
India-Pakistan tensions: A brief history of conflict
India and Pakistan are locked in a rapidly escalating military exchange that threatens to explode into a fully fledged war, triggered by a deadly attack on tourists in Indian-administered Kashmir on April 22 in which 26 civilians were killed, but rooted in decades-old hostilities.
On May 7, India launched a wave of missiles into Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, striking at least six cities and killing at least 31 people – including two children – according to Islamabad. Since then, Indian drones have hit major Pakistani cities and military installations, and India has accused Pakistan to launching a barrage of missiles and drones at its cities and military facilities.
Alongside the missiles and drones, the nuclear-armed neighbours have also traded allegations and denials. India says its May 7 missiles only struck 'terrorist infrastructure' while Pakistan insists civilians were killed. Pakistan denies that it launched missiles or drones towards India, and both claim to be victims of the other's aggression.
Yet the origins of this latest crisis between India and Pakistan go back to their very formation as sovereign nation states in their current form. Here is a recap of the state of near-constant tensions between the South Asian neighbours.
The Indian subcontinent was a British colony from 1858 until 1947, when British colonial rule finally ended, splitting the subcontinent into the two countries. The Muslim-majority Pakistan gained its independence on August 14 that year as non-contiguous and culturally distant zones, West Pakistan and East Pakistan. The Hindu-majority but secular India gained its independence on August 15, 1947.
The partition was far from smooth, causing one of the largest and bloodiest human migrations ever seen, displacing about 15 million people. The process also sparked horrific communal violence and riots between Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs across the region, in which between 200,000 and two million people died. Border disputes and separatist movements sprang up in the aftermath.
What stuck out as a major sticking point between the neighbours was the question of where the Muslim-majority Himalayan region, Kashmir, would go. The monarch of Kashmir initially sought independence and the area remained disputed.
In October 1947, the first war over Kashmir broke out when armed Pakistani tribesmen invaded the territory. The monarch of Kashmir asked India for its assistance in driving out the tribesmen. In return, the monarch accepted India's condition for help – that Kashmir join India.
Fighting continued until 1948, when it ended with Kashmir divided. Pakistan administers the western part of Kashmir, while India administers much of the rest, with China holding two thin slices of Kashmir's north. India claims all of Kashmir, while Pakistan also claims the part that India holds but not what China, its ally, holds.
The decade started with a promise of better ties. In 1960, India and Pakistan signed the Indus Waters Treaty, a World Bank-mediated deal under which they agreed to share the waters of the six Indus Basin rivers they both relied – and still rely – on.
The treaty gives India access to the waters of the three eastern rivers: the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. Pakistan, in turn, gets the waters of the three western rivers: the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. After the April 22 Pahalgam attack, India has suspended its participation in the treaty but until recently, the deal stood as a shining example, internationally, of a water-sharing pact that survived multiple wars.
One of those wars would take place in the 1960s.
In 1963, the then-foreign minister of India, Swaran Singh and his Pakistani counterpart, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, held talks over the disputed territory of Kashmir. These talks were mediated by the United States and the United Kingdom.
While exact details of the discussions were not made public, no agreement was reached. In 1964, Pakistan referred the Kashmir case to the United Nations.
In 1965, the two countries fought the second war over Kashmir after between 26,000 and 33,000 Pakistani soldiers dressed as Kashmiri residents crossed the ceasefire line into Indian-administered Kashmir.
As the war escalated, Indian soldiers crossed the international border into Pakistan's Lahore. The war ended inconclusively, with a ceasefire. In 1966, Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan signed an agreement in Tashkent, mediated by the Soviet Union, restoring diplomatic and economic relations.
In 1971, East Pakistan and West Pakistan went to war after then-president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto refused to let Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the East Pakistan-based Awami League, assume the premiership. This was despite the fact that the Awami League won the majority of seats in Pakistan's 1970 parliamentary elections.
In March, the Pakistani military began a crackdown in East Pakistan's Dhaka and in December, the Indian army got involved. The Pakistani army eventually surrendered. East Pakistan became the independent country of Bangladesh.
