Diego Maradona's homicide trial is declared invalid by court
The homicide trial of Diego Maradona's medical team for alleged malpractice was declared invalid by an Argentine court on Thursday.
The decision comes after one of the three judges overseeing the case was removed due to a possible lack of impartiality and for allegedly authorizing the filming of a documentary during court hearings.
The trial, which started on March 11, must now start from scratch.
This is a developing story and will be updated.
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CBS News
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- CBS News
Justin Baldoni's $400 million lawsuit against Blake Lively, Ryan Reynolds dismissed
Justin Baldoni's $400 million lawsuit against his "It Ends With Us" co-star Blake Lively and her husband, Ryan Reynolds, was dismissed by a judge on Monday, according to court documents. Baldoni accused the couple of civil extortion and defamation after Lively accused Baldoni of sexual harassment and retaliation in a complaint filed in December. Baldoni has denied the accusation. Baldoni also sued The New York Times, which was first to report Lively's sexual harassment complaint. That lawsuit was also dismissed Monday. This is a developing story. Please check back for updates.
Vox
2 hours ago
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Justice Jackson warns the Supreme Court is manipulating the rules to benefit Trump
is a senior correspondent at Vox, where he focuses on the Supreme Court, the Constitution, and the decline of liberal democracy in the United States. He received a JD from Duke University and is the author of two books on the Supreme Court. On Friday, the Supreme Court handed down a brief order permitting the Department of Government Efficiency, the enigmatic White House entity that billionaire Elon Musk previously ran, to access a wide range of sensitive information kept by the Social Security Administration — including many individuals' bank account numbers and medical records. All three of the Court's Democrats dissented from the Court's order in Social Security Administration v. AFSCME. Realistically, it was always likely that the Trump administration would eventually prevail in this case. As Solicitor General D. John Sauer in the brief, the plaintiffs in AFSCME 'do not contend that their information has been shared with parties outside the government.' Rather, this case boils down to whether the courts can second-guess the executive branch's decisions about which government employees may see data that is already held by the government. These sorts of internal management decisions typically are not subject to judicial review. SCOTUS, Explained Get the latest developments on the US Supreme Court from senior correspondent Ian Millhiser. Email (required) Sign Up By submitting your email, you agree to our Terms and Privacy Notice . This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply. Yet, while the result in AFSCME isn't surprising, the case reveals a schism within the Court — and it highlights how the Trump administration has managed to successfully circumvent normal court procedures to quickly get their grievances before a largely sympathetic Supreme Court. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson's dissenting opinion primarily focuses on her concerns over the rapidity with which the Court hears Trump cases, and she argues that her Republican colleagues appear to have abandoned an important limit on the Court's authority (or, at least, that they've done so when the Trump administration asks them to prematurely get involved with a case). The AFSCME case arises on the Court's 'shadow docket,' a mix of emergency motions and other matters that the Court decides on an unusually tight schedule, without full briefing or oral argument. Prior to the first Trump administration, the Court rarely granted requests for shadow docket relief — indeed, lawyers were so discouraged from seeking shadow docket decisions that both the Bush and Obama administrations only requested it about once every other year. That changed once President Donald Trump took office. Now, Trump's lawyers routinely approach the justices after a lower court issues a decision constraining its actions, and the justices frequently grant Trump's administration the relief it seeks — often over the dissent of the Court's Democratic minority. But there are supposed to be rules governing when the Supreme Court may allow a litigant to bypass the normal appeals process and seek an immediate decision blocking a lower court's order. Among other things, as Jackson writes in her dissent, the government is supposed to show 'that it will actually suffer concrete or irreparable harm from having to comply with the District Court's order' before it can obtain a Supreme Court decision blocking that order. Jackson is becoming increasingly vocal about her belief that the Court should return to its prior shadow docket policy. She argues, in both her AFSCME dissent and in a similar dissent she handed down a week earlier, that her Republican colleagues have abandoned this 'irreparable harm' requirement. Moreover, as she lays out in her previous dissenting opinion in Noem v. Doe, the Court took a much narrower view of its authority under the shadow docket when the Biden administration sought relief. Moreover, the evidence laid out in Jackson's opinions suggests that her Court is applying one set of shadow docket rules to Democratic administrations and another, more favorable set of rules, to Republicans. How the shadow docket is supposed to work Prior to the first Trump administration, when a lower court ruled against someone, its order would typically remain in effect while the case was being appealed. It was possible to persuade an appeals court to suspend this order while the appeals proceeded, but appeals courts were not supposed to do so except in rare circumstances. As the Supreme Court explained in Nken v. Holder (2009), it is not enough for a party that lost in a lower court to show that it is likely to prevail on appeal when it asks a higher court to temporarily block that lower court's decision. That party must also