Controversial Unification Church may be dissolved in Japan
The Unification Church has come under intense scrutiny in
Japan since a former prime minister was assassinated, but it could soon fall even further from grace.
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Authorities said in October 2023 they were seeking to dissolve the influential sect, founded in South Korea and nicknamed the 'Moonies' after its late founder, Sun Myung Moon.
The church is accused of pressuring followers into making life-ruining donations, and blamed for child neglect among its members – although it has denied any wrongdoing.
Now a court order is expected to strip the group of legal recognition as early as this month, major Japanese media outlets reported.
The dissolution would remove the church's tax-exempt status while branding the organisation a harmful entity.
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Asia Times
an hour ago
- Asia Times
US lethality not enough to counter China's malign influence
Originally published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission. The Trump administration, particularly Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, correctly identifies the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the primary threat to regional security, especially its stated ambitions for Taiwan. Were the PRC to seize Taiwan militarily without US intervention, Beijing could dictate the terms of trade past the island, project power farther into the Pacific and cause Washington's allies in East Asia and emerging partners on the Indian subcontinent to question US willingness to stand up for them. Hegseth has called for a defense budget increase, and the Pentagon is currently drafting its new national security strategy, due in August. He has also made clear that the United States would be ready to respond if Taiwan were attacked. Yet he also notes, correctly, the need to deter such a conflict. The effects of a war over Taiwan would be so catastrophic that neither side could win – not the United States, whose aircraft carriers would be vulnerable to Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles; not China, whose troops would be vulnerable during the initial strait crossing and whose economy might contract as much as 25%; not Taiwan, which might see its miraculous economic growth erased even if it survived as an autonomous entity. And not the world, which is ever more dependent on the technology-fueled growth enabled by the semiconductors that Taiwan plays the leading role in fabricating. Hegseth is signaling that the United States will prioritize countering an invasion and mobilize the necessary resources to do so, including reviving the industrial base and investing in shipyards. He also noted that deterring conflict with the PRC is not America's role alone, and his remarks at the Shangri-la Dialogue last month demonstrated a keen interest in working with US partners in the region in that endeavor. He called upon them to make a similar investment in their defense and combat readiness. Hegseth has emphasized the need to prioritize the 'lethality' of America's armed forces, also using similar descriptors like 'warfighting' and 'readiness.' It would appear that this administration views hard power as the key to keeping the PRC from achieving its aims for the region. However, do the Pentagon and its sister agencies have a plan to prevent China from winning without war? It has been easy in recent years for the PRC's critics to mock its political shortcomings as Beijing's prickliness over issues it considers core strategic areas has overridden its diplomatic professionalism, leading to it alienating previously ambivalent partners. In 2011, China took the step of withholding rare-earth exports to Japan during a territorial dispute; within a decade, Japanese leaders would openly discuss defending Taiwan as a national security priority despite Tokyo's pacifist constitution. From 2016-2022, China enjoyed warm relations with the Philippines under the Duterte administration – which considered ending their hosting of US bases – only for public outrage over Chinese aggression in the South China Sea to prompt a course change by Duterte and the election of a pro-US administration in 2022. South Koreans, who had long seen China as essential not only for economic growth but for a resolution to inter-Korean division, now have among the world's most negative views of China following years of PRC enabling of North Korea plus the spread of Covid-19 and sanctions imposed on the country following THAAD deployment. Taiwan, which until 2016 had leadership that desired to deepen cooperation with the PRC and eventually achieve unification, now has elected three successive administrations supportive of independence, and the PRC's response has been a series of punitive measures that have only deepened the public's antipathy toward Beijing. It must be stressed, again, that those 'wins' for Washington were the product of PRC actions taken in defense of what Beijing considers core interests – whether concerning territorial rights, defense of the Chinese mainland or the credibility of Communist Party rule – and had little to do with US messaging or improvements to the American reputation in the region. And political successes in these