
China's sail-less mini-sub a new menace for Taiwan
China's unveiling of a sleek, sail-less mini-submarine signals a bold leap in stealth warfare. At the same time, it raises questions about the vessel's value in a potential Taiwan blockade and whether sheer quantity can outweigh quality concerns in undersea combat.
This month, Naval News reported that China has just unveiled a new type of submarine spotted at the Guangzhou Shipyard, a facility unknown for submarine construction.
The vessel features a distinctive, ultra-modern design with large X-form rudders and no sail. This development, revealed through satellite imagery, underscores China's ability to build submarines in secrecy, contrasting with the transparency of Western naval projects.
The submarine, approximately 45 meters long and 5 meters wide, differs from the Type 041 mini nuclear submarine and the 'Olympic' mini-submarine.
Its design suggests it could be an extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicle (XLUUV), potentially the world's largest, or a crewed vessel optimized for shallow water operations.
China is known to have built a sail-less mini-submarine in 2018, although that unit appears to be larger at an estimated 50 meters long and has no torpedo tubes, suggesting it may be a test prototype.
The absence of a sail, the presence of torpedo tubes and a possible towed sonar array indicate advanced stealth and combat capabilities.
Removing the traditional sail from a submarine minimizes its radar and sonar visibility. It also lowers its profile to reduce hydrodynamic drag, turbulence and noise while enhancing its speed and operational efficiency.
Further, using large X-form rudders boosts maneuverability, providing agility and stability for navigating complex underwater environments while supporting stealth.
Regarding armament, China's new submarine features torpedo tubes for engaging enemy vessels and potentially housing missile launch systems against surface and land targets.
It may also be capable of minelaying to disrupt enemy navigation, supply routes, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and insert special forces into Taiwan's frontline islands of Kinmen and Matsu or on secluded beaches on the main island.
Small submarines like China's new model may confer operational advantages in the Taiwan Strait, which is almost less than 150 meters deep and 180 kilometers across.
In a December 2023 Proceedings article, William Toti mentions that the Taiwan Strait restricts submarines' ability to maneuver vertically, making them more susceptible to detection and attacks, complicating evasive actions and limiting the effectiveness of traditional submarine tactics.
Further, the strait's narrowness positions submarines close to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assets, heightening detection risks amid escalating naval capabilities and military exercises.
Despite those constraints, small submarines thrive in shallow waters thanks to their stealth, agility and ability to merge with seabed clutter, says Liborio Palombella in a June 2024 Naval Review article.
Palombella states that the reduced size of these submarines results in quieter acoustic signatures, allowing them to evade sonar detection while enabling close navigation to the ocean floor and improved maneuverability in narrow waters.
He mentions that this stealth and agility offer a considerable tactical advantage over larger conventional submarines, which find operating effectively in environments such as the Taiwan Strait challenging.
Further, small submarines may cost less to build than larger models, increasing the number of undersea threats without the cost of larger vessels. China's massive shipbuilding base lends itself to the maxim that 'quantity has a quality of its own.'
Sarah Kirchberger, in a September 2023 China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) report, says that China's submarine industrial base has significantly modernized, enabling larger-scale production of conventional submarines, particularly at the Wuchang and Jiangnan shipyards.
Kirchberger says China's investments in modular construction, advanced shipyard expansions and integration of military-civil fusion strategies have enhanced output.
However, she notes that weaknesses in propulsion systems and submarine quieting remain, limiting China's ability to match Western and Russian designs. However, she notes that closer ties with Russia may help China bridge these gaps.
China's new small submarine, along with its larger conventional and nuclear-powered ones, may play a critical role in a possible blockade of Taiwan to starve the self-governing island into submission.
In an August 2024 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Bonny Lin and other writers mention that China could use submarines to blockade Taiwan by deploying them to lay sea mines at the entrances of Taiwan's major ports, disrupting maritime traffic.
Further, Marek Jestrab mentions in a December 2023 Atlantic Council paper that to make a warning, Chinese submarines could covertly attack Taiwanese-owned merchant vessels sailing through the South China Sea and then deny involvement in the attack.
Such an action, Jestrab says, could swiftly sink the target and instill fear in the shipping industry due to potential losses and risks.
However, China's rapid submarine production may lack the rigorous quality assurance standards of the US Navy's SUBSAFE program, raising concerns about reliability and survivability.
