
Taiwan bolsters combat readiness, prepares for 'war of endurance' against China threat
Taiwan's military is prioritizing combat readiness and overhauling training programs in response to increasing threats from China. President Lai Ching-te emphasizes the need to stockpile supplies and prepare for a potential war of endurance. The annual Han Kuang exercises are extended to identify weaknesses, and a troop number review is scheduled to assess ongoing military enhancements.
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Taiwan's military is prioritising combat readiness as a key aspect of deterrence due to escalating threats from China, as reported by Focus Taiwan , citing Minister of National Defence Wellington.President Lai Ching-te noted that the armed forces are undergoing a significant transformation to better handle the increasing hostility from Beijing. "As we are situated on an island, we need to stockpile military supplies in case China launches multiple assaults. We may even need to prepare for a war of endurance," he stated, according to the Focus Taiwan report.To prepare for these potential situations, the military has revamped its training programs. Koo mentioned that new training subjects have been introduced for both conscripts and senior officers, encompassing topics related to newly acquired military assets.He emphasized that the objective is to "prepare for war," insisting that readiness is crucial for maintaining a strong deterrent, as noted by Focus Taiwan.Koo also highlighted Taiwan's ongoing focus on asymmetric warfare, especially following the extension of compulsory military service to one year starting January 1, 2024. Elements like air defence units, drones, and mobile radar systems are integral to Taiwan's strategy to ensure precision and adaptability against a numerically superior opponent, as indicated by Focus Taiwan.He remarked that the military must evaluate whether troop planning and positioning are sufficient for scenarios in which the Chinese People's Liberation Army suddenly escalates exercises near Taiwan into real attacks.The annual Han Kuang exercises are set to take place from July 9-18 this year, significantly longer than last year's five-day war games, which were cut short by a typhoon. Koo stressed that the exercises intend to identify weaknesses in existing plans and address any issues, according to Focus Taiwan.Koo also mentioned that a review of troop numbers is scheduled for the second half of the year, considering ongoing military enhancements. This review will determine whether adjustments are required across various units, as reported by Focus Taiwan.

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