In 1972, Bhutto and Indian PM Indira Gandhi signed an agreement in the Indian town of Simla, called the Simla Agreement where they agreed to settle any disputes by peaceful means.
The agreement established the Line of Control (LoC) between the two countries, which neither side is to seek to alter unilaterally, and which 'shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side'.
In 1974, Kashmir's state government affirmed that it 'is a constituent unit of the Union of India,' an accord rejected by Pakistan.
In the same year, India detonated a nuclear device in an operation codenamed 'Smiling Buddha'. India deemed the device a 'peaceful nuclear explosive'.
By the early 1980s, Kashmir was back at the centre of India-Pakistan tensions. A separatist movement took root, as popular sentiment started turning against the elected government of Indian-administered Kashmir, which many locals felt was betraying their interests in exchange for close ties with New Delhi.
A tipping point was the 1987 election to the state legislature, which saw the National Conference, a party committed to the Indian Constitution, win amid widespread allegations of heavy rigging to keep out popular, anti-India politicians.
By 1989, a full-blown armed resistance against India had taken shape in Indian-administered Kashmir, seeking secession from India.
New Delhi has consistently accused Islamabad of financing, training and sheltering these armed groups, who India describes as 'terrorists'. Pakistan has insisted that it only offers 'moral and diplomatic' support to the separatist movement, though many of those groups have bases and headquarters in Pakistan.
In 1991, both countries signed agreements on providing advance notification of military exercises, manoeuvres and troop movements, as well as on preventing airspace violations and establishing overflight rules.
In 1992, they signed a joint declaration banning the use of chemical weapons.
In 1996, after a series of clashes, military officers from the countries met at the LoC in order to ease tensions.
In 1998, India detonated five nuclear devices. Pakistan responded by detonating six nuclear devices of its own. Both were slapped with sanctions by many nations – but they had become nuclear-armed states.
In the same year, both countries tested long-range missiles.
In 1999, Indian PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee met with Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif in Lahore. The two signed an agreement called the Lahore Declaration, reaffirming their commitment to the Simla Accord, and agreeing to undertake a number of 'confidence building measures' (CBMs).
However, later in the same year, the Pakistani military crossed the LoC, seizing Indian military posts in the Kargil mountains, sparking the Kargil War. Indian troops pushed the Pakistani soldiers back after bloody battles in the snowy heights of the Ladakh region.
Tensions across the LoC remained high throughout the 2000s.
In December 2001, an armed attack on the Indian parliament in New Delhi killed 14 people. India blamed Pakistan-backed armed groups for the attacks, that led to a face-to-face standoff between Indian and Pakistan militaries along the LoC. That standoff only ended in October 2002, after international mediation.
In 2002, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, amid Western pressure following the 9/11 attacks, pledged that Pakistan would combat extremism on its own soil, but affirmed that the country had a right to Kashmir.
In 2003, during a UN General Assembly meeting, Musharraf called for a ceasefire along the LoC, and India and Pakistan came to an agreement to cool tensions and cease hostilities. In 2004, Musharraf held talks with Indian PM Vajpayee.
But in 2007, the Samjhauta Express, the train service linking India and Pakistan, was bombed near Panipat, north of New Delhi. Sixty-eight people were killed, and dozens injured. Hindu extremists were charged by the Indian government at the time, but have subsequently been set free.
In 2008, trade relations began to improve across the LoC and India joined a framework agreement between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan on a $7.6bn gas pipeline project.
However, in November 2008, armed gunmen opened fire on civilians at several sites in Mumbai, India. More than 160 people were killed in the attacks.
Ajmal Kasab, the only attacker captured alive, said the attackers were members of Lashkar-e-Taiba. Kasab was executed by India in 2012. India blamed Pakistani intelligence agencies for the attacks.
In 2009, the Pakistani government conceded that the Mumbai attacks may have been partly planned on Pakistani soil, but denied that the plotters were sanctioned or aided by Pakistan's intelligence agencies.
In 2014, Pakistan's then army chief General Raheel Sharif called Kashmir the 'jugular vein' of Pakistan, and that the dispute should be resolved in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of Kashmiris and in line with UN resolutions.
