How to start a war with Russia in these easy steps: Just ask Merz's Germany

Russia Today

3 days ago

If in a dark hole, dig deeper, especially even deeper than feckless German ex-chancellor Olaf Scholz. That seems to be Berlin's new motto. Under Friedrich Merz's new mis-management, the German government is clearly setting out to worsen its current abysmal non-relationship with Russia. That is a sadly ambitious aim, because things are already more dire than they've been at any point since 1945.
But Merz and his team, it seems, are not satisfied with playing a key role in fighting a proxy war against Russia that has been a ruinous fiasco; not for the Russian economy, but for Germany's. Even by February 2023, German mainstream media reported that the war had sliced 2.5 percent off GDP.
That, by the way, is a large figure in and of itself, but consider that between 2022 and 2024 Germany's annual GDP growth (or, really, reduction) rate has varied between -0.3 percent (2023) and +1.4 percent, and it looks even worse.
And yet, instead of sincerely – and finally – trying to use diplomacy to end this war against Russia via Ukraine, Merz's Berlin is now taking the risk of escalating the current mess into the nightmare of a direct military clash between Russia and Germany (and, hence, presumably NATO – though not necessarily including the US any longer). Such a confrontation would be devastating in a manner that Germans have not experienced for a long time, as even a recent German TV documentary had to admit, despite its obvious purpose to boost the country's current re-militarization-on-steroids.
The single most obvious symbol of Berlin's new, industrial-strength recklessness is the Taurus cruise missile, a sophisticated, very expensive weapon (at €1-3 million each) with a full name you will want to forget (Target Adaptive Unitary and Dispenser Robotic Ubiquity System) and, crucially, a maximum range of about 500 kilometers.
The government under Scholz, breathtakingly incompetent and shamelessly submissive to the US as it was, never agreed to let Ukraine have this weapon. For, in essence, two reasons: The Taurus, once in Ukraine, could fire deep into Russia, even as far as Moscow, and it is undeniable that it can only be operated with direct German help, which would bring about a state of war between Moscow and Berlin. Merz, however, has created a vague yet substantial impression that delivering the Taurus to Kiev is an option again.
Throughout this war – and its prehistory, too – Russia has been sending clear warnings about what such a war might entail: According to Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, for instance, Germany is 'already directly engaging' in the Ukraine War. But clearly, he, too, sees room for things to get much worse again, with, in his words, Germany 'sliding down the same slippery slope it has already treaded a couple of times just this past century – down to its collapse.'
Dmitry Peskov, spokesman of President Vladimir Putin, has underlined that Merz's statements, muddled as they were, pointed to a 'serious escalation.' Less diplomatically, the head of Russia's RT, Margarita Simonyan, has explained that German-Ukrainian Taurus strikes on Russian cities could provoke a Russian missile strike on Berlin. An important Russian military expert, meanwhile, has mentioned the possibility of a strike against Taurus production facilities in Germany.
Are these warnings any help? Of course, German politicians would not openly admit to being successfully deterred by Moscow, but it is a fact that Merz has abstained from following through on his implied threat of transferring the Taurus to Ukraine.
If he had wanted to do so, the visit of Ukraine's leader Vladimir Zelensky in Berlin would have provided an excellent opportunity to close the deal. Yet, instead of the hotly desired cruise missiles, Zelensky has received something else: a demonstrative use of the German informal you ('du'), plenty of money (again), and a promise that Germany will help build long-range weapons in Ukraine. Considering that Moscow has just demonstrated its ability to strike such production facilities anywhere in Ukraine, that promise is the equivalent of a cop-out. For now at least.
That is a good thing. It avoids an immediate, extremely dangerous escalation. Yet Merz and his experts are naïve if they believe that there will be no Russian response to their declared intention to transfer German know-how to Ukraine so that long-range weapons can be made there.
For one thing, Moscow has just demonstrated its ability to strike Ukraine's military industry. At the same time, even the Taurus is by no means off the table. Neither are Russian warnings about the catastrophic consequences of its use. The Russian Defense Ministry is confident that its air defenses could stop Taurus strikes, but also emphasizes that its special ability to fly far into Russia constitutes a problem in a class all by itself.
What is the new Berlin even trying to do here? Negotiations to end the war are ongoing, even if Merz claims the opposite. Russia is not, as he repeats, merely 'playing for time.' In reality, the second round of the Istanbul 2.0 talks is now scheduled to go ahead, at least as far as Moscow is concerned.
The real problem for Western politicians like Merz is that Moscow is not willing to abandon its own interests or comply with unilateral demands backed up by threats.
Indeed, if a plausible Reuters report based on leaks is correct, Putin has outlined Russia's conditions for a realistic settlement once again: unsurprisingly, they include a complete stop to NATO expansion, an at least partial end to sanctions against Russia and to attempts to fully seize frozen Russian sovereign assets, the genuine neutrality of Ukraine, and protection for its Russian-speakers.
Against this background, Merz's recent sallies are only more puzzling: Russia is not weak but winning this war. A summer offensive may be close and make Ukraine's situation even more untenable. But there also is a genuine opportunity to exploit negotiations that have been restarted so as to finally limit the losses to both Ukraine and the West.
Meanwhile, the reluctance of the US to reliably back up a hard course against Russia could permit the NATO-EU Europeans to explore constructive alternatives to the ongoing proxy war. Indeed, it should be their worst nightmare to be left alone with this conflict if Moscow and Washington should break through to a full détente.
The German economy will not thrive – even with a hail-Mary boost of debt-based military Keynesianism, as now launched by Merz – unless its relationship with Russia is reframed. Last but not least, Ukraine will not be rebuilt before there is a durable peace.
And Berlin's response to all of the above? More of the same, but worse. Now, with the Taurus back on the options menu and open announcements to help Ukraine build, in essence, its own version of it, presumably under intense German coaching and packed with German technology, Kiev's chances are not better and Germany's position is more precarious. The probability of an escalation into a direct Russian-German war remains even higher than before Merz's new initiative, and the probability of peace has been reduced. Call it a lose-lose.