The US Department of Defense's (DOD) 2024 China Military Report mentions that despite the ongoing retirement of older hulls, China's submarine force is expected to grow by 65 units in 2025 and 80 units in 2035, thanks to a massive increase in construction capacity.
This issue was underscored by reports of a possible pier-side sinking of a Type 041 nuclear-powered submarine in June 2024, highlighting potential design, construction or maintenance flaws.
The same concerns may extend to China's mass production of small, conventionally powered submarines, which, though produced in large numbers, may suffer from similar oversight gaps.
Moreover, China still has to account for Taiwan's ASW capabilities. For maritime domain awareness (MDA), Ian Easton and Randall Schriver mention in a December 2014 report for Project 2049 that Taiwan is believed to have a network of seabed sonar listening posts co-developed with the US.
Easton and Schriver say these posts are similar to the US SOSUS system, covering Taiwan's northeast coast up to the Senkaku Islands and its southern coast up to the Bashi Channel to the Philippines.
According to them, these underwater sensors are linked to the US Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) for tracking ship and submarine movements through the First Island Chain.
Taiwan is also building an ASW fleet, with plans for six ASW frigates and an indigenous submarine force. Its first submarine, the ROCS Hai Kun, is undergoing testing and seven units will be built.
As China ramps up the construction of stealthy new mini-submarines, the real test isn't just numbers—it's whether these vessels can evade Taiwan's defenses and the US' ASW capabilities and survive the fast-evolving realities of modern undersea warfare.

Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles


Asia Times
29-05-2025
- Asia Times
How SE Asia can break China's rare earth monopoly
Last week, Australia's Lynas Rare Earths produced heavy rare earth elements (HREEs) at a commercial scale in Malaysia, marking the first time this has ever happened outside of China. This breakthrough, which includes elements like dysprosium and terbium, is no small feat in a market dominated by China, which is responsible for around 60% of global rare earth production and virtually 100% of the world's HREE supply. Rare earth elements (REEs) are critical for the US and other advanced economies: they power technologies from electric vehicles to defense systems. The US Department of Defense, for instance, has identified HREEs as vital for missile systems, radar and advanced communications. Yet, the US itself produces only about 12% of global REEs—and almost none of the heavy types. Without secure access to these materials, Western industries risk supply chain disruptions that could slow the clean energy transition and compromise national security. It is for these reasons that the US recently signed an agreement with Ukraine to secure preferential access to its mineral resources—including, notably, REEs—in exchange for establishing a Ukraine reconstruction fund, as well as certain payback for the estimated US$150 billion the US has provided Ukraine since the war started. However, a significant portion of Ukraine's known REE reserves lies in the Donetsk region, which remains under Russian control, highlighting the fragility of relying on politically contested sources. In this context, Lynas' progress is not just a technical achievement but a geopolitical shift. It positions not only Malaysia, but also Southeast Asia, as a key hotspot for the future of sourcing REEs. Until recently, there were few incentives to produce REEs in the region. But market shifts, the strategic push for supply chain diversification and the growing capacity of Southeast Asian countries to process REEs domestically promise to unlock vast potential. Vietnam, in particular, holds some of the world's largest REE reserves—estimated at around 3.5 million tonnes (with some sources suggesting as much as 20 million tonnes), nearly twice the size of US reserves. Yet its production today is negligible, representing less than 1% of global output. Major deposits in the country's northwest, such as Dong Pao and Nam Xe, remain largely untapped, while significant areas across the country are still unexplored. Still, Southeast Asia's potential REE suppliers face substantial challenges: (1) environmental concerns, notably the management of radioactive byproducts like thorium; (2) a lack of technical expertise and processing infrastructure, with China still controlling key separation technologies; and (3) market and geopolitical pressures, as these countries navigate a landscape dominated by Chinese pricing power, potential retaliation and complex export dynamics. If Southeast Asia—especially Vietnam and Malaysia—can overcome these challenges, the region could emerge as a critical node in global REE supply chains, offering the US, Europe, Japan and others an alternative to China's near-monopoly. However, this will require more than favorable geology; it demands investment in refining capacity, strict environmental standards, and strategic partnerships that ensure technology transfer and long-term market access. For the West, the stakes are clear: support Southeast Asia's rare earth ambitions—or remain perilously dependent on a single Chinese supplier. Patricio Faúndez is country manager at GEM Mining Consulting


Asia Times
09-05-2025
- Asia Times
SWIFT battling Russia, China's crypto use to dodge sanctions
