Ojit Singh is Army's 1st Command Subedar Major, to advise Northern Command chief on JCO, OR matters
This newly instituted position follows a directive by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), who ordered the creation of Command Subedar Major posts across all Army Commands, including at the COAS-level. The Northern Command is the among the seven commands of the Indian Army.
The appointment of Comd SM Singh from 3 Assam Regiment was made Monday by Lt. Gen. Pratik Sharma, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Northern Command, in Udhampur.
New Delhi: Subedar Major Ojit Singh has been appointed as the first Command Subedar Major (Comd SM) of the Indian Army, a post reflecting the growing recognition of the vital role that the Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and Other Ranks (ORs) essay in evolution of the force.
The initiative is said to draw inspiration from the Senior Sergeant Major (SMA) structure used in Western militaries. Like the SMA, the Comd SM's role is intended to establish a formal communication channel between the Army's senior leadership and its JCOs and ORs, who make up the core of the force.
Comd SM Singh, an Army officer said, will serve in an advisory role to the Army commander on matters related to JCOs and ORs. This advisory function is similar to that of the Colonel Military Secretary (Col MS), who manages officer-level issues. His inputs will be key in shaping policy, morale, training standards, and personnel welfare from the ground up.
In addition to advisory responsibilities, the Comd SM will have a role in operational reviews. He will accompany the Army commander during visits to units and formations and will conduct dedicated interactions with JCOs and ORs to assess on-ground realities and communicate them back to the command leadership.
The officer added the role is purely advisory and does not include administrative responsibilities to the Army commander. Further, the tenure is set at two years, extendable to three.
'The appointment followed a rigorous interview process personally overseen by the previous Army commander. The Infantry Directorate (Inf-6) issued the final posting order for Subedar Major Ojit Singh, who was chosen from a panel of shortlisted JCOs,' the officer said.
According to the Army, this appointment is expected to institutionalise stronger trust and coordination between the Army's top brass and field units, particularly in strategically vital areas under the Northern Command.
The Indian Air Force (IAF) already has a comparable structure in place, with the Master Warrant Officer (MWO) acting as a conduit between enlisted personnel and commissioned officers, primarily on technical and personnel matters. MWOs are also recognised to influence decisions related to squadron operations and management.
(Edited by Tony Rai)
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