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Twelve Post-War Tales by Graham Swift review – haunting visions from a Booker winner

Twelve Post-War Tales by Graham Swift review – haunting visions from a Booker winner

The Guardian3 days ago

There are several wars, not all of them military ones, in these deftly turned stories from Booker winner Graham Swift. With characteristic exactness and compassion, Swift considers the cost of human conflict in all its forms – and the challenge, for those who manage to stay alive, of retrieving the past.
In The Next Best Thing former Leutnant Büchner, gatekeeping civic records in postwar Germany in 1959, fields a British serviceman's attempts to trace the fate of his German Jewish relatives during the Holocaust. Denial and guilt vie chillingly in a tale about the agony of looking back when there are only 'pathetic little scraps of paper' to be found. 'What did they expect, after all, what did they really hope for,' Büchner wonders, 'these needy and haunted ones who still, after 15 years, kept coming forward … To be given back the actual ashes, the actual dust, the actual bones?'
In Blushes the 'ghost world' we're shown is the suddenly empty one created by the Covid pandemic, with its unpeopled streets and rising death toll. Here the war being fought is the war against disease. Hinges, meanwhile, takes us into the thoughts of a middle-aged woman during her father's funeral. As the coffin is brought to the cemetery she thinks back to a day when, as a girl, she waited with him for a carpenter to arrive and fix their creaking front door. The door, he'd explained, was 90 years old. Swift's conceptual agility is on dazzling display here:
But she couldn't have thought, then, what her 49-year-old self could think: that 90 years was the length of a decent human life, though rather longer, as it had proved, than her father's. And she surely couldn't have thought then, as she thought now, that there were two things, generally made of wood, specifically designed to accommodate the dimensions of a single human being. Two objects of carpentry. A door and a coffin. It was like the answer to a riddle.
Neat as the parallel is, if these stories occasionally feel a little pat, it is precisely because they are so smoothly jointed. Sometimes the 'hinge' involves a moment of slick linguistic doubleness. The carpenter in Hinges is called Joe Short – 'As in 'life is short',' we're reminded. In Black, another daughter makes sense of the way her angry coalminer father and his friends terrorised their families by concluding that 'their place was the pit and they didn't want pity'. The riddle of life, you suspect, isn't that easily solved.
Where the moral focus is blurrier, the emotional payoff is often much greater. Beauty is a story of bereavement without a resolution: hoping for closure, a grandfather pays a secret visit to the university residence where his granddaughter Clare recently killed herself, only to feel like 'an old man among ghostly young people'. The tale is a haunting palimpsest of shifting impressions. While the dean is showing him to Clare's dorm, he's incongruously aroused by her beauty. She tells him that the room 'has now been cleared' and he notes that 'there was the little collision of 'Clare' and 'clear'. They were the same word.' But is anything clear? In this story the craving for life and the pull towards death are murkily intertwined. On the train back, even 'the scudding fields and trees became obscure'. The image of dissolution tugs at the heart, without trying to reel us in.
Swift's interest in what a meaningful reconstruction of the past might look like achieves an even deeper resonance in the final piece, Passport. Though she's in her 80s and doesn't expect to travel again, Anna-Maria Anderson has recently renewed this official proof of identity. She concedes ruefully that 'there really was no way of travelling through time', which is what she would really like to do. But of course, there is; this story is it. As she thinks, marvelling, of her parents' love affair during the Spanish civil war and her own survival, as a baby, of the Blitz bomb that killed her mother, the piece becomes a moving reflection on the haphazardness as well as the serendipity of life. But it acknowledges something else too: the awkwardness of growing old, and its inescapable tedium. 'If life turns out to be short, well then that's cruel,' Anna-Maria decides. 'But when life is long, that can be cruel too.' Skilful, generous and humane, these 12 tales suggest the complexity and heartbreak of being engaged on such an uncertain journey.
Twelve Post-War Tales by Graham Swift is published by Scribner (£18.99). To support the Guardian, order your copy at guardianbookshop.com. Delivery charges may apply.