The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), the Western-led global financial transfer system, has implemented various control measures for banks to identify those who use cryptocurrencies to assist Russia and China bypass Western sanctions, including those imposed over the Ukraine war, according to a SWIFT executive. 'There is a number of different controls that are built into the system, and things that financial institutions and banks can use to manage and permit the traffic that happens over the SWIFT network,' SWIFT's Chief Innovation Officer Tom Zschach told Asia Times in the Q&A session at a London cryptocurrency event on May 6. 'It's a pretty mature infrastructure that we have in place. It's all driven by our banks, around the agreements they have in place to transact with any of the counterparties around the world,' he said. 'It's pretty robust. It's been in place for quite some time, and it helps to support things, even in the future, with some of the ideas we see rolling out around automatic compliance.' Currently, SWIFT offers the Customer Security Programme (CSP) and the Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF) to help financial institutions monitor suspicious or sanctions-dodging transactions. Zschach's said his primary responsibility is to drive innovation across SWIFT and collaborate with the SWIFT community and partners to prevent the fragmentation of international payment markets amid the rise of cryptocurrencies. However, at the Digital Assets Summit organized by the Financial Times on May 6, media members were more interested in SWIFT's efforts to prevent Russia and China from evading sanctions and moving to a different payment system. Zschach did not name Russia and China specifically but stressed SWIFT's increasing role in ensuring the world stays connected in today's geopolitical situation. 'The geopolitics impacts many different areas, including payments,' he said. 'We could build 'digital islands' and start to create different networks that aren't connected. But nobody wins from the fragmentation.' 'In the US, there's a pullback from globalization…. Now, SWIFT plays an even more important role in ensuring the world stays connected and that we don't lose the trust and the ability to scale.' Tom Zschach says SWIFT wants to ensure the world stays connected in cross-border payments. Photo: Asia Times / Jeff Pao His comments came after Reuters reported in March that Russia has used cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin, ether and stablecoins such as Tether (USDT) to effectively bypass Western sanctions in its estimated US$192 billion oil trade with China and India. Stablecoins are digital assets that use blockchain technology to peg to the US dollar. They allow 'T+0' or same-day settlement for cross-border transactions, while a traditional wire transfer can take up to five working days. Traditional cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin have a limited supply and high volatility as they are made through time-consuming and heavy electricity-using 'mining' activities. Stablecoins have an unlimited supply as long as they are backed by dollars. Crypto trading, which does not involve the SWIFT system, creates an environment for money laundering, cybercrime, and sanctions evasions. Crypto exchanges and related banks are responsible for 'knowing your customer' (KYC). The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) often sanctions companies and bourses in Russia, North Korea and Venezuela for suspicious crypto activities. After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the US, European Union (EU), United Kingdom (UK) and Canada agreed to punitively purge seven Russian banks from the SWIFT system. China had once settled trade transactions with Russia in renminbi but the US deterred that workaround with secondary sanctions. Russia and China then settled their transactions in more complex, harder-to-decipher ways. For example, Russians bought Chinese electronic parts and paid in gold, precious metals or gemstones, which were sold to the Middle East for US dollars. Hong Kong is both a logistics and financial hub for such operations. Last year, the US Treasury curbed these activities by sanctioning a group of Hong Kong and Chinese companies and threatened to sanction some small Chinese banks. The Wall Street Journal reported in April last year that intermediaries and smugglers have turned to using Tether to buy weapons and equipment for Russia's defense industry. Some quoted in the article estimated this 'shadow trade' at $10 billion a month. Last September, Russia reportedly opened two crypto exchanges in Moscow and St Petersburg to support external trade. 'Could crypto eventually provide a 'workaround' to sanctions enforcement and prohibitions on terrorist financing?' researchers at the Washington-based Brookings Institution weighed in a report last year. 'The fundraising techniques of those seeking to evade sanctions and prohibitions could easily become more sophisticated.' The report said stablecoins could also become a way for terrorists to launder funds. On January 23, US President Donald Trump signed an executive order encouraging the growth and use of digital assets, blockchain technology and related technologies across all sectors of the US economy. Steve Lee, co-founder of Neoclassic Capital, says Asian countries are building their crypto exchanges. Photo: Asia Times, Jeff Pao Steve Lee, co-founder of Neoclassic Capital, said at the Digital Assets Summit that many Asian countries are quickly building new crypto exchanges. 