Reframing the French Indo-Pacific: French Polynesia, a Model of Shared Sovereignty?

The Diplomat

12 hours ago

French Polynesia is a pivotal element of France's strategy in the Pacific – and offers a compelling case study for shared sovereignty within the French Republic.
As Emmanuel Macron wrapped up his visits to Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore – where he delivered the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue at the end of May – the French president reaffirmed the Indo-Pacific's strategic importance for both France and Europe. In a context of growing geopolitical uncertainty and renewed unilateralism, Macron emphasized France's commitment to a stable, multipolar order grounded in international law, freedom of navigation, and inclusive multilateralism – an international posture shared with key partners such as India, Japan, and ASEAN.
Building on this common strategic vision, and as the only remaining European Union (EU) member state with sovereign territories in the Indo-Pacific, France seeks to position its diplomacy not only as a national actor but also as a standard-bearer for European engagement in the region.
The exercise of sovereignty is precisely what underpins France's specificity and credibility as a resident power. The French Indo-Pacific overseas collectivities (FIPOCs) – La Réunion, Mayotte, les TAAF (or South Antarctic Lands), New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, and Clipperton – which together have a population of 1.65 million inhabitants, play a central role in the construction and elaboration of a credible strategy.
Notably, 93 percent of France's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) lies in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, making it the second largest EEZ in the world after that of the United States. There are also around 200,000 French expats residing in countries of the region, more than 7,000 French subsidiary companies operating in the region, and 8,000 military personnel stationed permanently.
The assimilation of the FIPOCs into a single geostrategic Indo-Pacific framework is a logical step for a state seeking to assert itself as a legitimate actor in the region. However, despite some common geographical, economic, and political characteristics, grouping the FIPOCs into a single macro-region does not fully reflect the diversity of contexts and geopolitical challenges specific to each territory.
A comprehensive and nuanced understanding of local contexts is thus essential to fully comprehend the complexity of France's Indo-Pacific engagement. This series will explore each of the FIPOCs separately to understand their characteristics, role in France's Indo-Pacific strategy, and potential friction points between national and local drivers. You can view the full series here; today, we focus on French Polynesia.
Encompassing five archipelagos and 118 islands, French Polynesia is a pivotal element of France's strategy in the Pacific. Its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), covering nearly 4.8 million square kilometers, accounts for almost half of the total French EEZ – which is the second largest globally. Beyond its maritime significance, French Polynesia offers a compelling case study of how post-colonial legacies, nuclear trauma, and political evolution have shaped a successful model of shared sovereignty within the French Republic.
Colonial Imprint and Nuclear Legacy
Eastern Polynesia was among the last regions on Earth to be explored and settled by humans. In the case of French Polynesia, archaeological evidence suggests an initial wave of settlement beginning around 800 CE in Tahiti, between 800 and 900 CE in the Marquesas and Gambier Islands, around 1000 CE in the Tuamotu atolls and the eastern parts of the Society Islands, and approximately 1100 CE in the Austral Islands.
French influence began formally in 1842 with the establishment of a protectorate, in a context of heated rivalries between French and British colonial power in the region.
The territory underwent a major transformation in the 1960s, when France established its Pacific Experimentation Center (CEP), triggering a wave of modernization – and deep trauma. Between 1966 and 1996, France conducted 193 nuclear tests, including 41 atmospheric and 152 underground at Moruroa and Fangataufa (Tuamotu archipelago). These experiments left lasting social and environmental scars.
Although long taboo in Paris, the nuclear legacy has since entered public debate. The current political party in power, the pro-independence Tavini Huiraatira, has historically opposed nuclear testing and pushed for transparency and reparations. In 2010, a national law established a right to compensation for individuals recognized as victims of French nuclear testing.
In a gesture of appeasement and openness, the French state granted access to the Moruroa site in March 2024 to a high-level Polynesian delegation, including President Moetai Brotherson, marking a shift from opacity to cautious transparency. The change is a rational response considering the evolving political dynamics between Paris and Papeete.
Increased Autonomy
French Polynesia's political evolution reflects France's gradual accommodation of demands for self-government. From a protectorate (1842–1880) to a colony (1880–1946), and then an overseas territory (1946–2003), the territory has undergone significant institutional transformations. Today, as an overseas collectivity, it enjoys broad autonomy, with its own laws and institutions – including a president, a government, and a parliament – managing key areas such as the budget, foreign investment, and resource exploitation.
While sovereign competencies – such as national defense, justice, public order, internal security and currency issuance – remain under the authority of the French state and are implemented by the High Commissioner, foreign affairs may, in certain cases, be the subject of shared competence.
A Quiet Model?
French Polynesia represents a rare example of international agency of a non-state actor, as it holds formal membership in several interregional organizations, including the Pacific Islands Forum, the Pacific Community, and the Polynesian Leaders Group. Successive presidents of French Polynesia have engaged in high-level meetings with foreign heads of state – a development that underscores the territory's growing diplomatic autonomy. This trend was exemplified by then-President Edouard Fritch's attendance at the first U.S.-Pacific Island Country Summit in 2022, and Brotherson's visit in 2023 to Washington for the second summit, where he met with U.S. President Joe Biden.
This ad hoc model of shared competences in foreign affairs can at times create ambiguity. While French Polynesia is at the forefront of France's Indo-Pacific ambitions, local voices – including Brotherson – have expressed skepticism about the wider strategy. But this ad hoc relationship often functions harmoniously, as French presidents have repeatedly associated their counterparts from French Polynesia in the France-Oceania Summits, and even during presidential trips abroad, such as President Macron's visit to Vanuatu in 2023.
Despite the enduring legacies of sensitive issues, including the public health consequences of nuclear testing, French Polynesia offers a relatively stable model of negotiated autonomy within the French constitutional order. The most recent example came when Brotherson and French President Emmanuel Macron jointly announced at the U.N. Ocean Conference in Nice that nearly the entire EEZ of the archipelago – 4.55 million sq km, or 47 percent of France's EEZ – would be designated as a Marine Protected Area (MPA), in a mutually beneficial act of environmental diplomacy.
Shared sovereignty in French Polynesia diverges from the impasse faced by New Caledonia, suggesting that calibrated devolution and respectful partnership can reconcile historical grievances while maintaining continued political association.