In 2016, armed fighters killed 17 Indian soldiers in Uri, Indian-administered Kashmir. As a response, India carried out what it described as 'surgical strikes' against bases of armed groups across the LoC.
In 2019, a suicide bomber killed 40 Indian paramilitary soldiers in Pulwama in Indian-administered Kashmir. Jaish-e-Muhammad claimed the attack.
In the aftermath, the Indian Air Force launched an aerial raid on Balakot in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, claiming it targeted terrorist hideouts and killed several dozen fighters. Pakistan insisted that Indian jets only hit a forested region and did not kill any fighters.
Later in 2019, India revoked Article 370, which granted Kashmir a special, semi-autonomous status and began a crackdown that saw thousands of Kashmiri civilians and politicians arrested, many under anti-terror laws that rights groups have described as draconian.
On April 22 this year, an armed attack on tourists in Pahalgam, in Indian-administered Kashmir, killed 26 men.
An armed group called The Resistance Front (TRF), which demands independence for Kashmir, claimed responsibility for the attack. India alleged that TRF was an offshoot of the Pakistan-based LeT. Islamabad denied allegations of its involvement in the attack and called for a neutral investigation.
On May 7, India launched Operation Sindoor, carrying out missile strikes on multiple targets in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Pakistani authorities have claimed that at least 31 people were killed in six targeted cities.
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Al Jazeera
3 hours ago
- Al Jazeera
How is Pakistan raising money for a 20 percent hike in defence spending?
Islamabad, Pakistan – Pakistan has increased its defence spending by more than 20 percent – the most substantial hike in a decade – following last month's military confrontation with neighbouring India. Presenting the annual federal budget on June 10, Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb proposed an allocation of 2.55 trillion rupees ($9bn) for the country's three armed services – the army, air force and navy – amounting to 1.97 percent of Pakistan's gross domestic product (GDP), up from 1.7 percent in the previous budget. 'The security situation in the country is precarious, and the armed forces have rendered commendable service in protecting the borders,' Aurangzeb said during his speech, as India has threatened to carry out strikes if armed groups carry out attacks on India or Indian-administered Kashmir. But analysts say that Islamabad will need to walk a fine balance in spending more on defence at a time when its fragile economy is under strict oversight from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and cuts in social sector expenditure could embolden the opposition. On May 7, India carried out missile strikes on what it called 'terrorist infrastructure' in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir after blaming Islamabad for backing fighters responsible for the killing of 26 people in Indian-administered Kashmir's Pahalgam town on April 22. Pakistan denied involvement in the Pahalgam attacks, demanding a 'credible, transparent, independent' investigation. Islamabad said innocent civilians were killed in India's attacks on May 7. Tensions escalated after the two nuclear-armed neighbours engaged in tit-for-tat missile and drone attacks over four days, primarily targeting each other's military installations. By the time a ceasefire was announced by United States President Donald Trump on May 10, in excess of 70 people had been killed – more than 50 in Pakistan and at least 20 in India. Against that backdrop, Pakistan's defence hike was expected, say analysts. India, which presented its budget before the conflict, also increased its defence spending to $78.7bn, a 9.5 percent rise from the previous year. But unlike India, Pakistan has more than a neighbour to keep an eye on: It also confronts pressure from the IMF. The IMF approved a 37-month, $7bn loan programme for Pakistan last September, its 25th since 1958. The most recent tranche of $1.3bn was released in May this year, a day before the ceasefire between India and Pakistan took place. But in exchange, the global lender has been pressuring Pakistan to streamline its expenditure, reduce subsidies and improve the efficiency of its governance structures. Pakistan appears to have paid heed to those demands from the IMF. Even as its defence spending has gone up substantially, its overall budget for the next fiscal year has been slashed by 17.57 trillion rupees ($62bn), marking a 6.9 percent decrease from last year. The defence spending hike, while massive, is in line with growing defence allocation in recent years. The military's budget has nearly doubled in the past five years. In fiscal year 2020-21, the allocation stood at 1.28 trillion rupees ($4.53bn). The army, long seen as the most powerful institution in Pakistan's defence and political spheres, has received 1.17 trillion rupees ($4.1bn), accounting for nearly 46 percent of the total defence budget. The air force and navy received just more than 520 billion rupees ($1.8m) and 265.9 billion rupees ($941m), respectively. Pakistan's military budget increase also reflects a broader global trend. A report published in April by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which specialises in conflict and arms control research, stated that global military expenditure reached $2.7 trillion in 2024, a 9.4 percent increase from the previous year and the 'steepest year-on-year rise since the end of the Cold War'. Hina Shaikh, a Lahore-based economist with the International Growth Centre (IGC), said the increase in Pakistan was expected and reflects the government's continued prioritisation of security amid geopolitical tensions and domestic instability. 