'Japan has been very progressive regarding crypto regulations since 2017. They are now aiming to lower the tax rate on crypto gains from 55% to 20%,' Lee said. 'In South Korea, institutions might be able to start trading cryptos by the end of this year.' 'Singapore is easing its regulations to attract global crypto players, such as Robinhood Crypto (a US-based bitcoin trading platform),' he added. It remains unclear whether these Asian crypto exchanges will become new platforms for Russian and Chinese companies to circumvent US sanctions. In a crypto roadmap unveiled last November, the UK's Financial Conduct Authority outlined its policy publications for regulating stablecoins, crypto firms, and exchanges. It will finalize the rules in 2026. Multinational law firm Pinsent Masons said in March that crypto companies have begun self-reporting suspected breaches of sanctions against Russia to the UK government. Three out of 50 self-reports originated from crypto firms, while others were from financial institutions. Read: US warns Chinese banks over Russian shipments


South China Morning Post
02-05-2025
- South China Morning Post
EU fines TikTok €530 million for China data transfer
TikTok has been in the crosshairs of Western government for years over fears of China using personal data for espionage or propaganda TikTok was hit with a massive EU fine of €530 million (US$600 million) on Friday, accused of sending personal data of Europeans to China and failing to guarantee it was shielded from access by Chinese authorities. The Chinese-owned social media giant, which is also in the crosshairs of the United States, acknowledged during a probe that it has hosted European data in China, contrary to a previous denial, according go Ireland's data protection watchdog. One of the largest fines ever imposed by the authority followed a probe into the lawfulness of data transfers by TikTok. In 2023 Ireland's Data Protection Commission (DPC) fined TikTok – which has 1.5 billion users worldwide – €345 million for breaches of European rules on processing child data. As TikTok – a division of Chinese tech giant ByteDance – has its European headquarters in Ireland, the Irish authority is the lead regulator in Europe for the social platform, as well as others like Google, Meta and X. 'TikTok failed to verify, guarantee and demonstrate that the personal data of (European) users, remotely accessed by staff in China, was afforded a level of protection essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the EU,' said DPC deputy commissioner Graham Doyle. 'TikTok did not address potential access by Chinese authorities to (Europeans') personal data under Chinese anti-terrorism, counter-espionage and other laws identified by TikTok as materially diverging from EU standards,' Doyle said in a statement. Newsletter DAILY SCMP Today: Intl Edition By submitting, you consent to receiving marketing emails from SCMP. If you don't want these, tick here {{message}} Thanks for signing up for our newsletter! Please check your email to confirm your subscription. Follow us on Facebook to get our latest news. TikTok said it planned to appeal the EU fine, insisting it had 'never received a request' from Chinese authorities for European users' data. '(TikTok) has never provided European user data to them,' Christine Grahn of TikTok Europe said. 'We disagree with this decision and intend to appeal it in full.' The social media giant has been in the crosshairs of Western government for years over fears personal data could be used by China for espionage or propaganda purposes. TikTok also infringed requirements within the EU's General Data Protection Regulation by transferring user data to China, said the DPC's statement. Friday's decision 'includes administrative fines totalling €530 million and an order requiring TikTok to bring its processing into compliance within six months', it said. The authority said €45 million of the fine was imposed due to a lack of transparency between 2020 and 2022 when the platform did not indicate to users which countries the data was transferred to or that it could be accessed from China. The DPC said its decision also includes an order suspending TikTok's transfers to China if the firm does not meet the six-month deadline. The fine is expected to increase pressure against the social network in the United States. Trump says he's open to Musk buying TikTok 'if he wanted to' The US Congress passed a law in 2024 requiring ByteDance to divest control of TikTok in the United States or be banned from the country. President Donald Trump has postponed twice, until June 19, the deadline set for the sale of the social network, which has 170 million American users. Aside from the data issue, TikTok is also accused of confining its users to silos through an opaque and powerful recommendation algorithm, fostering the spread of misinformation and illegal, violent, or obscene content. Several countries have banned the platform for varying periods, such as Pakistan, Nepal, and France in the territory of New Caledonia. For years, TikTok has highlighted its data protection policies. In Europe, it launched the Clover programme, which provides for €12 billion of investment over 10 years. It claims that Europeans' data is by default stored in Norway, Ireland, and the United States and 'that employees in China have no access to restricted data', such as phone numbers or IP addresses. The DPC, which opened its probe in 2021, however, said Friday it was informed in April by TikTok that European data had been stored, then deleted, in China – contrary to what the firm previously claimed.