Could U.S. and Israel destroy Iran's nuke program? Yep, here's how.

Japan Times

a day ago

Despite hopeful signals from U.S. President Donald Trump's administration about a potential nuclear deal with Iran, the fundamentals don't look good.
Trump recently said, and rightly so, that the U.S. would not allow Tehran any form of uranium enrichment capability (although top aides have sent mixed signals). Iran, conversely, makes the unconvincing claim that it would use enrichment capacity not to build an atomic weapon, but to feed nuclear power plants.
Israel, meanwhile, is sending blatant signals that it is ready and enthusiastic to launch strikes at Tehran's nuclear facilities now, while Iranian air defenses are still weakened after two years of sporadic conflict. Trump is telling the Israelis to cool their jets (literally) while he tries to forge a peaceful arrangement. But he is equally clear that if talks collapse, the next step may well be joint U.S.-Israeli strikes.
You can bet that serious planning for strikes is in progress at the Pentagon, U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida, and Israeli Defense Forces HQ. General plans for such an assault, of course, have been in existence for decades and are frequently updated — most recently after the significant Israeli airstrikes months ago.
What would joint Israeli-U.S. assaults on Iran's nuclear facilities look like? How effective would they be? In other words, what is the risk-benefit calculus for such an audacious and aggressive move?
The most obvious and necessary element of such an operation would come from the air: a combination of cruise missiles, drones and manned aircraft. But before any bombs are dropped over Iranian nuclear sites at Natanz and Fordow, there would be significant military preparation.
First would be a comprehensive offensive cyberwar campaign, probably coinciding with an onslaught of cruise missiles and drones attacking Tehran's remaining Russian-supplied S-300 and S-200 air-defense stations and Iranian surface-to-air systems like the Bavar 373 or Khordad 15. The cyber-offensive would best be set off inside Tehran's military electric grid: The Israelis probably have that ability — essentially cyber-boots on the ground.
The Israelis would probably also use some level of special forces. The strike they conducted on Iranian missile production facilities in Syria in 2024, Operation Many Ways, is instructive in that they used Shaldag Unit commandos dropped in by helicopters. For the IDF and Mossad (Israel's intelligence agency) to get real ground power in place would require transporting commandos significant distances. One option would be to use an Israeli naval flotilla to get the special forces close enough for helicopter movements.
The combination of cruise missiles and drone attacks would be where U.S. combat power would come into play — particularly with long range Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile volleys from Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and Ticonderoga-class cruisers. U.S. submarines could also contribute, although their missile inventories are far below those of the surface ships. The cruise missiles would be focused on destroying Iran's air-defense batteries, electric grid, early warning radars and strategic communications nodes.
Simultaneously, a wave of drones would be sent to take out the Iranian air force before it could get into the skies. Tehran's planes are mostly old by modern combat standards, including ancient U.S.-made F4 and F14 fighters (think Tom Cruise in Top Gun in the 1980s) and have significant maintenance problems.
They would be easy prey in the air, but knocking them out while they are still parked on the ground — much like the Ukrainians did to Russia's strategic bombers last week — would further de-risk the battlefield.
This phase would use a combination of Israeli and American aircraft. The most sophisticated planes flown by both air forces are the fifth-generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, which could operate from land bases in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar and be refueled in the air by KC-135 and KC-46 super tankers. The American aircraft could also come from the sea — it would be best to have at least two aircraft carriers, with 80 combat aircraft each. (Currently there is only one carrier strike group in the region, but another could be there in less than two weeks.) Israel's older F-18s and F-16s, alongside carrier-based U.S. F/A-18 Hornets, could be used to mop up any remaining Iranian aircraft after the air defenses were thoroughly denuded.
Then would come the main event: heavy air strikes, probably led by U.S. B-2 Spirit strategic bombers carrying 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrators, aka "bunker busters.' The U.S. recently positioned up to eight of the stealth bombers at striking positions on the island of Diego Garcia, southeast of Iran in the Indian Ocean. They were replaced last month by a fleet of venerable B-52s, but could return within a matter of hours.
Iran's best defense isn't missiles or planes, however — it is that much of the uranium-enrichment program is buried deep underground and hardened against bombing. Still, I wouldn't want to be in the central centrifuge rooms when the B-2s arrive. Conservative estimates of battle damage indicate the program would be knocked back by at least a year.
Unfortunately, the Iranians likely have important sites we don't know about — the "known unknowns' my old boss Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld talked about. Iran is a huge country, almost two and a half times the size of Texas, much of it mountainous and difficult to fully surveil from space. This would be a challenging mission indeed.
Iran would respond vigorously to a massive strike. Counterattacks would be both direct and asymmetrical and would almost certainly include another volley of ballistic missiles at Israel (far larger than the ineffective attack last year), alongside strikes from what's left of Hezbollah's inventory in Syria. Bombings at U.S. and Israeli embassies and commercial facilities worldwide would be likely and cyberattacks a certainty.
Tehran might close the Strait of Hormuz with mines, small craft and short-range surface-to-surface missiles. This would shut down 35% of the world's oil and gas shipments and it would take perhaps months for the U.S. and allies to reopen it. Tehran might also strike at Saudi or UAE offshore oil and gas facilities or even attack the Saudis' main energy facilities on land.
If Tehran goes this far, it would widen the war to potentially include strikes on Iranian naval facilities in the Indian Ocean, major military bases inland or other command-and-control sites. Re-opening the Strait of Hormuz would likely pull in America's European and Gulf allies.
But having lost control of its decimated proxies — Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis — Iran has few moves left on the chessboard. It's said that Iran's progenitor, the Persian Empire, was one of the first societies to play the game of chess. If Tehran blows this chance to negotiate with the U.S., it is headed to a very dark endgame indeed.
James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, a retired U.S. Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO, and vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group.