'While understandable from a strategic lens, this increase does come when economic recovery is just beginning to happen, but still fragile, inflation is easing and fiscal space is constrained,' she told Al Jazeera. Ali Hasanain, an economics professor at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), called the hike in defence spending both 'inevitable and necessary' but warned against sacrificing long-term development. 'The only way out of this dilemma for Pakistan is to undertake deep structural reforms of the sort which no government has shown a commitment to yet, so that both the economy and defence spending can stay robust over the medium and long terms,' Hasanain said. While most analysts agree that the defence spending hike is a fallout of the May conflict, a major challenge for the government is to fund it without compromising the social welfare, health, or education sectors. Due to Pakistan's sizable external debt, recorded at $87.4bn according to the latest government figures, the largest share of the national budget is consumed by debt servicing, which stands at $29bn, which is almost 47 percent of total expenditure. In the budget announced on Tuesday, Pakistan's government has cut subsidies. The budget also outlines plans to expand the tax base, removes exemptions, and introduces new taxes to raise public revenue. The opposition party of jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan dubbed the budget 'anti-people' and 'crafted for the elite.' The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, which remains banned, said on Wednesday that the budget provided no real relief to the public, as government staff salary raises were low and agriculture, the mainstay of the country's economy, witnessed decline. Sajid Amin Javed, a senior economist at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), said that the combination of a decline in the interest payments Pakistan owes its debtors this year, and the cut in subsidies had provided the government 'some fiscal space'. Still, others highlighted that Pakistan's defence spending, while the highest in South Asia as a percentage of GDP, has declined in relative terms compared to past decades as it has been forced to set money aside to repay loans. Hasanain of LUMS said that Pakistan now spends less, as a percentage of GDP, than countries like Singapore (2.8 percent), Greece (3.1 percent), Poland (4.2 percent), or the United States (3.4 percent), and nearly three times less than Saudi Arabia (7.3 percent), Russia (7.1 percent), or Israel (8.8 percent). But he pointed out that Pakistan also collects far less tax than most other countries, so the defence spending hike still eats up a giant chunk of the government's revenue. 'A low tax to GDP ratio means that defence spending is a bigger burden for the government in Pakistan than most other countries in the world.' The last few years have been deeply turbulent for Pakistan's economy. Foreign reserves fell to just under $3bn in 2023, bringing the country of 250 million people to the brink of default. Foreign reserves have since risen to $11bn following IMF deals. Similarly, the Pakistani rupee, having lost more than 60 percent of its value against the US dollar over the last two years, has now stabilised between 280 and 282 rupees per dollar. Javed of SDPI says these indicators show Pakistan's macroeconomic fundamentals are stabilising, but the public impact remains uncertain. 'It is a budget of stabilisation, made in consultation with the IMF, to ensure that the country's revenue, growth and fiscal deficit targets are met. But on the whole, it remains a traditional budget, with no deep-rooted structural changes or strategic change visible, at least for now,' he said. Economist Shaikh argued that the budget lacks inclusive or pro-poor reforms and shows limited investment in sectors like health and education. 'This may be called a technocrat's budget under IMF constraints, fiscally conservative, tax-heavy, and focused on short-term stabilisation. It is focused on restoring macroeconomic stability, controlling inflation, and building reserves,' she said. Hasanain, however, says that the IMF principally concerns itself with helping countries move back towards stability, and does not consider long-term, sustainable growth as its purview. 'By cutting expenditures and running primary budget surpluses, the government is indeed moving out of the acute debt crisis it found itself in two years ago, but the larger project of correcting longstanding structural deficiencies is, despite receiving some lip service, largely neglected to date,' he said. 'Given the lack of any serious political opposition, this excessive caution towards reform is deeply frustrating.'