show that it 'will be irreparably injured absent a stay.' Additionally, Nken instructs higher courts to consider whether temporarily blocking the lower court order will 'substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding' or harm 'the public interest.' One reason for this 'irreparably injured' requirement is that appeals courts are typically far less familiar with the details of a case than the trial court that initially decided it, especially when a party seeks emergency relief on something like the Supreme Court's shadow docket. So, if appeals courts are too eager to block lower court decisions before they fully consider the case on appeal, they are likely to hand down many wrongly decided orders. That said, Nken recognized that it is unfair to make a litigant wait for a higher court to step in if they need immediate, time-sensitive relief to prevent them from being injured in a way that cannot be fixed by a later court decision. As Jackson writes in her Doe dissent, appeals courts are supposed to ask 'whether the applicant can be made to wait until the conclusion of the litigation to vindicate their purported legal rights, or whether irreparable harm will befall the applicant in the interim such that the court must act early to stave off that damage.' But the Supreme Court's shadow docket orders rarely even mention this irreparable harm requirement, and even when they do mention it, they typically don't explain how the Court analyzed this question. The Court's decision in Doe, which allowed Trump to strip half-a-million immigrants of their ability to live in the United States, does not mention Nken at all. The order in AFSCME quotes the Nken standard, but it does not explain why the Republican justices who joined that order believe that this standard was met. In both cases, Jackson argues — without any rebuttal from the majority — that the Trump administration failed to show irreparable harm. In the Doe case, she points out that the administration 'does not identify any specific national-security threat or foreign-policy problem that will result' if the immigrants targeted by Trump are allowed to remain in the country for a few months longer while appeals courts fully consider the issues in that case. In the AFSCME case, it is even clearer that there is no irreparable harm. The trial court in this case found that the government 'never made clear why … the DOGE Team requires unbridled access to the [personally identifiable information] of countless Americans in order to effectuate [its] responsibilities.' And when the judge asked the Trump administration to explain why DOGE needed this information right away, the government chose instead to 'stand on the record in its current form.' The Trump administration's brief to the justices in the AFSCME case devotes only a single paragraph to the question of irreparable harm, and that paragraph also doesn't explain what harm will result if the lower court's decision is not stayed. Instead, it complains that the lower court's order 'impinges on the President's broad authority to direct the federal workforce, to oversee government information systems, and to require agencies to identify fraud, waste, and abuse.' So the Trump administration, for whatever reason, chose not to even make an argument that there is irreparable harm when it brought the AFSCME case to the justices. Nevertheless, at least five of the Court's Republicans voted to block the lower court's order. (In shadow docket cases, the Court typically does not name which justices voted with the majority. So it is possible that one of the Court's six Republicans disagreed with the Court's order but chose not to make that disagreement public.) The Court did not behave this way when a Democrat was in the White House Some justices have implicitly argued that Nken should be overruled — or, at least, that it should be modified to permit shadow docket relief in some cases where there is no irreparable harm. Concurring in Labrador v. Poe (2024), Justice Brett Kavanaugh claimed that, in many shadow docket cases, 'this Court has little choice but to decide the emergency application by assessing likelihood of success on the merits.' Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined that opinion. So Kavanaugh and Barrett, at least, have explicitly stated that there are some cases where shadow docket relief will be granted solely based on which party is likely to prevail once the case is fully litigated. But, if you look at the Court's past behavior, it seems that the main factor determining whether Nken should be abandoned is whether the party seeking shadow docket relief is a Democrat or a Republican. In her Doe dissent, Jackson flags several cases where her Court 'denied similar stay requests from federal agencies.' The primary difference between these cases and the Doe and AFSCME cases appears to be that Joe Biden was president when the Court denied these stays. In Biden v. Texas (2022), for example, the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that a Trump-appointed district judge was wrong when he ordered the Biden administration to reinstate a Trump immigration policy that required many asylum-seekers to remain on the Mexican side of the US-Mexico border while awaiting a hearing. But it did so after leaving that Trump judge's order in place for more than 10 months. Similarly, in United States v. Texas (2023) the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that a Trump judge didn't even have jurisdiction to hear a case, where the judge cut off the Biden administration's authority to set enforcement priorities for Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE). But the Court left that judge's order in place for nearly an entire year while the case was pending on appeal. Maybe there is a nonpartisan explanation for why the Court treated Biden differently than Trump. Perhaps there were legally sound, politically neutral arguments for why Nken shouldn't apply in Doe or AFSCME. Or maybe the Republican justices have a good argument for why irreparable harm does exist in those cases — even though the Trump administration didn't even bother to argue that it exists in the AFSCME case.
