UBTech partners with furniture chain to bring 10,000 robots to Chinese homes
UBTech Robotics has announced a partnership with a major Chinese furniture retail chain to sell 10,000 robots , including models specifically designed for elderly care, marking the firm's latest initiative to expand its presence in the consumer market.
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Shenzhen-based UBTech said in a statement on Monday that it would sell 500 humanoid robots this year to Easyhome New Retail Group to 'enhance the customer shopping experience' in furniture stores . Meanwhile, Easyhome planned to sell 10,000 UBTech robots to its customers and promote the use of intelligent elderly care robots in home service environments, the robot maker said.
The partnership will also involve the joint development of 'renovation robots' to reduce costs and improve efficiency during home remodelling, according to UBTech, whose elderly products include delivery robots, companion robots, walking aides and arm chairs.
The deal comes as humanoid robots are attracting increasing public attention, while production levels are on the rise. According to China's statistics bureau, the country produced 1.5 million service robots from January to February, a nearly 36 per cent increase from a year earlier.
03:31
Ageing Japan turns to AI robots to care for the elderly
Ageing Japan turns to AI robots to care for the elderly
The household sector 'has the largest potential' for the application of humanoid robots, according to UBTech chairman and CEO Zhou Jian. Easyhome chairman and CEO Wang Linpeng expected that more types of robots – such as those for housework, healthcare and gardening – would become integral to family life.
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Asia Times
20 hours ago
- Asia Times
Hot race for Pacific's deep sea mineral wealth
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The ecological consequences (destruction of benthic habitats, disruption of deep-ocean food chains, and disturbance of carbon sequestration processes) are well-documented yet remain politically unpriced. These effects unfold on spatial and temporal scales that transcend immediate accountability. Damage incurred in the hadal depths will not register in electoral cycles or quarterly earnings. This externalization of environmental costs is structurally embedded. States and corporations reap concentrated benefits (strategic minerals, technological primacy, economic gain), while the ecological liabilities are diffused across a global commons and deferred into an indeterminate future. The legal framework that will govern these activities, particularly ISA's provisional mining code, lacks both clarity and enforceability. In this vacuum, environmental safeguards function less as constraints than as negotiable instruments. Where conservation discourse exists, it is often instrumental. 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