Al Jazeera
19 hours ago
- Al Jazeera
In India, war came dressed in feminist camouflage
When two female officers of the Indian armed forces – one Hindu, one Muslim – took centre stage to announce Operation Sindoor, the government celebrated it as a landmark moment for gender inclusion. The image of uniformed women addressing the media from the front lines, avenging the deaths of 26 civilians, all men, and symbolically restoring the sindoor (vermilion) of widowhood, was widely praised as feminist iconography in service of the nation. The moment echoed a historical parallel: during the 1971 Indo-Pak War, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was famously likened to the Hindu warrior Goddess Durga, a symbol of feminine power and nationalist resolve, in recognition of her decisive role in the creation of Bangladesh. That invocation of Durga underscored how Indian political power is often framed through a gendered and mythologised lens, blending statecraft with religious symbolism. But can women leading war be inherently feminist? Nation-building, as feminist scholars have long warned, is not a gender-neutral project. It reconfigures women into roles that serve its ends: sacrificial mothers, grieving widows, or militant daughters of the nation. Scholars like Nira Yuval-Davis argue that women are positioned as symbolic bearers of the nation's honour and cultural authenticity but rarely as its political agents. In the Indian context, scholars like Samita Sen and Maitrayee Chaudhuri remind us that women's public roles have historically been framed not in terms of autonomy, but duty to patriarchal structures. Therefore, the mere presence of women in public or political spheres does not automatically equate to gender justice. Representation must also be interrogated for its objectifying function. Today's military feminism, in which women gain visibility in war zones, follows this same path: celebrating women's ability to 'be like men' while leaving untouched the masculine and patriarchal foundations of militarism itself. This can be observed in Operation Sindoor, which projects the spectacle of two women in uniform as feminist optics, while the script they perform remains deeply patriarchal, demanding women prove their worth through masculine-coded nationalism. Such feminist optics align neatly with the ideological framework of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Founded in 1925, the RSS is a Hindu nationalist organisation that serves as the ideological parent of India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). It envisions India as a Hindu rashtra (nation), advocating cultural nationalism rooted in Hindu traditions and values. Scholars like Christophe Jaffrelot argue that the RSS fosters majoritarianism and undermines India's secular fabric. Its paramilitary structure and emphasis on discipline and nationalism reveal its aim of deepening the hierarchical and patriarchal structure of Indian society. The women's auxiliaries of the RSS – the Rashtra Sevika Samiti and Durga Vahini – reflect and reinforce this patriarchal vision. These groups have long trained women in martial arts and ideological devotion not for feminist liberation, but to protect the Hindu rashtra. The aesthetics of Operation Sindoor – its saffron undertones, warrior femininity, and choreographed resolve – mirror this legacy. As Bina D'Costa's work on gender and war in South Asia underscores, women's bodies often become vehicles of nationalist redemption. The inclusion of a Muslim officer in this tableau may appear to signal secular pluralism. But as D'Costa warns, such inclusions often serve to legitimise exclusionary frameworks. Her presence sanitises a majoritarian script by casting minority visibility as proof of national unity, even as Islamophobic currents persist in broader public discourse. Sindoor – the red vermilion powder traditionally applied by Hindu wives on their head – symbolises marital status, wifely devotion, and the ideal of the 'good' woman. It also invokes Goddess Durga. In Hindu Wife, Hindu Nation, historian Tanika Sarkar explores how nationalist discourse fuses the sanctity of the wife with that of the motherland. The very name Operation Sindoor weaponises this metaphor: it promises to avenge broken marital bonds through military strikes on Pakistan, thereby 'restoring' the honour of Hindu widows. Yet this operation also constructs a tableau of women rendered widowed – stripped of their sindoor – whose grief is appropriated as nationalist fuel. As feminist historian Urvashi Butalia reminds us, women's bodies and symbols become 'testimonies of war.' In this context, sindoor represents not what widows possess, but what they have lost: honour, status, and social security. In the imagined redemptive arc of the nation, sindoor is not merely restored – it becomes a badge of nationalist