
China unleashes hackers against its friend Russia, seeking war secrets
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China is far wealthier than Russia and has plenty of homegrown scientific and military expertise, but Chinese military experts often lament that Chinese troops lack battlefield experience. Experts say that China sees the war in Ukraine as a chance to collect information about modern warfare tactics, Western weaponry, and what works against them.
'China likely seeks to gather intelligence on Russia's activities, including on its military operation in Ukraine, defense developments, and other geopolitical maneuvers,' said Che Chang, a researcher with TeamT5.
It is unclear how successful these attempts have been, partly because Russian officials have never publicly acknowledged these intrusions. But a classified counterintelligence document from Russia's domestic security agency, known as the FSB, makes clear that intelligence officials are concerned. The document, obtained by The New York Times, says that China is seeking Russian defense expertise and technology and is trying to learn from Russia's military experience in Ukraine. The document refers to China as an 'enemy.'
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With Putin largely cut off from the West, his country has come to rely on China to buy its oil and sell it technology that is essential to its war effort. Moscow and Beijing have formed a bloc against Washington and its allies, alarming Western leaders. The FSB document presents a more complicated relationship than the 'no-limits' partnership that Xi and Putin describe.
Allies have been known to spy on one another, but the extent of China's hacking activities against Russia suggests both a higher level of mutual distrust and a reluctance by the Kremlin to share all that it is learning on the battlefield in Ukraine.
Drone warfare and software are of particular interest to China, the document says.
'The war in Ukraine fundamentally shifted intelligence priorities for both countries,' said Itay Cohen, a senior researcher with cybersecurity firm Palo Alto Networks who has followed Chinese hacking groups for years. Experts say, and the document indicates, that China wants to learn from Russia's war experience to bolster its own preparedness for potential future conflicts. Taiwan, in particular, is a major potential flashpoint with the West.
One Chinese government-funded group has targeted Rostec, the powerful Russian state-owned defense conglomerate, seeking information on satellite communications, radar and electronic warfare, according to Palo Alto Networks. Others have used malicious files, intended to exploit vulnerabilities in Microsoft Word, to penetrate Russian aviation industry targets and state bodies.
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Messages seeking comment were left with the Kremlin and the Chinese Embassy in Moscow.
Not all Chinese hacking groups operate at the behest of the government. But security experts have seen evidence of government ties.
Russian cybersecurity firm Positive Technologies, for example, said in 2023 that cyberattacks had been mounted on several Russian targets, including in the aerospace, private security, and defense sectors. The attackers used a tool known as Deed RAT, which is widely deployed by Chinese state-sponsored hackers. Cybersecurity experts say Deed RAT is considered 'proprietary' among these groups and is not available for purchase on the dark web like other malware tools.
That has enabled state-backed hacking groups in China to use it more widely because it is tough for their adversaries to find a way to combat the malware.
Chinese state-sponsored hacking groups have often targeted international companies and government institutions, including in the United States and Europe. But hacking groups appear to have become more interested in Russian targets after the country's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Chang said he and his colleagues tracked several Chinese hacking groups targeting Russia. Among them was one of the country's most active hacking groups, known as Mustang Panda.
Little is known about Mustang Panda's origins or where it operates inside China, according to researchers who have studied the group. Its activities often accompanied China's Belt and Road economic development initiative, according to Rafe Pilling, director of threat intelligence at security firm Sophos. As China invested in development projects in West Africa and Southeast Asia, he said, hacking soon followed.
That is most likely because China invests in countries where it has political and economic interests, which motivates state-sponsored hackers, Pilling said.
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After Russia invaded Ukraine, TeamT5 said that Mustang Panda expanded its scope to target governmental organizations in Russia and the European Union.
Pilling, who has been monitoring Mustang Panda's activities for several years, says he suspects that the group is backed by China's Ministry of State Security, its main intelligence body. The ministry supports threat groups that attack targets around the world, he said. In 2022, Mustang Panda targeted Russian military officials and border guard units near the Siberian border with China.
'The targeting we've observed tends to be political and military intelligence-gathering,' Pilling said. That is true of all Chinese hacking groups targeting Russia, he said. 'I think of them as being one of the main tools that the Chinese state has for gathering political and economic intelligence.'
Mustang Panda has also attracted the attention of US authorities. In January, the Justice Department and the FBI said that Mustang Panda's malware had infected thousands of computer systems, seeking to steal information. Many of the targets were American, but the malware was also found on computers belonging to Chinese dissidents and European and Asian governments, according to a federal indictment.
