must have had some involvement in this. What started as a clear case of rage on femicide by any definition of the word, swiftly flattened into a PR-friendly lecture on how girls should behave. Inevitably, rolling the red carpet for everyone's favorite pseudo-moralists, who, true to form, reach for their most iron-clad, tight-fisted defence: the Islam card. This ranged from throwaway one-liners about the necessity of modesty, casually dropped into comment sections, to full-blown fanatics spewing the most vile vitriol, calling for the swift "erasure" (being generous here) of all such women, because they are the ones spreading "fahaashi", leading society astray and betraying the word of God. Ironically, they consistently fail to acknowledge what Islam actually teaches: that there is no compulsion in religion, that justice is sacred, and that the burden of wrongdoing lies not on the victim, but the oppressor. But nuance, of course, rarely trends. Neither does picking a side, because celebrities with mammothian platforms, sweeped in at just the right time to provide half-baked statements of condemnation while simultaneously preaching the dangers of social media, the importance of privacy, and how young girls should be careful. Only a few and far between had the courage to call a spade a spade: a man felt entitled to a girl's life and he took it. It is not just the social media echo chamber that is pushing this narrative, too. Just last week, Justice Ali Baqir Najafi stood in the Supreme Court, following Jaffer's sentencing and described Noor's case as a warning against live-in relationships. Unfortunate and disgusting sure, but a cautionary tale, nevertheless. And so, the case of a woman who was tortured, killed, and beheaded became, somehow, a parable about lifestyle choices inviting danger. And the cancer does not stop at the courtroom. We saw this unfold in real time with the Dua Zehra case, where large media outlets and mainstream journalists after expressing their concerns, speculated on her character, questioned her sanity, painted her as rebellious, and amplified every salacious detail they could find. Our silent complicity Perhaps the most devastating betrayal comes when these words are repeated by our own. At the dinner table, the cancer lives in our mothers, who mourn the news as it plays on the television and then reinforce this is why girls should stay home. It grows in our grandmothers, who agree with them, sighing "in my day girls stayed quiet." It breathes in our cousin commenting, "this happens when girls don't stay within their limits". It thrives in phrases like, "apni izzat apne haath" (you are the guardian of your own honour). While there is some truth to the notion that we have a degree of control over the respect we receive from those around us, more often than not, this phrase is used in a deceptive way to teach young girls something far more insidious. It becomes a subtle, almost palatable way of implying: "What happened to you is sad but if you hadn't done this or that, you wouldn't have invited this trouble; maybe you could have saved yourself." So the point we arrive at is this: despite what we like to tell ourselves, these are not bad apples, or an "uneducated" few. This is the symptom of a society suspended in a coma, where shock is expected, but action is absent. Each time a woman's name becomes a headline, we jolt awake, shaken by our anger; we post tributes, we write captions, until slowly slipping back into a familiar sleep. The truth is, we live in a state of denial, of the unique willful kind, where we have learned to perform our grief. Public mourning has become our substitute for justice and expressions of solidarity have become our excuse to avoid confronting the systems and this has allowed this violence to happen again and again. Perhaps, at this point, this has paralysingly become our only choice. But at the very least, let us not pretend to be surprised. Let us not mourn Sana as if her death was unprecedented or unthinkable. The cancer that led us here is not new and it is not hiding. It has baked into our institutions, families, conversations and media. And it is now convincing us that our grief is enough. Which, for the record, it never was, and it never will be.


Express Tribune
2 days ago
- Express Tribune
PHC halts rollback of cadet promotions
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