FairPoint: The exodus never probed, the blood we see in Pahalgam

Hans India

04-05-2025

As information about the April 22 Pahalgam massacre emerges, it is becoming increasingly clear that a crucial local support system aided the terror attackers.
This support included choosing the site of the attack based on high vulnerability and limited accessibility for security forces; arranging lodging and boarding through local residences; establishing a support network that led unsuspecting victims to the spot; arranging, transporting, concealing, and handing over weapons to the attackers; providing cover during the attack; monitoring the movement of security forces; facilitating swift escape; offering shelter- possibly in local homes - and using vehicles while fleeing, thereby managing to evade security forces and even the intelligence radar.
In each of these aspects, the involvement of the locals was for sure. Pakistan trained terrorists, offered money to lure locals, and used religion to justify the act.
In Kashmir, the National Investigation Agency (NIA), which is now probing the case, has reportedly questioned around 2,500 locals.
Unconfirmed sources suggest that approximately 35 locals were directly involved in the attack, and more casualties could have occurred had more of them been armed. It is being said that these terrorists had been living near the attack site for the past month.
While some carried out the actual assault, others - including ponywallahs, snack vendors, and others - were actively part of the network. Although the terror network mostly relied on human communication, security agencies have also detected the presence of a banned Huawei satellite phone in the Pahalgam region at the time of the attack. Huawei, a Chinese company, is prohibited in India. It is suspected that the device was smuggled from Pakistan. Despite ongoing investigations into the local links, the announcement of a Rs 60 lakh reward has so far yielded no leads.
The Jammu and Kashmir Police released sketches and announced the reward for information leading to the neutralisation of the three Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorists involved in the Pahalgam terror attack: Hashim Musa alias Sulaiman, Ali Bhai alias Tulha Bhai - both Pakistani nationals - and Aadil Hussain Thokar from South Kashmir's Anantnag district. The identities of informants are being strictly kept confidential.
The presence of local support - whether from Kashmir, Jammu, or, as is being speculated, even other states - is a grave concern for national security. This is further evidenced by reactions on social media, where some individuals have objected to the desecration of Pakistani flags. Why should they object? Why are slogans against Pakistan being opposed? Why is there sympathy for the perpetrators when India has officially declared that Pakistan is behind the Pahalgam terror attack? These questions are unsettling, but they also highlight the uncomfortable truth about sleeper cells and overground workers.
Former Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister and current president of the National Conference, Farooq Abdullah, has acknowledged the possibility of local involvement in the Pahalgam terror attack. He stated that he does not believe such incidents can occur without local support, and he questioned how the attackers managed to arrive and operate undetected.
Farooq Abdullah is arguably well-placed to speak on this issue, having been at the helm when terrorism first took root in the Valley. He was the Chief Minister of the erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir state when Kashmiri Pandits/Hindus were targeted and faced a genocide-like situation. Local support became the backbone for the so-called 'azadi' movement led by terrorists and separatists, which ultimately resulted in the mass exodus of Hindus. Nearly 7,00,000 Kashmiri Pandits were forced to flee, and their homes, properties, and institutions were taken over.
The two per cent minority population of Kashmir was effectively driven out.
Around 1,000 Kashmiri Pandits - including men, women, and children - were brutally killed. Many women were kidnapped, gang-raped for days, and then murdered. There are harrowing tales of torture and death from this period. When mosques broadcast calls for a Kashmir with only Kashmiri Pandit women and no Hindu men, the community had no choice but to flee.
Locals - including neighbours, colleagues, subordinates, and even vegetable vendors - became informants for terrorists who hunted and killed Hindus. Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) terrorist Farooq Ahmed Dar, also known as Bitta Karate, openly boasted of killing between 30 and 42 people, most of them Kashmiri Hindus.
He admitted on a national news channel that he never covered his face while killing and that people never handed him over to the security forces. He said the people supported him. This open admission demonstrates the local support that terrorism received in the Valley during Farooq Abdullah's tenure and also the subsequent rulers. This support continued over the years, and those in power - including Abdullah - were aware of it. Yet no substantial action was taken.
Had the ethnic cleansing of Kashmiri Hindus been properly investigated or the individual killings thoroughly probed, the role of local collaborators might have been exposed and addressed.
The local connections - shaped by appeals to religious sentiment, reinforced by fear and financial inducements - have played a pivotal role in executing Pakistan's nefarious designs. These local links and sleeper cells in Jammu and Kashmir are complicit in both the ethnic cleansing of Hindus and the April 22 Pahalgam massacre.
Kashmiri Pandits and other pro-India individuals were prime targets of Pakistani-backed terrorism in the late 1980s, 1990s, and even into the 2000s. Non-locals were often attacked to instil fear, and now even tourists are being targeted. Pakistan has repeatedly demonstrated that it can orchestrate terror attacks anytime and anywhere - the 26/11 Mumbai attack being another chilling example. The local link must be unmasked and dealt with effectively to deter future attacks.