The indictment makes clear that the United States believes that Mustang Panda is a state-sponsored group.
Other Chinese groups have targeted Russia, too. Chang said his team was following another threat group, Slime19, that is continuously targeting the Russian government, energy, and defense sectors.
In agreements in 2009 and 2015, China and Russia promised not to carry out cyberattacks targeting each other. But even at the time, analysts suggested that the announcement was largely symbolic.
Chinese hacking in Russia did not begin with the war in Ukraine. A 2021 cyberattack, for example, targeted Russian submarine designers. But experts say the war prompted a spike in computer intrusions.
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'The activity — we saw it immediately in the months following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine,' Cohen said. 'Even though the public narrative was of close ties between Russia and China.'
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Business Insider
an hour ago
- Business Insider
Nio or XPeng: Goldman Sachs Chooses the Superior EV Stock to Buy
Since 2009, China has held the title of the world's largest automotive market, driven by its vast population and a rapidly growing urban middle class. In 2022 alone, the country recorded 26.88 million new car sales. By the following year, domestic production surged past 31 million vehicles. So far this year, Chinese auto sales have made up 28% of the global total. Confident Investing Starts Here: Easily unpack a company's performance with TipRanks' new KPI Data for smart investment decisions Receive undervalued, market resilient stocks right to your inbox with TipRanks' Smart Value Newsletter A key driver of this growth is the rapid adoption of electric vehicles (EVs), which are claiming an ever-larger share of the market. Backed by robust government support and rising consumer demand, EV production and adoption have soared. China is now home to around 100 active EV makers, and its EV market is the largest in the world. According to Fortune Business Insights, the electric car market in China is expected to grow at a strong CAGR of approximately 18.4% through 2030. But with this rapid expansion comes intensifying competition. The EV boom has turned the market into a fierce battleground, where price wars and shrinking margins are becoming the norm. For investors, the rapid expansion of China's EV sector brings both opportunities and pitfalls. Goldman Sachs analyst Tina Hou is closely following the action, focusing on two of China's most prominent EV names: Nio (NYSE:NIO) and XPeng (NYSE:XPEV). Her insights aim to separate the leader from the laggard, and help investors determine which stock offers the more compelling case. Let's take a closer look. Nio We'll start with Nio, one of China's innovative electric car makers. Since its founding in 2014, Nio has developed a line-up of EV models, nine under its own nameplate along with additional models under the Onvo and Firefly brands. The company's vehicle lines include several sedan and SUV models, combining luxury styling, the latest EV tech, digital dashboards, and long-range battery systems. On pricing, Nio aims to run the gamut – from low-end budget models to high-priced luxury offerings. At bottom, the company's Onvo and Firefly brands feature ticket prices as low as $16,700 for Firefly's low-cost trim, to $33,400 for the top-end Onvo model. Nio's eponymous nameplate features vehicles such as the ET5, at $41,000, the ET7, priced at $59,000, and the ET9 for $90,000. Vehicle pricing is based on battery technology and packages, vehicle trim levels, and idiosyncrasies of local region and market conditions. Nio backs up its vehicles with a solid service network. The company pioneered EV battery swapping in China, developing a network of swapping stations where vehicle owners and drivers can pull in and replace depleted battery packages for new ones – without having to wait for recharging. The service is offered on a subscription basis, and has proven popular with Nio's customer base, as it solves two 'pains' that EV drivers frequently complain of: long battery charging times and high battery costs. We should note here that Nio has faced headwinds in recent months. The company's stock is down 22% year-to-date, after the firm has faced difficulties hitting sales goals and has cut delivery guidance. The lowered guidance has come alongside lower delivery numbers and increased quarterly earnings losses. On the delivery side, Nio delivered 23,900 vehicles in April of this year, for a 53% year-over-year gain; in May, that number was 23,231 vehicles, for a year-over-year gain of 13.1%. On revenue and earnings, Nio reported $1.66 billion in 1Q25, up 21.5% year-over-year but missing the forecast by $70 million. At the bottom line, Nio's non-GAAP EPS loss in Q1, of 41 cents, was 4 cents per share below the forecast; the company's net loss was 24% deeper than in the prior-year quarter. In her write-up on Nio for Goldman, analyst Tina Hou notes that company management is actively working to improve efficiencies and mitigate losses, but has not reaped the benefits yet. 