Ukraine experiencing drone shortage
Ukrainian forces are facing a critical shortage of drones, the BBC has reported, citing officers from various units. They told the broadcaster that a third of the drones needed by the army are being purchased using unit-held funds or assembled from wreckage.
The news comes a week after Kiev launched a coordinated drone strike on multiple Russian air bases, targeting long-range, nuclear-capable bombers stationed in the country's north and far east. Moscow has reported that most of the drones were intercepted, and that the aircraft targeted were damaged, but not destroyed as Ukrainian officials claimed. According to Kiev, more than 40 Russian bombers were hit in the attacks.
Earlier this week, Ukraine's Vladimir Zelensky told ABC News that only Ukrainian-made weapons were used in the attacks, which had reportedly been planned for more than a year.
A commander of the drone systems battalion of the 58th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Sergey Varakin, told BBC that a year ago his unit could afford to launch up to 100 first-person-view (FPV) aerial drones a day, adding that the current situation is 'nothing like that anymore.'
'Now, our brigade can receive only 200–300 FPV drones a month through official supply requests,' Varakin emphasized.
According to the commander of the 429th Separate UAV Regiment, Yury Fedorenko, as cited by the news outlet, only a third of drones meeting the army's needs are typically delivered via state-backed supply channels. He specified that another third are purchased with unit-held funds, while the remaining third come from voluntary donations by Ukrainians.
Fedorenko emphasized that state-supported drone supplies are often delivered with a two-month delay due to bureaucratic foot-dragging.
Drone operators from several brigades deployed near Pokrovsk, the largest city remaining under Ukrainian control in the southwest of the DPR, also reported a shortage, adding that they are trying to obtain drones by all possible means, sometimes assembling them from old parts.
The Russian military has repeatedly targeted drone manufacturing facilities and launch sites in Ukraine. The latest strikes came shortly after an attack on military airfields across the country.
FPV drones have played a pivotal role on the battlefield since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict in February 2022. The Times reported in May that Russia has taken the lead in the drone race, surpassing Ukraine in the production and use of medium-range FPV drones and their fiber-optic variants.
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