virtue. The two women officers are cast not as autonomous agents, but as foot soldiers of a mythical motherland – extensions of the same patriarchal script that has long confined Indian women to domestic altars. What is celebrated here is not women's liberation, but their assimilation into a militant masculine narrative. Militarised femininity is constructed to legitimise state violence, not resist it. It is crucial to debunk symbols and interrogate the hierarchies they represent. What exactly is being applauded when female officers lead a war? Is it the war itself, or the fact that women are participating in it, that is considered 'feminist'? The gender metaphor in this spectacle casts women into patriarchal frameworks where they must emulate men to legitimise their agency. By celebrating these officers, the state co-opts women's leadership to validate militarism while leaving intact the structures that perpetuate gendered violence. Feminist agency demands that women define the terms of their engagement. Here, those terms are dictated by the patriarchal nationalism of the RSS ideology. The two officers did not challenge gender norms; they stepped into a pre-written script that equates womanhood with wifely duty to the nation. Their exalted martial roles serve to naturalise militarism, even as they are packaged as gender progress. The inclusion of a Muslim officer is not incidental. In the ideological universe of Durga Vahini, non-Hindu women can be co-opted, so long as they defend the Hindu 'family'. This token inclusion supports an illusion of pluralism, while systemic marginalisation of Muslim citizens continues unabated. Feminist movements have historically challenged the logic of war itself, not simply who wages it. If we accept that nation-building is inherently patriarchal, the solution cannot lie in merely enlisting more women into patriarchal institutions. Instead, we must interrogate the very optics of national honour that equate women's value with wifely symbols and martial sacrifice. Feminist politics in war must decentre militarism, prioritise civilian protection, and insist that women's leadership be recognised in peacebuilding, rehabilitation, and policymaking — arenas where the absence of sindoor cannot be remedied by bombs or bravado. True gender justice in national security would uplift dissenting women leaders who refuse to be conscripted into patriarchal metaphors, provide material support to widows, and reject marital symbolism as a proxy for state virtue. Operation Sindoor may make for powerful headlines. But behind the illusion of feminist triumph lies an old patriarchal script: women as metaphors of the motherland, valued only when they serve its wartime needs. Liberation lies not in militarised spectacle, but in dismantling the gendered metaphors that bind women to nationalist rites – and expanding the meaning of agency beyond the theatre of war. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial stance.


Al Jazeera
a day ago
- Al Jazeera
Are India and Pakistan preparing for a naval face-off in a future conflict?
Islamabad, Pakistan – When Indian Minister of Defence Rajnath Singh visited the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier INS Vikrant on May 30, nearly three weeks after a ceasefire was announced with Pakistan after a four-day conflict, he had stern words for Islamabad. Wearing an Indian Navy baseball cap, with his initial 'R' emblazoned on it, Singh declared that Pakistan was fortunate the Indian Navy had not been called upon during the recent hostilities. 'Despite remaining silent, the Indian Navy succeeded in tying down the Pakistani Army. Just imagine what will happen when someone who can keep a country's army locked in a bottle, even by remaining silent, speaks up?' Singh said, standing in front of a Russian-made MiG-29 fighter jet on the deck of the 262-metre-long (860 feet) ship. Just two days later, on June 1, the Pakistan Navy issued a pointed response. In a message posted on X, it announced a two-day exercise, 'focusing on countering sub-conventional and asymmetric threats across all major ports and harbours of Pakistan'. These symbolic shows of strength followed India's 'Operation Sindoor' and Pakistan's 'Operation Bunyan Marsoos', the countries' respective codenames for the four-day conflict that ended in a ceasefire on May 10. The standoff was triggered by an April 22 attack in Pahalgam, in Indian-administered Kashmir, in which 26 civilians, almost all tourists, were killed. India blamed armed groups allegedly backed by Pakistan, a charge Islamabad denied. On May 7, India launched missile strikes at multiple sites in Pakistan's Punjab province and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, killing at least 51 people, including 11 soldiers and several children. Over the next three days, the two countries exchanged artillery