countries may not be as durable as they appear. Taiwan's pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party recently launched a sweeping set of measures designed to counter PRC influence, but its pro-unification opposition still finds much success in local elections and now holds the majority in the Legislative Yuan, where it has used that majority to fight the defense budget increases the Trump administration wants to see, and even civil defense-bolstering programs. The current leadership of the Philippines has been strident in its support for the US alliance and has done the most among ASEAN nations to shine a light on the PRC's coercive tactics in the South China Sea. Yet the former president, who enjoyed a much friendlier relationship with China, remains a popular figure despite his recent arrest by the International Criminal Court. Duterte's party did very well in recent Senate elections, increasing the chances that his daughter, the current vice president, will survive upcoming impeachment proceedings and run for president herself in 2028. South Korea, after three years of close cooperation with the United States and Japan, just elected a candidate much more open to cooperation with China. Even Japan, where the success of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party is rarely in doubt, currently labors through a period of weak governance that makes the formulation of effective defense policy difficult, especially in terms of overcoming its post-war pacifism and insularity and preparing for an operation as risky as the defense of Taiwan. If the United States is to remain engaged in the Indo-Pacific and prevent PRC domination, it faces obstacles that cannot be solved by lethality alone. The PRC currently wages a campaign that lethality cannot counter. As Xi Jinping continues to purge high-ranking officers, the PRC would seem to lack the capability to direct an invasion even if it has the manpower and equipment to wage one. Therefore, its assaults on these locations will remain more subtle. These will include: seeking to co-opt the target countries' politicians, academics, media and social media personalities with paid trips to China, directing and controlling diaspora communities through the presence of overseas 'police stations' that some countries are not legally equipped to counteract, buying up crucial assets and establishing partnerships to ensure deference from business communities, and spreading narratives through official and unofficial channels that the United States is unreliable, untrustworthy and unable to counter the inevitability of China's rise. If the United States is not engaged in countering such influence, in the next five years Taiwan could again have a pro-unification leadership – or, at least, gridlock could prevent it from adequately prepping its defenses – while Manila could turn against hosting US military bases, Seoul could vow neutrality in a Taiwan contingency and Tokyo might not have made any meaningful preparations to counter PRC ambitions in the region. Under such circumstances, even if the defense secretary does get the most lethal US military in history, the US armed forces may be rendered helpless by politics in partner countries. The recent departure of Elon Musk, the Department of Government Efficiency's founder, from the US government is an opportunity to begin rebuilding soft power organs – USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy and the Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy and Labor at the State Department – that were targeted by spending cuts. The Defense Department should be part of broader, whole-of-government efforts – including State, Commerce, Energy, Treasury and others – not just to counter the PRC, but also to erode its influence. The lethality of US forces should not merely be enhanced; partners should know the United States will use it to good ends, including their defense against unprovoked aggression. The Trump administration need not worry about empowering political leaders who do not share its vision – political parties of the right are leading the charge against Chinese influence in Manila, Seoul, Tokyo and elsewhere and, despite its name, Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party is a big tent more committed to Taipei's autonomy than to political progressivism. Nor should such moves be seen as interference in the domestic affairs of partners; Washington has worked with unlikely partners in countries where politicians have campaigned on skepticism of the United States – until they, and the constituencies that elected them, saw what the alternative to the United States was. But before the United States can convince these countries that they should arm themselves, Washington must first convince regional countries that there is a threat to prepare for and that the United States is the reliable partner it claims to be. A trillion dollars in lethal weapons systems, by itself, will not buy that. Rob York ( rob@ ) is director for regional affairs at Pacific Forum International. He is the editor of Pacific Forum publications and spearheads Pacific Forum outreach to the Korean Peninsula and South Asia, as well as programming on countering malign influence in US partners. He earned his PhD in Korean history in December 2023.