'Nio has been focusing on cost reduction through a series of cost control and efficiency improvement measures since Mar, including terminating low return projects, and integrating R&D and S&M teams to support multiple brands with a c.20% headcount reduction. By doing so, management aims to achieve 20%-25% opex optimization and profit breakeven in 4Q25… Although we believe Nio's cost reduction efforts would help improve the company's R&D and operational efficiency, we remain relatively more conservative on Nio's FY25 sales volume compared to management's target largely due to the ongoing industry competitive intensity, YTD run rate and overall demand outlook,' Hou stated. Hou follows these comments with a Neutral (i.e., Hold) rating on NIO, along with a $3.80 price target that points toward a one-year upside of 11%. (To watch Hou's track record, click here) This view is in line with the Street's consensus; Nio has a Hold rating, based on 11 recent reviews which include 2 to Buy, 8 to Hold, and 1 to Sell. The shares are priced at $3.42, and their $4.51 average price target suggests a ~32% gain in the next 12 months. (See NIO stock forecast) XPeng, Inc. Next on our list here is XPeng, a fast-growing EV maker in the Chinese market. The company is based in the southern city of Guangzhou, where it was founded in 2014. XPeng started regular vehicle production in 2019, and in recent months has seen its production and delivery numbers grow rapidly. XPeng's current success is based on a line-up of battery-powered EVs that include elegant luxury models, large SUVs, a coupe, and even an extra-large seven-seater. Customers can choose from a range of features, including luxury-styled interior finishing, long-range battery packs, flat-screen cockpits, and voice-activated driving assistance. XPeng's vehicles are aimed at China's growing upper-middle-class demographic, a population that has the available funds to buy high-end electric vehicles and is tech-savvy enough to appreciate and use the added smart-car technology features. While the company has put a premium on high-tech features in its cars, it hasn't skimped on basic automotive technology; XPeng's cars are powered by proven electric drivetrains to provide drivers with a favorable driving experience. To support its vehicles and customers, XPeng provides solid warranties for its vehicles and their systems, along with remote vehicle support and diagnostics, and 24/7 roadside assistance. On a more prosaic level, the company has also built up a network of 772 branded supercharging stations and 1,870 free charging stations. The network spans China, and includes 319 cities with free charging services. The company's supercharging technology includes built-in safety monitoring, to ensure that fast chargers are safe to use. In its last reported quarter, 1Q25, XPeng reported quarterly deliveries of 94,008 vehicles, covering all models. This number was up 331% year-over-year, and reflects increasing sales success in the past year. The company's most recent delivery numbers, covering this past May, came in at 33,525 total vehicles – a figure that was up 230% year-over-year. XPeng has recorded monthly vehicle deliveries of 30,000-plus for seven consecutive months. Looking at financial results, we find that XPeng generated $2.18 billion in revenues, in line with expectations and achieving a year-over-year gain of 141.5%. At the bottom line, XPeng recorded a net loss of 6 cents per share by non-GAAP measures – but that net loss was significantly less than had been expected, beating the forecast by 15 cents per share. Recognizing the momentum, Goldman Sachs analyst Tina Hou sees particular strength in XPeng's ability to scale up new model launches and maintain a steady pace of innovation. 'Since 4Q24, XPeng has shown consistent improvement in its new and refreshed model launches with Mona M03 and P7+ sales volume ranking among the top 3 in their respective segment. XPeng has also stepped up on its new model launch frequency with 10 over 2024-2026, compared to only 1-2 new models each year from 2019-2023. XPeng will now introduce 10 new + refresh models each year to better compete in today's highly dynamic market environment… We are Buy-rated, as we see the result of a series of efforts coming through that has transformed the company's product and cost structure competitiveness, leading to higher visibility for sustainable sales volume growth as well as profit margin improvement going forward. XPeng is currently trading in line with historical average forward P/S multiple in the past 1 year,' the analyst opined. That stated Buy rating is complemented by a price target of $24, suggesting a 29% potential upside for the next 12 months. The Street, generally, likes XPEV shares, and gives the stock a Moderate Buy consensus rating based on 9 recent reviews with a breakdown of 6 Buys, 2 Holds, and 1 Sell. The stock's $18.61 selling price and $24.78 average target price together indicate room for a 33% gain in the coming year. (See XPEV stock forecast) With the facts laid out, and the ratings and price targets compared side-to-side, it's clear that Goldman Sachs has picked out XPeng as the superior Chinese EV stock to buy. To find good ideas for stocks trading at attractive valuations, visit TipRanks' Best Stocks to Buy, a tool that unites all of TipRanks' equity insights.