and air power, hitting each other's airbases. The 96 hours of conflict brought 1.6 billion people to the brink of war. But while the navies largely remained passive observers, they monitored each other's movements – and were ready for action. Satellite imagery showed that the INS Vikrant moved towards Pakistan soon after the Pahalgam attack and remained deployed for four days in the Arabian Sea before returning to its base in Karnataka. Pakistan also mobilised its fleet, which was bolstered by the docking of a Turkish naval ship in Karachi on May 2. According to the Pakistani Navy, Turkish personnel engaged in 'a series of professional interactions' with their counterparts. Now, even amid the current pause in military tensions, analysts say Singh's remarks and Pakistan's naval drills highlight the growing part that maritime forces could play in the next chapter of their conflict. This is a role the Indian and Pakistani navies are well-versed in. After independence from Britain in August 1947, India inherited two-thirds of British India's naval assets. These saw no use during the first India-Pakistan war in 1947, over the contested Himalayan region of Kashmir. India and Pakistan both administer parts of Kashmir, along with China, which governs two thin strips. India claims all of Kashmir, while Pakistan claims all the parts not controlled by China, its ally. By the 1965 war, also over Kashmir, Pakistan had expanded its fleet with aid from the United States and United Kingdom, its Cold War allies. It had acquired Ghazi, a long-range submarine, giving it an edge over India, which lacked a submarine at the time, though it owned an aircraft carrier. Pakistan, to date, does not have an aircraft carrier. While the land war started on September 6, the Pakistan Navy joined the conflict on the night of September 7-8. A fleet of seven warships and submarine PNS Ghazi left Karachi harbour and made their way towards the Indian naval base of Dwarka in the western state of Gujarat, roughly 350km (217 miles) away. They were tasked with carrying out the 'bombardment of Dwarka about midnight using 50 rounds per ship', according to the Pakistan Navy's official account, targeting the base's radar and other installations. The selection of Dwarka was significant from a historical and strategic perspective. The city is home to one of the most sacred sites for Hindus, the Somnath Temple, on which the Pakistan Navy named its operation. Militarily, the radar installations in Dwarka were used to provide guidance to the Indian Air Force. Knocking them out would have made it harder for India to launch aerial attacks against Pakistani cities, especially Karachi. That, in turn, would have forced India to send out its warships from the nearby port of Bombay (now Mumbai) – and PNS Ghazi, the submarine, could have ambushed them. But the Pakistani plan only partly worked. Many Indian warships were under maintenance, and so the Indian Navy did not send them out to chase the Pakistani fleet. According to the Pakistan Navy's accounts, after firing about 350 rounds, the operation ended in 'four minutes' and all its ships returned safely. Syed Muhammad Obaidullah, a former commodore in the Pakistan Navy, recalled the attack. 'We were able to send eight vessels, seven ships and a submarine – that surprised the Indians, as our ships targeted the radar station used to assist Indian planes,' Obaidullah told Al Jazeera. Muhammad Shareh Qazi, a Lahore-based maritime security expert, added that the operation was a tactical surprise, but did not lead to any gains in territory or of the maritime continental shelf. 'All our ships returned safely, without resistance, but it was only an operational-level success for the PN, not a strategic one,' he said, referring to the Pakistan Navy. Official Indian Navy records claim that most of the shells fired by Pakistani ships caused no damage and remained unexploded. Anjali Ghosh, a professor of international relations at Jadavpur University, Kolkata, in her book India's Foreign Policy, described the attack as 'daring' but symbolic rather than strategically 1971 war, fought over East Pakistan's secession to become Bangladesh, saw more substantial naval engagements. India launched two operations – Trident and Python – which dealt major blows to Pakistan's Navy, sinking several ships, including the destroyer PNS Khaibar and minesweeper PNS Muhafiz, and destroying fuel tanks at Karachi Harbour. Uday Bhaskar, a former commodore in the Indian Navy, said the navy played a pivotal role in India's 1971 victory. 