Asia Times
a day ago
- Asia Times
Asia's shaky economies need a US-China trade truce, fast
As Asian governments go through the motions of negotiating with the US, Donald Trump's trade war is inflicting serious and ever-increasing damage on the region's largest economies. It remains to be seen what the US and China will ultimately agreed on in London this week. Vague talk of a preliminary strategy to ease trade tensions, with zero specifics or timelines, has so far left global markets with more questions than answers. The final readout said the two sides agreed in principle on a framework for de-escalating trade tensions, which will next be presented to Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping for approval, according to reports. In the meantime, Japan and South Korea, Asia's No 2 and No 4 economies, are officially in negative territory, both down 0.2% in the first quarter on an annualized basis. What's important to consider is that these contractions predate the worst of Trump's tariffs. As the full brunt of those import taxes hits, Japan and Korea are sure to slide deeper into the red. Those levies include 30% on China, down from 145% earlier, 25% on autos, 50% on steel and aluminum and 10% across the board globally. Things could quickly get worse from there if China's factory gate deflation deepens. In May, China's producer prices fell to the lowest level in nearly two years. Consumer prices, meanwhile, extended declines as trade headwinds collide with a prolonged housing downturn. The 3.3% year-on-year drop in the May producer price index was even steeper than the 2.7% decline in April — and the deepest contraction in 22 months. China, says economist Zhiwei Zhang at Pinpoint Asset Management, 'continues to face persistent deflationary pressure.' Given the magnitude of the headwinds, says Johns Hopkins University economist Steve Hanke, it's 'no surprise' why this is the fourth-straight month in which China's consumer price trajectory 'has been gripped with an outright deflation.' The collateral damage from Trump's trade war is rising, in part because no one knows where the tariffs are headed. On China, it's still an open question whether Trump will lower Chinese taxes to 10% or raise them to 100%. For Japan and Korea, only Trump can say whether or not reciprocal tariffs of 24% and 25%, respectively, will soon return. Risks abound as neither Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba nor new South Korean President Lee Jae-myung seems in any hurry to sign a bilateral trade pact with the US that might disadvantage their populations. That risks enraging a Trump White House desperate for any deal at all. Declarations by Trump trade Peter Navarro and Howard Lutnick have aged terribly. Trade advisor Navarro earlier assured that Trump would seal 90 deals in 90 days. Commerce Secretary Lutnick's late April statement that Trump already had 200 agreements nailed down is now a punchline. As Trump becomes more desperate for a win, real or imagined, the odds of him making tariffs great again increase. Especially since Chinese leader Xi Jinping hasn't rolled out lots of concessions, as Trump hoped. Optimism that Xi's government might increase the flow of now-restricted rare-earth minerals hasn't come to fruition. On Sunday, Kevin Hassett, Trump's National Economic Council head, told CBS News: 'We want the rare earths, the magnets that are crucial for cell phones and everything else to flow just as they did before the beginning of April, and we don't want any technical details slowing that down. And that's clear to them.' Yet what Xi has in common with Ishiba and Lee is a belief that time is on his side. The longer Trump's tariffs fan US inflation and cause economic disruption at home, the more he needs big splashy trade deals to justify the pain households are enduring in the name of making America great again. It follows, then, that Trump will become more willing to sign trade deals in name only to save face. That's the strategy China and Japan employed during the Trump 1.0 era to great effect. And it might well work again under Trump 2.0. The best hope for the global economy and financial system is Trump throttling back on tariffs in the months ahead. 'If this problem goes away, I think that the second half of this year will actually be one of growth,' says Indermit Gill, the World Bank's chief economist. The World Bank has a rather bleak view of the rest of 2025. It expects the slowest growth in 17 years, outside of recessionary periods. It sees global growth weakening to 2.3% this year, 0.4 percentage points less than it expected a few months back. Trouble in bigger economies is sure to spill over into smaller, less developed ones, given today's 'tight trade and investment linkages' with the US, Europe and China, the World Bank said in a report. The good news is that 'capital flows to emerging markets stabilized in May, breaking a two-month pattern of volatility and retrenchment,' says Jonathan Fortun, an economist at the Institute of International Finance. Non-resident flows rose to US$19.2 billion, marking a decisive shift from the $3.7 billion net outflow recorded in April. 'The rebound,' Fortun says, 'was broad-based, with both equity and debt components contributing positively. However, the recovery masks significant asymmetries across regions and asset classes, and the underlying investor tone remains cautious in light of ongoing global uncertainty.' Fortun adds that emerging Asia was the main beneficiary in May, attracting $11.4 billion across asset classes. 'The bulk of the inflows came through local debt and equity channels, as investors responded to stabilizing inflation prints and more predictable policy stances,' he says. In contrast, Fortun adds, Latin America recorded a modest 1.1 billion in net inflows, with strong equity demand partially offset by a sharp decline in debt flows. Emerging Europe attracted $5.1 billion, 'supported by resilient demand for domestic bonds in countries with improved fiscal outlooks,' he notes. In Japan's case, says economist Takeshi Yamaguchi at Morgan Stanley MUFG, markets are waiting with bated breath for the Bank of Japan's views on downside risks. BOJ Governor Kazuo Ueda, after all, is grappling with the impact of Trump's 25% automobile tariff by the US on small and midsize enterprises and spring wage negotiations amid prolonged US-Japan trade discussions. Yamaguchi says BOJ officials are also watching the impact of China's rare-earth export regulations on manufacturing activity, including automobile production. Other factors include the impact of US lawmakers giving Trump latitude to tax foreign investors, including potentially for punitive purposes on US Treasury holders. 