Buzz Feed
2 hours ago
- Buzz Feed
The Unexpected Consequences of My 2016 Trump Vote
I am a Chinese woman, a daughter of immigrants, who voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election. It is almost a secret, though I sometimes offer up the confession like it is penance. I cried driving away from my polling place and sobbed on a futon when he won. My chest was tight, my stomach churned, my face was hot — all blood and breath and acid had conspired inside me to signal alarm. I immediately hated my choice, but I did not yet believe it to be wrong. I had bought into the lesser-of-two-evils arc, with 'But her emails!' still echoing in my mind to assure me that this was the only option. Earlier that fall, my church had just launched a new 'Adopt A College Student!' ministry. It was imagined as a mentorship and fellowship opportunity for the young adults in our congregation, a chance to share coffee and do laundry. We were invited to apply for the program, so that we could prayerfully be matched up with an adoptive family. I learned the family of one of our church's pastors had requested to be paired with me, and this thrilled me. I had secretly hoped to be matched with them, and I loved a narrative in which I was chosen. My eagerness to sign up for anything that promised me love was what had brought me to church in the first place. The messaging was direct. They had cornered the market on love, and all I needed to do was say yes. The love would turn out to be a gimmick to get me signed up for the real program, one that I was even more primed to receive, and that I believed was simply the precursor to how to be loved: how to be good. In addition to a behavioral and ideological rulebook, white evangelical culture provided me with one other thing I'd been chasing after my whole life: an entry point into dominant white culture. I wanted to un-other myself and believed that I could assimilate myself into safety, power, and love. A deep sense of un-belonging had been with me since my earliest memories. When I was little, kids would ask me why my eyes weren't more Chinese — the asker would drag their own eyes out to the edges of their face in a sliver. I never had an answer but took it as a mercy that I was less Chinese than I could have been. At my Baptist preschool, my favorite teacher, who had long brown hair that I loved to play with, asked me one day what the Chinese word for hair was. I answered, 'Tóufa' — and then it became my nickname for the rest of my years there. I internalized these differences as things that made me special, but over time this morphed into two beliefs: I was only as special as I was separate; and in this showcase of separation was where I was most likely to be endeared. In church, I learned to further capitalize on this difference, twisting the isolation into testimony. I had felt much pain related to my Chinese identity, and the church was ready to pin Chinese culture as the culprit and this American gospel as the solution — as salvation. I had grown up in a family that was not apolitical but that had not considered politics from a perspective that I could understand. My parents were Chinese immigrants who'd grown up during the Cultural Revolution and come to the United States following the Tiananmen Square massacre, and who'd told me exactly none of this over the course of my years at home. I was in high school when I learned about the massacre on the internet and in my 20s when I thought to ask my mother if she had been in Beijing when it happened (she had been). Once, after a fifth-grade civics lesson, I wondered whether my parents were Democrats or Republicans, and I asked my neighbor down the street what she thought: Which was better, and which were my parents? She said my dad was probably a Republican because he owned a small business. Then she shared that she was a Republican, too. I remember feeling a frivolous pride teaching my parents the Pledge of Allegiance when they were preparing to become citizens, like it was my little American trick. The first time they voted in a presidential election, I was surprised. I knew they could, but it hadn't occurred to me that they would. They still felt so un-American to me, and U.S. politics felt like it didn't belong to them, or to us. Over the next few years, I felt a growing sense that I both should and shouldn't find my place in political conversations around me. In churched spaces, the prevailing message was that politics were bad, divisive, and a scheme, but still, there was an unspoken alliance. I don't remember learning Christian nationalism, but one day it was just there, the innate understanding that Christians were Republicans, that liberalism was bad, and that it was good to root for our beliefs to be everybody's beliefs. The church I attended had an American flag on the stage, the children said the Pledge of Allegiance before AWANA, and on more than one occasion, we sang about God and country during Sunday worship, declaring our patriotism through choruses of 'America, America, God shed his grace on thee.' My public school invited students to church lock-ins with the aim of proselytization, refrained from Halloween festivities, prayed before sporting events, and I had come to receive this breakdown of church and state as a blessing. By the time the 2016 election rolled around, I had spent a lifetime in sacred and secular institutions that had braided moral uprightness with a message of Christian faith. In the months leading up to the election, I spent a lot of time with the pastor's family who had 'adopted' me for the college student ministry. The wife, in particular, spoke frequently to me about politics. She shared her beliefs with a parental (and pastoral) authority