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Bulgaria could break the euro. The EU would only have itself to blame
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  • Telegraph

Bulgaria could break the euro. The EU would only have itself to blame

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The Sweden Democrats have exerted considerable influence over the government and its agenda. The question is whether voters will give Jimmie Akesson enough of a mandate to finally bust the taboo that has so far kept a party partially founded by Nazi sympathisers from being formally in government. Italy (2027) Giorgia Meloni has emerged as a genuine stateswoman since she took power in 2022, and experts believe her example of government has made the hard-Right in Europe more credible. She has kept her Right-wing coalition together, which is no easy task in Italy. She positioned herself as a mediator between the EU and Mr Trump while successfully spearheading a drive to get Brussels' tacit backing for offshore migrant detention camps. Thanks to her, the Italian hard-Right's vote share has risen from just 1.97 per cent in 2013 to 27.2 per cent in 2022, and she will be optimistic of another victory in 2027's general election. She has much in common politically with Mr Orban, but they are divided over Ukraine, which has split the European hard-Right. She shares a European political party with Poland's Law and Justice, which is hawkish on Russia and will be contesting the general election in 2027 if Mr Tusk's vote of confidence passes next week. Spain (2027) Spain's conservatives won the popular vote – 33.1 per cent – in the last general election, but fell short of a majority. Their potential coalition allies, Vox, the far-Right and Trump allied nationalists, underperformed, obtaining just 12.4 per cent of the vote. That opened the door for socialist prime minister Pedro Sanchez to assemble an extremely broad coalition of the centre-Left, communists and Catalan and Basque separatists. Polarised Spain's culture wars have only got worse in the years since the 2023 election and the start of the divisive Mr Sanchez's second term. The pardoning of Catalan separatists and political discussions with former terrorists, as well as corruption allegations about his wife and allies, could cost him in 2027. France (2027) Emmanuel Macron called snap parliamentary elections, effectively daring the French to hand over power to the hard-Right, after Marine Le Pen's National Rally defeated him in the European Parliament elections last summer. National Rally did not get a majority, after a group of different parties united to keep out the hard-Right. But Mr Macron's party lost its majority in the National Assembly and has been a lame duck domestically ever since. Head of the largest single party in France, Ms Le Pen is well positioned for presidential elections in 2027, in which Mr Macron cannot stand. But Ms Le Pen was banned from running for the presidency in March after being found guilty of embezzlement. It drew immediate comparisons to the 'lawfare' waged on Mr Trump, who offered his support. She is appealing, but her protege Jordan Bardella will run in her stead if necessary. Polls are showing that either could win against Gabriel Attal, a contender to succeed Mr Macron as candidate – if they were to run. Ms Le Pen would beat him 53 per cent to 47 per cent, Bardella by 52 per cent to 48 per cent. The question is whether the 'front republican' will once again emerge in the second round of the presidential elections to keep the National Rally from power. Or, as it did this week in Poland, fall just short. The election of a Eurosceptic leader to the presidency of France, the EU's most influential member state alongside Germany, would be a political earthquake that would shake Brussels to its core. Why now? Andre Krouwel, who teaches political science at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, said the populist parties in Europe were comparing notes as they plotted their routes to power. He said: 'They use the success and failure of other parties to learn from and use in campaigns. You see a lot of copying of strategies, such as victim playing or attacking so-called elites.' In general, traditional parties had an advantage in their experience and ability to govern, he added. Mr Wilders' decision to pull the plug on his coalition was an example that proved populists were 'good at saying things, not doing them.' The parties were also 'super-unstable' and given to infighting. For Prof Krouwel, the rise of the populist Right across Europe has its roots in economic anxiety as well as fears over immigration. 'There was always an expectation that your children will do better than you. You can't say that now,' he said, adding that Dutch children were staying home far longer because they can't afford to move out. 'We are all becoming southern Europe and that is an explanation for the populist surge,' he said. Maria Skora, visiting researcher at the European Policy Centre think tank in Brussels, said there were certain broad trends common to many EU countries where the hard Right was on the rise. There have been 15 years of difficulties, including the eurozone and migrant crises. The pandemic was followed by the war in Ukraine and the resulting cost of living crisis. That all contributed to the sense that traditional parties were not delivering. Meanwhile, parties like the AfD were extremely effective at using social media and digital campaigning. 'It's a digital revolution, as big a revolution as you know, radio back in the day,' Ms Skora said. 'I think this feeds into this tribalism and polarisation, which we see in more countries.'

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