'The naval role enabled the final outcome on land,' Bhaskar, the current director of the Society for Policy Studies, an independent think tank based in New Delhi, told Al Jazeera. Pakistan also suffered the loss of its prized submarine Ghazi, which sank while laying mines near Visakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh, home to India's Eastern Naval Command. The one major victory for the Pakistani Navy was its torpedoing of the Indian frigate INS Khukri using its submarine Hangor, which killed more than 170 Indian sailors. Qazi, who is also an assistant professor at Lahore's Punjab University, said that the Indian Navy replicated the Pakistani playbook from the 1965 war in the way it surprised the Pakistan Navy. 'India caused a heavy blow to Pakistan and our naval capabilities were severely dented,' he said. Since the 1971 war, India and Pakistan have approached different naval strategies. Obaidullah, who retired from the Pakistan Navy in 2008, said that India has tried to build a 'blue water navy' capable of projecting power across oceans. The idea: 'To assert its dominance in [the] Indian Ocean,' he said. Qazi, the maritime expert, agreed, saying that the Indian Navy has focused not just on building a numerical advantage in its naval assets but also on partnerships with nations such as Russia, which have helped it develop a powerful fleet. 'The Indian Navy now has the ability to conduct missions that can cover long distances, all the way down to Mauritius near southern Africa, or even some adventures in [the] Pacific Ocean as well,' he said. As the world's fifth-largest economy, India has invested heavily in naval development. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a London-based research institute focusing on defence and security issues, India has 29 principal surface combat vessels, including two aircraft carriers, 12 destroyers, 15 frigates and 18 submarines, of which two are nuclear-powered. Pakistan, by contrast, has prioritised its land and air forces. Its navy has grown more slowly, mainly through cooperation with China and Turkiye. It regularly holds major naval exercises with its allies, with the last one taking place in February this year. IISS data shows that Pakistan's navy lacks aircraft carriers and destroyers but includes 11 frigates, eight submarines and at least 21 patrol vessels. Obaidullah explained that Pakistan's naval ambitions and objectives are very different from those of India. 'India aims to project global power. We have a defensive navy to secure our sea lines of communication and deter aggression,' the former naval officer said. With more than 95 percent of Pakistan's trade sea-based, protecting maritime routes is its top priority. Maritime expert Qazi also said that the Pakistani Navy is focused on defending its 'littoral zones'. From a naval perspective, a 'littoral zone' is a critically important area close to coastlines, unlike the open ocean's 'blue water' expanse. It is within this space that countries engage in coastal defence. 'Pakistan has a small economy, and we do not have blue water ambitions. We do not have the capacity to build a fleet, nor [do] we need one,' Qazi said. 'Our defence paradigm is about defending our coastlines, and for that, we have our submarines, which carry cruise missiles.' The latest conflict saw both conventional and modern warfare, including drones used to strike deep inside each other's territory. But Singh's May 30 remarks suggest a more assertive naval posture in future conflicts, say analysts. 'If Pakistan does any unholy act this time, it is possible that the opening will be done by our navy,' Singh said during his speech on May 30. Bhaskar, the Indian commodore who retired in 2007, agreed that future conflicts could see naval escalation. 'If another military conflict escalates, the probability of navies being actively involved is high,' he said. Bashir Ali Abbas, a New Delhi-based maritime affairs expert and former fellow at the Stimson Center, in Washington, DC, said that naval platforms inherently serve multiple roles. Abbas said that warships and submarines can switch from patrolling missions or exercises to operational missions on short notice. But that would carry risks of its own. 'Should the Indian Navy play a substantial role in operations against Pakistan following the next crisis, then the element of escalation control practically disappears. Any ship-on-ship, or ship-on-land engagement will imply that India and Pakistan are at war,' he told Al Jazeera, adding that the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation is also potentially highest in the nuclear domain. Qazi, however, said that Singh's statement was ambiguous about whether the Indian Navy would engage in surveillance or aggression. Any attack on Karachi, Pakistan's economic hub, would provoke a strong response, the Lahore-based analyst said. 'I believe India will choose to play hide and seek like it did this time,' Qazi said. But he added that there was a 'high probability' that India could attack Pakistan's naval installations on land, including its planes and radar stations. And that, he said, was an 'alarming possibility'.