New York Times
2 hours ago
- New York Times
Defense cites ‘reliability concerns' of E.M. in first of closing arguments at Hockey Canada trial
LONDON, Ont. – Defense attorneys began delivering their closing arguments in the Hockey Canada sexual assault trial on Monday, attacking the complainant's testimony as containing a 'cornucopia of credibility and reliability concerns' and suggesting that she has re-tooled her narrative to present herself as a victim to evoke sympathy from friends and family and in pursuit of the civil lawsuit she settled in 2022. Advertisement Michael McLeod, Carter Hart, Alex Formenton, Dillon Dubé and Cal Foote are all charged with sexual assault after an alleged incident in June 2018. The complainant — a woman known as E.M., whose identity is protected by a publication ban — has said she was sexually assaulted over the span of several hours in a London, Ont., hotel room. The players were in town for a Hockey Canada event celebrating their gold medal at the 2018 World Junior Championship. McLeod is also facing a second charge for 'being a party to the offense' for what the Crown has asserted was his role 'assisting and encouraging his teammates to engage sexually' with E.M. All five players have pleaded not guilty. David Humphrey, attorney for McLeod, was the first defense attorney to make oral submissions in front of Justice Maria Carroccia in the eighth and final week of the trial. He pre-empted his argument by telling Carroccia that usually defense teams are 'happy to have a few hits' on the complainant, but this case has an abundance. 'This is a case where the defense has an embarrassment of riches,' Humphrey said. 'A cornucopia of credibility and reliability concerns in (E.M.'s) testimony.' E.M. testified that she met McLeod at a local bar, engaged in a night of drinking and dancing before the two went back to his hotel to have consensual sex. She said that following that initial sexual encounter, she emerged from the bathroom to find more men in the room. Over the course of several hours, she said she was pressured to perform sexual acts, spit on, slapped and asked to insert golf clubs and golf balls into her vagina. She described feeling scared and vulnerable and said that she went on 'autopilot' – dissociating to get through the night. Multiple players testified about a group text message they received from McLeod, inviting them for a '3 way quick' and supplying his room number, but said she initiated the sexual acts, asking players to have sex with her and goading them when they declined. Advertisement Humphrey said that E.M. is a 'flawed witness' whose testimony is 'unbelievable and unreliable.' She may have not wanted to acknowledge that she had a 'sexually adventurous' night in the hotel room, Humphrey said. He said that she didn't want to take responsibility for her actions and suggested that embarrassment and regret prompted her to tell a 'white lie' to her mother about what happened in the early-morning hours of June 19, 2018. Humphrey said that 'white lie' then snowballed into a criminal investigation. Humphrey seized on E.M.'s initial police interview in the days following the alleged incident and noted that she did not describe the fear she testified about when speaking with Detective Stephen Newton. (E.M. testified that at the time of that June 2018 interview with London Police, she was still processing what happened to her and felt uncomfortable talking about it with a male detective whom she had never met previously). Humphrey said that the element of fear was not sincere and instead invoked to support her $3.55 million lawsuit against Hockey Canada, which was resolved via an out-of-court settlement in 2022. 'Her new terror narrative that was advanced in the claim was scripted to remedy the deficiencies in the first narrative she had provided to Detective Newton,' Humphrey said. Justice Carroccia's first substantive remark of the day was to note the speed with which the Hockey Canada lawsuit was settled: 'Extremely quickly, frankly,' Carroccia said. 'I have never seen a settlement that takes place one month after the statement of claim is served.' In his submission, Humphrey addressed a few elements of his client's actions, including his initial interview with police in November 2018 and the two videos he referred to as 'consent videos.' Humphrey acknowledged that when McLeod was interviewed by police he did not detail the full contents of the text messages he sent to teammates, including the group chat message with an invitation for three-way sex and an invitation to another player offering a 'gummer,' which is slang for oral sex. Humphrey said he wasn't sure if McLeod just didn't remember the content of his texts or had not done a deep dive on the contents of his phone. He expressed disappointment that Newton did not ask further questions after McLeod disclosed he texted teammates that he was ordering food and had a girl in his room that night. Advertisement Humphrey said McLeod only invited a 'limited number' of players. (The 'gummer' text was sent to Taylor Raddysh. The '3 way' text was sent to a group chat of 19 players.) Humphrey argued that because the text describes a 'three-way' it wasn't reasonable to conclude he anticipated more than a few players taking him up on the invitation. 'He was surprised by the number of people who came,' Humphrey said. Humphrey said the two videos recorded in the early morning of June 19, 2018 are critical to McLeod's defense. In one of the videos, she says 'I'm OK' when asked if she's 'OK with this.' In the other, she says, 'It was all consensual.' E.M. has testified that she didn't recall those videos being recorded but said that she believes they were taken at the end of the night because she recalled McLeod hounding her to say the sexual acts were consensual. Humphrey said it was an 'unusual' and 'awkward' situation and that McLeod didn't know if E.M. would wake up the next morning to 'gloat' about what happened or with regret. He praised McLeod's presence of mind in memorializing what he described as evidence of her being 'happy' and fine with everything that was happening. 'He was drunk but he still had his head on straight and he wanted to make sure she was fully consenting,' Humphrey said. In his oral submission, Humphrey argued that the Crown had not met its burden of proof in proving the charges against his client beyond a reasonable doubt. He added that the alcohol consumption and passage of time that degraded the memory quality of many witnesses in the trial should leave the court with reasonable doubt. Humphrey also said that he wanted to explain, for those watching the proceedings less familiar with the law, that it was not the court's job to 'assess the morality of how the accused or others in the room were acting, whether they could have been better behaved or more respectful.' Advertisement 'Those issues may be of interest to the public, but they are not issues for assessment by the court,' Humphrey said. — The Athletic's Dan Robson reported remotely from Toronto and The Athletic's Kamila Hinkson reported remotely from Montreal. (Courtroom sketch of defense attorney David Humphrey from earlier in the trial by Alexandra Newbould / The Canadian Press via AP)