on gun control and racism, and Hillary Clinton. She presented ideologies as an assumed commonality, sparing me the opportunity to react wrongly. One day in the car, she shared her 'all lives matter' ethic with me at a stoplight on the way to pick up her daughter from dance. I tensed for a moment — and then we were talking about something else. By November, we had had so many conversations about Hillary Clinton that I knew she was not an option. I don't remember any conversations about Donald Trump. My first time voting in a presidential election was when I was 21. I had spent my few previous adult years priding myself on being good and moral, while managing to stay outside of political schematics. An impulse to challenge the things that unsettled me had begun to creep in, but immediately I would assert that I didn't care about politics, that this thing I was bringing up wasn't that. I had begun the psychic separation of church and state, knowing that I would legally support gay rights, even if doctrinally I couldn't. But I wasn't watching the news, and I wasn't engaging with the worst of Donald Trump. I had reduced him to nothing more than the option that was not Hillary Clinton. I knew that I had a duty to civic participation and that I couldn't leave this world completely up to chance, but I also believed that my citizenship was not of this world but another. I believed there was a spiritual superiority in staying above the anxiety of politics. It's true that this ideology I had built my life on had begun to fray, that I expressed unease over my plan to vote for Donald Trump, that I fought to justify it because I knew it wasn't justifiable. But nuancing my culpability wouldn't do a damn thing for the mistake I would make in the end. A few months before the election, I had just for the first time considered whether or not I was a 'person of color.' I had watched a recording of a diversity roundtable segment from a popular Christian women's conference featuring people of color discussing race and the church, and two East Asian women were on the panel. Afterward, I asked my white roommate if I was a person of color and cracked a joke about whether or not yellow was a color. I knew I wasn't white, but I had been white-adjacent enough to believe that a racialized experience wasn't something that belonged to me. I had only ever heard race discussed in the contexts of Blackness and whiteness. Recently, my only Asian American friend from high school shared that her prevailing memory of me was that I hated being Chinese and wished I was white. She remembers me saying this over and over again. I had always felt the categorical otherness of being Chinese in a town that was over 90% white and had so minute an Asian population that the category was often omitted altogether in census data (other times, it came in at a decimal below 1%). But I lacked a framework to make sense of it. I didn't yet understand white supremacy, or the model minority myth or even systemic racism. I didn't know that I was a person of color. I instinctively hated what was hated in me, but even that felt like pointing at a ghost. How do you gather evidence when all the evidence is just ways you are quietly not there? The movies you are not in, the books, the TV shows. The way your history is omitted, but you can't cite what you don't know, you can only know what isn't yours, and the history you learn never is. You singularly fill the gap that accounts for your existence, because if you haven't learned about you, then surely they haven't either. They ask you about your eyes or your food or your parents' names, but it's all in good faith (except when it's not). The systems that are designed to restrain us — the ones that succeed without our ever seeing them — breed a particularly maddening brand of self-hatred. Following the election, the bubble of white-adjacent privilege I had quietly kept myself in popped overnight. All of the good behavior in the world couldn't save me from the pain that was now presented to me as my birthright. People I loved had received a blanket permission slip to say out loud any abhorrent things they had believed all along. Oftentimes racist ideology was shared with me with no awareness of its implication on me at all. I'd spent so many years trying to convince white people and myself that I was one of them, and I'd almost done it. I'd prided myself on being the kind of Asian you could make Asian jokes to, ask your racist questions to. I beat people to the punchline for a quick laugh. I cracked jokes about pretending to be everybody's adopted Chinese daughter; one year, I wound up in three different families' church directory photos as a gag. I'd spent my life allying with whiteness, and I couldn't believe now how it had betrayed me. When I share now that I voted for Trump in 2016, it drops like a bomb every time. People who didn't know me then are shocked because it feels aggressively counter to every value I hold now. People who did know me then just never clocked me as particularly Republican, and so even 'voting for the platform' doesn't quite explain what I did because was I ever so against abortion? When I told my therapist a few weeks ago, she gasped and immediately asked me, 'Why?' The truth of the moment of decision is not particularly interesting or compelling. 