What SE Asia does and doesn't want from Trump

Asia Times

09-04-2025

On his first official visit to Asia, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth underscored while in Tokyo the need for Japan to accelerate military strengthening in light of China's growing assertiveness and the looming risk of a Taiwan contingency.
From Manila to Hanoi, regional leaders have publicly welcomed reassurances of the US's security presence, viewing America's 'robust, ready and credible' approach to China – as described by Hegseth – as a needed deterrent that their own militaries cannot mount alone.
Yet beneath the chorus of strategic approval runs a quieter undercurrent of anxiety: Could America's Indo-Pacific ultimately tilt tip the region toward instability rather than restore equilibrium?
In recent turmoil involving Canada, Panama, Greenland and Yemen, US security concerns have been revealed to function less as strategic interests than as instruments of economic leverage.
'If the US successfully restores freedom of navigation (for shipping lanes around the Middle East) at great cost, there needs to be some further economic gain extracted in return,' wrote S.M., according to leaked Signal chats reported by multiple news outlets. S.M. is believed to indicate Stephen Miller, the White House's deputy chief of staff.
In the Indo-Pacific, the logic of 'America First' extends beyond economics into the realm of security – shaped by a doctrine of denial articulated by Defense Undersecretary-nominee Elbridge Colby.
America's Indo-Pacific strategy is clear: deny China regional hegemony through forward military posturing, strengthened alliances and assertive naval operations.
To many ASEAN states, to be sure, that approach has its appeal. China's rise, after all, hasn't just jeopardized the security of trade routes – it has militarized the South China Sea and deepened regional asymmetries. The US's focus on deterrence thus presents a timely hedge.
That deterrent logic, however, is fragile. Consider Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific's geopolitical tripwire. President Donald Trump's administration has emboldened Taipei through continued high-profile arms deals and repeated rhetorical affirmations.
In February, the US State Department amended its Taiwan Fact Sheet, removing the phrase 'we do not support Taiwan independence' as part of what it described as a routine update.
While these moves boost morale in Taiwan and draw praise in Tokyo and Manila, they simultaneously narrow China's strategic options.
The People's Liberation Army's recent 'Strait Thunder-2025A' live-fire exercises surrounding the self-governing island underscore a sobering reality: Beijing perceives US moves not as defensive, but as prelude to permanent separation. The more the US doubles down, the more likely China is to test its resolve.
This feedback loop raises the specter of strategic overreach.
In conjunction with Hegseth's Asia tour, Tokyo launched the Japan Joint Operations Command, a new body tasked with coordinating its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces – a significant step toward strengthening Japan's ability to respond to regional contingencies and deepening operational cooperation with US forces.
The US currently has 55,000 troops stationed in Japan, 28,500 in South Korea and a growing rotational presence in the Philippines. Add AUKUS nuclear submarine deployments and increased intelligence-sharing under the Quad, and the region increasingly resembles a Cold War-era containment arc.
Yet Trump's approach lacks the full-spectrum diplomacy that once underpinned credible deterrence. Absent a credible economic program for ASEAN, his strategy leans heavily on trade coercion without offering a corresponding vision for regional development.
The 'Liberation Day' tariffs, announced on April 2, 2025, threaten to deliver a sharp economic blow to all ASEAN states, including strategic ally Singapore, despite its Free Trade Agreement with the US and existing trade deficit, not surplus.
Cambodia faces the highest tariff at 49%, followed by Laos at 48%, Vietnam at 46% and Myanmar at 44% – even though its trade with the US remains minimal due to existing sanctions.
Thailand and Indonesia face tariffs of 36% and 32%, respectively, while Brunei and Malaysia are each hit with a 24% levies. The Philippines fares slightly better at 17%, while both Timor-Leste and Singapore face the baseline 10%.
Unlike China's Belt and Road Initiative, which continues to position Beijing as ASEAN's leading infrastructure partner, Trump's punitive trade measures come without meaningful investment or aid, further eroding long-term regional goodwill.
There is also a deeper historical irony at play. In Washington, Japan's growing military assertiveness is widely seen as a success of US security leadership. But casting Taiwan's stability as essential to Japan's own national security revives certain bitter memories among its Southeast Asian neighbors.
The echoes are hard to ignore: In 1931, Japan justified its invasion of Manchuria, triggered by the staged Mukden Incident, on strikingly similar grounds – protecting vital interests from perceived Chinese encroachment.
Without a meaningful reckoning with this past, Japan's shift away from postwar pacifism, however US-encouraged, risks alienating ASEAN rather than uniting it under the American banner.
And yet, perhaps the greatest risk of American overreach lies in the fact that the US 'doctrine of denial' is calibrated for theater-specific flashpoints – Taiwan, the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands.
But key ASEAN states such as Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia are not eager to enter such permanent alignments. Southeast Asia seeks deterrence without entrapment.