'All underlying inflation measures of the BOJ have risen further' in the central bank's latest update, Yamaguchi says. Stefan Angrick, head of Japan at Moody's Analytics, notes that 'tariffs and tariff threats are damaging [Japan's] exports and industrial production. Household spending is weak as inflation outpaces wage growth, and pay gains may slow further if tariff pain derails the economy.' At the same time, Angrick says, slowing inflation will 'help home-made demand find better traction, but reduced government support for energy bills and a surge in food prices mean inflation will decelerate very gradually.' This will push real pay gains further into the distance, raising the stakes ahead of the upper house election in July, Angrick adds. Opposition parties have called for consumption tax cuts to ease the cost-of-living crisis. 'We're not convinced that's the best way forward,' Angrick says. But Prime Minister Shigeru's blanket rejection of all forms of fiscal support was already looking shaky before the trade war ramped up. All told, the outlook for 2025 looks extremely challenging.' In Seoul, the arrival of President Lee's new administration 'will reduce political tensions and improve the country's economic outlook,' following the six-month vacuum caused by Yoon Suk Yeol's impeachment, says Jeremy Chan, a Eurasia Group analyst. 'Lee will immediately confront two major challenges: reviving economic growth and striking a trade deal with the US to reduce crippling US tariffs on Korean exports,' Chan says. China's trajectory is complicated by a serious property crisis that's helping to drive deflation. The danger is that the trade war precipitates 'a race deeper into deflation,' says Tom Orlik, chief economist for Bloomberg Economics. Zichun Huang, China economist at Capital Economics, adds that 'we still think persistent overcapacity will keep China in deflation both this year and next.' There's still hope Trump might pivot away from tariffs. Headlines about several trillions of dollars of stock market losses, talk of a 'Trumpcession' and chatter that the so-called 'bond vigilantes' were displeased had Trump backing off. The same with China's stance going into the weekend trade talks in Geneva in mid-May, where Team Xi demanded a goodwill gesture on tariffs; Trump ultimately obliged by throttling back on import taxes from 145% to 30%. Asian 'economies now face the secondary shock of an influx of cheap Chinese imports, as China exports excess capacity amid subdued domestic demand and elevated trade tensions with the US and other developed markets,' says Alex Wolf, head of Asia investment strategy at JP Morgan Private Bank. 'This phenomenon is already negatively impacting local emerging market manufacturing and employment.' Wolf adds that 'as the Trump administration targets not just China but almost every trading partner with trade imbalances – whether due to trade deficits or tariff rate differentials – many EM [emerging market] economies could end up in the crosshairs. With both the direct impact of US tariffs and the indirect impact of a slowing China and weaker global trade, EM economies may face tougher challenges ahead.' Yet the detour in Trump's phraseology thickens the plot. Around 'Liberation Day' on April 2, Trump World argued the US is being 'looted, pillaged, raped and plundered by nations near and far.' Since then, Trump's White House has also talked of the 'importance of a sustainable, long-term and mutually beneficial economic and trade relationship.' All officials in Tokyo and Seoul can do is hope real progress was made behind closed doors in London this week. In the interim, though, Asia's 2025 is turning out monumentally different from what Asia expected. Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek
Asia Times
a day ago
- Asia Times
Recommitting to Japan-South Korea cooperation amid uncertainty
This article, originally published by Pacific Forum, is republished with permission. As President Lee Jae-myung takes office in South Korea, his new government is poised to begin rebuilding domestic trust and setting forth a new foreign policy agenda. South Korea has been in political limbo for the past six months since former president Yoon Suk Yeol briefly declared martial law in December 2024 – and in the meantime the international arena has been thrown into chaos. As South Korea reemerges into this new global context, it faces some difficult decisions about how to manage its relationships with its key economic and security partners. Precisely because of this uncertain outlook, now is a critical time for the governments in South Korea and Japan to recommit to further strengthening their bilateral relations to deal with shared problems. Prior to the recent period of limbo, Japan-South Korea ties had improved markedly as part of a push by former President Yoon, former Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and former US President Joe Biden to strengthen trilateral relations among their countries. Since the trilateral Camp David Summit in August 2023, over 80 US-Korea-Japan dialogues have been convened to promote collaboration in areas ranging from economics to security to people-to-people exchange. However, with recent changes in political leadership, there are questions as to how Japan-South Korea relations will evolve in the coming months under the Shigeru Ishida and Lee administrations as the two leaders begin to engage. Why should the governments of Japan and South Korea recommit to cooperation now? To begin with, the two governments face worsening security threats. Both Japan and South Korea harbor long-standing concerns about China, as well as about