'I was told I had to,' feels cheap and off-kilter. My understanding of that political era is so different now than it was then that it is hard for me to access my actual beliefs from that time. What did I truly believe about Hillary Clinton? How little did I think about my decision as my own before I cast it on a ballot? Most of my close white evangelical friends sat the election out because they said they just couldn't vote for him, and they couldn't vote for her. How, then, had I reconciled the cognitive dissonance that was voting for Donald Trump? The short answer is, I didn't. The longer one is that two primary impulses compelled me to my vote: the desire to stay loved and the desire to stay close to whiteness — both repackaged as a desire to please God. I didn't believe Trump would get me any closer to these things, but I thought compliance might. I don't know what I really believed about the stakes of that election or the platforms of the candidates (though my body gave me signs I had betrayed myself immediately after I voted), but I do know that I truly believed that the church was the reigning authority on love. This belief, paired with my pleasing tendencies and my insecurities, made me incredibly susceptible to the church's ideological mandates. I felt like I had snuck into the group and had so much to lose. I wanted to stay trusted and to be seen as good, and I believed them when they told me how to do it. I wonder sometimes how long it would have taken me to get here had Trump not won the election in 2016. My story of regret is not unique, and neither is it noble. I allied with whiteness until it had nothing left to offer me. I was swayed by the church's authority on love not because of how I hoped the church might dispense love to others but because of how I hoped it might dispense love to me. I still live in the same small, white, churched town in West Virginia. Everyone I love either loves someone who voted for Trump or is someone who voted for Trump. I worry that there is a parallel universe in which I did again, too — in which I am a completely different person because I remained allied with power. I have laid down much at the altar of white supremacy, but if Trump's first term gave me nothing else, it gave me an ultimatum. I am not grateful to have made the mistake of voting for Donald Trump in 2016, and I am not grateful for anything that has come from his politics or his presence, but I am grateful for the other side of a crisis point.


Newsweek
3 hours ago
- Newsweek
Satellite Images Show Damage to Iranian Nuclear Site After Israeli Strikes
Based on facts, either observed and verified firsthand by the reporter, or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources. Newsweek AI is in beta. Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content. Israeli jets have bombed a nuclear reactor under construction in central Iran during a wave of air strikes on the seventh day of the conflict between the two countries. Satellite images show a hole in the domed roof of the facility caused by a blast. The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed the damage and said no nuclear material was present during the strike. Why It Matters The airstrike targeted the Arak heavy water reactor, known officially as the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor, located about 240 kilometers southwest of Tehran. The Israeli military said the attack was designed to disable the core seal of the unfinished reactor and prevent it from being used to produce weapons-grade plutonium. What To Know The Arak facility, though still under construction, has long been viewed by Western powers as a potential component of a nuclear weapons program. Heavy water reactors like Arak produce plutonium as a byproduct, which can be used in nuclear weapons. Under the 2015 nuclear agreement, Iran was required to disable the Arak reactor by removing its core and filling it with concrete. However, in 2019, Ali Akbar Salehi, then head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, revealed in a televised interview that Iran had secretly obtained duplicate piping to rebuild the core. Israel released black-and-white footage of the strike, showing a bomb hitting the reactor's domed roof, followed by a large explosion. Iranian state TV aired daytime footage of smoke rising from the site and reported the area had been secured and evacuated prior to the attack. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which last inspected the site in May, confirmed there was no radioactive material at the facility and noted that key structures, including the distillation units of the adjacent heavy water plant, were damaged. The agency also acknowledged it had lost "continuity of knowledge" regarding Iran's heavy water production due to restricted access. Israel has previously struck other nuclear sites, including Natanz and Isfahan, in what it describes as a campaign to neutralize Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi condemned the attack, saying Israel had "crossed a new red line in international law." Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the strikes are necessary to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. What People Are Saying IDF spokesperson Brigadier General Effie Defrin said: "We continue to dismantle Iran's strategic capabilities—each strike reinforces our air superiority." President Donald Trump, during a bilateral meeting with the Canadian prime minister at the G7 summit, said: "They should talk, and they should talk immediately. I'd say Iran is not winning this war." Abbas Araghchi, Iran's foreign minister, wrote in a post on X: "If Trump is genuine about diplomacy and interested in stopping this war, next steps are consequential. It takes one phone call from Washington to muzzle someone like Netanyahu," Iran's top diplomat continued. "That may pave the way for a return to diplomacy." What Happens Next White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said Trump will make a decision on whether or not to have the United States join Israel's war with Iran "within the next two weeks."