Trump, however, leaves little room for nuance. His worldview, which appears zero-sum thus far – where failing to align with America is seen as siding with China – risks alienating the very middle powers whose support is crucial to sustaining US power and influence in the region.
As Singapore's Foreign Minister Dr Vivian Balakrishnan reminded Parliament at last month's Committee of Supply debate, 'We must maintain an omnidirectional balance and a constructive engagement with all partners.'
Even as the US reasserts deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, China is mounting a parallel campaign to reshape perceptions and re-anchor Southeast Asia in its orbit.
Long gone is China's snarling rhetoric of 'wolf warrior' diplomacy from 2017. In its place is a strategic reset wrapped in charm, trade and deference to ASEAN Centrality.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi now echoes the language of regional autonomy, calling for a 'multipolar world' and defending Southeast Asia's 'right to choose.'
Beijing's statecraft appears to have shifted from confrontation to courtship. At the same time, it has reinforced its status as ASEAN's largest trading partner for 16 consecutive years.
President Xi Jinping's upcoming visits to Malaysia, Cambodia and Vietnam this month reflect China's deeper, concerted push for personal diplomacy and economic pragmatism.
Even Indonesia's recent decision to join BRICS and strengthen digital and green cooperation with China underlines a wider regional trend: hedging against American volatility by embracing Chinese steadfastness.
Furthermore, China's multilateral rhetoric – championing ASEAN-led platforms like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and promoting minilateral initiatives like 'Security Belt 2025' – gives it further legitimacy as a partner invested in peace, not provocation.
To be clear, China's charm offensive carries its own sharp edges – its tense relationship with the Philippines is a case in point. The Philippines remains a crucial node in America's first island chain of forward defense.
During his recent stop in Manila, Hegseth announced that the US would deploy additional advanced military capabilities for joint training, enhance interoperability for 'high-end operations,' and prioritize defense industrial cooperation with the Philippines.
Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, Manila has deepened its security ties with Washington – welcoming increased US troop rotations, participating in expanded trilateral exercises with Japan and Australia, and openly condemning Chinese harassment of Filipino vessels near the Second Thomas Shoal and other contested sea features.
Meanwhile, China's maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea has grown more calibrated – aggressive enough to assert red lines, yet measured enough to avoid outright conflict. Still, this delicate balancing act exposes the limits of Beijing's soft-power reset.
While China may outspend and outbuild the United States in infrastructure in Southeast Asia, it cannot easily dispel the deep-seated anxieties provoked by its territorial assertiveness. ASEAN nations may engage with Beijing's diplomacy, but many remain wary of its gray-zone tactics.
In effect, Southeast Asia is not choosing between Washington and Beijing – it is balancing, hedging and gaming both. The danger lies in mistaking polite nods for alignment. Trump's administration must recognize that regional countries prefer options over ultimatums and dialogue over dominance.
Critics may argue that Trump's tough talk has at least reawakened America's strategic muscle. But history urges skepticism.
His first term was marked by erratic diplomacy – courting North Korea's Kim Jong Un while withdrawing from foundational multilateral frameworks such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Agreement.
For all its bluster – from a Ukraine ceasefire that has failed to hold, to hostages still held by Hamas, to Houthi rebels continuing to menace shipping lanes near Yemen – Trump's brand of deterrence so far feels more performative than institutionalized.
Indeed, Indo-Pacific allies and partners are left wondering whether US support comes with an expiry date. US Defense Undersecretary-nominee Colby's 'Strategy of Denial' calls for prioritizing the Indo-Pacific by assembling a tightly knit coalition to resist Chinese hegemony.
But ASEAN doesn't just want a wall. Its youthful populations, emerging industries, growing infrastructure needs and appetite for investment – whether financial, technological, or developmental – demand partners who are willing to build bridges as well.
ASEAN wants a US that can deter China while also reassuring the region. It wants an America that upholds international rules without provoking war. It wants a US that invests in shared prosperity undergirded by an equilibrium that a robust security architecture offers.
Southeast Asia – long accustomed to being an arena for great power rivalry – remains acutely aware that deterrence without diplomacy is a dangerous gamble.
Living in permanent proximity to China, and mindful of America's history of strategic withdrawals, the region understands that US overreach today could lead to hemispheric abandonment tomorrow.
Marcus Loh is a director at Temus, a digital transformation services firm headquartered in Singapore, where he leads public affairs, marketing and strategic communication.
He was formerly the President of the Institute of Public Relations of Singapore and presently serves on the digital transformation chapter executive committee of SG Tech, the leading trade association for Singapore's technology industry.