North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Concerns about North Korea have been compounded by deepening cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow in the war in Ukraine and the likelihood that Russia is rewarding North Korea's support with the transfer of military technologies. In addition, Japan and South Korea depend heavily on an international economic order that is currently in crisis. For years, the World Trade Organization has been stalled by disagreements among developed and developing countries and challenged by the practices of China's state-led economic system. Now, the trade system is under immense strain as the United States imposes unilateral tariffs that undermine the 'most favored nation' principle, and escalating trade war looms as a possibility. Japan and South Korea share an interest in stabilizing the existing economic order, maintaining relatively free flow of goods and services and strengthening their own economic security and national resilience. Moreover, Japan and South Korea must deal with a mutual US ally that is increasingly a source of disruption rather than stability. Both countries run significant trade surpluses with the US, which has made them top targets for tariffs. Japan and South Korea currently face reciprocal tariffs of 24% and 25% respectively, as well as Section 232 tariffs on autos, auto parts, steel, and aluminum. Japanese and Korean companies are being asked to invest more in the US. The two governments are also facing US pressure to boost their defense spending and host nation support and to increase other kinds of alliance burden-sharing at the same time as the US is considering reducing its military presence. In general, the return of an 'America First' approach to US foreign policy throws traditional alliances and institutions into question, leaving Japan and South Korea in a more vulnerable position. How can Japan and South Korea work together to address these challenges? The first step is to maintain the positive progress that has been achieved over the last two mechanisms have been established, and plans have been set in motion to start addressing many of the common concerns mentioned previously. Some initiatives will need to be reexamined under new national leadership, but they constitute an important baseline that should not be lost. Although the Trump administration has reaffirmed support for trilateral US-Japan-South Korea cooperation so far, Tokyo and Soul may need to push forward bilaterally without Washington in some cases. Second, Japan and South Korea may benefit from consulting with one another regarding their respective bilateral negotiations with the US on trade and security issues. In some cases, they may even find creative ways to coordinate their efforts. For example, SK Group Chairman Chey Tae-won recently proposed that South Korea and Japan could respond to US pressure by jointly purchasing liquefied natural gas from the US, 'to increase deal size and leverage greater buying power to secure lower prices.' This type of approach could be applied in other areas. Tokyo and Seoul could also quietly consult on their respective bottom lines, to avoid one government taking a 'bad' deal with the US that sets a negative precedent for the other. Third, Japan and South Korea can build upon the foundation of the last two years to cultivate more widespread support for improving bilateral ties among their domestic stakeholders including legislators, civil society organizations, scholars and the general public. There have already been modest improvements in the two countries' public sentiment toward each other, and now is the time to build on this momentum. The more stakeholders who see Japan-South Korea ties as valuable, the more resilient their relationship will be to negative episodes in the future. There are also likely to be opportunities to build ties in the trilateral context; for example, the US House of Representatives recently introduced bipartisan legislation to establish an inter-parliamentary dialogue among elected politicians in the US, Japan and South Korea. Fourth, Japan and South Korea will benefit from embedding their bilateral cooperation in broader regional and international coalitions. Most of the problems that these two countries face cannot be solved through bilateral cooperation alone; instead, Tokyo and Seoul must partner with other governments in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and elsewhere to address transnational security and economic challenges. For example, Lee, the new president, has already announced that he will be attending the June summit of the G7, which is an important venue for South Korea to consult with other like-minded countries as a guest. Japan and South Korea can continue to strengthen their cooperation with NATO as part of the 'Indo-Pacific 4.' The two countries should also explore ways to shore up the international economic system through broader trade initiatives. For example, they could work together to revitalize discussions on the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific at the APEC summit in Gyeongju in November, and South Korea could considering joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership as well as the WTO's Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement. Participation in such minilateral initiatives will help further reinforce and stabilize Japan-South Korea bilateral efforts. The path ahead will not be easy. Internal politics in both countries are complex, and leaders will have to balance competing domestic and foreign policy priorities moving forward. The grievances that haunt Japan-South Korea relations cannot simply be ignored, and it will require careful, sustained effort to find mutually acceptable resolutions. However, taking steps now to put Japan-South Korea relations on a more resilient footing will help to facilitate these difficult conversations – and the costs of not cooperating will increase if the international system becomes more unstable. Kristi Govella ( is an associate professor of Japanese politics and international relations at the University of Oxford and senior advisor and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
