Sixth-gen fighter could block airspace 1,000km from Chinese shore, military article says
In a future conflict over Taiwan, Beijing's
sixth-generation fighter could block the airspace to foreign bases in Guam for up to two hours from 1,000km away, according to a mainland Chinese military magazine.
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The goal involving the next-gen fighter was created in view of
People's Liberation Army weaknesses against the American B-21 stealth bomber in a conflict within the first island chain, it said. The ginkgo leaf-shaped fighter is unofficially dubbed the J-36 and is in development by the PLA.
According to the article in Shipborne Weapons, a publication owned by China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, when the sixth-generation fighter is in service, the PLA will be able to intercept US warplanes trying to penetrate the first island chain. It said it would also be possible to conduct airspace blockades lasting one to two hours and to suppress the air defence of bases in Guam from a distance.
01:09
New Chinese fighter jet seen over Chengdu tacitly confirmed by military
New Chinese fighter jet seen over Chengdu tacitly confirmed by military
'This will make it difficult for the US Navy and Air Force to maintain air superiority over the western Pacific and to intervene militarily in a series of operations by the Chinese military within the first island chain,' the analysis in the magazine's March edition said.
Should they ever engage in a war over Taiwan, the mainland Chinese and US air forces would most likely focus on fighting for control of the airspace about 1,000km (621 miles) from the Chinese coast, the article said.
In recent weeks, the Chinese stealth aircraft under development has been spotted repeatedly undergoing test flights near the base of its developer, the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation, suggesting it is making rapid progress.
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In March, the US also announced its sixth-generation fighter, the F-47, but has revealed little further detail.
However, the B-21 Raider – described as the world's first sixth-generation bomber by its developer Northrop Grumman – had its maiden flight in November 2023. The firm declared that production was 'ahead of schedule and on budget' and that it aimed to deliver at least 100 aircraft to the air force in the mid-2020s.
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Asia Times
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Li Qiang's realist pitch seeks to reset Sino-Japan ties
In a moment of diplomatic clarity that quickly gained traction across Chinese and international media, Chinese Premier Li Qiang recently remarked: 'China and Japan are neighbors who cannot be moved. Since we cannot move, we should be good neighbors.' This deceptively simple statement carries a deep sense of geopolitical realism. It reflects Beijing's awareness that proximity is not merely a geographical fact—it is a strategic condition that requires sober diplomacy, especially amid rising regional volatility and heated rivalry with the US. Few bilateral relationships in the Indo-Pacific are as fraught and intertwined as those between China and Japan. Rooted in centuries of interaction, marred by the horrors of 20th-century warfare and shaped by decades of economic symbiosis, the China-Japan relationship has historically and recently swung between wary competition and cautious cooperation. In invoking the idea of immutable geography, Premier Li also hinted at a basic truth: China wants stability with Japan, not out of sentimentality but strategic necessity. 'Cannot be moved' is a blunt admission of reality. From Shanghai to Fukuoka, the distance is less than 800 kilometers. Between them lies the East China Sea—an arena of resource disputes, overlapping air defense zones, and naval brinkmanship, but also a vital artery of commerce and energy transit. Despite maritime tensions, this shared body of water anchors both countries in an unavoidable relationship. Li's appeal to geography recalls the thinking of the late Japanese diplomat Yukio Okamoto, who argued that China and Japan are condemned by fate and physics to coexist—so they must learn to do so constructively. The remark also stands in contrast to nationalist or triumphalist rhetoric that often defines Cross-Strait and East Asian discourse. It acknowledges limits. Neither Beijing nor Tokyo can wish the other away. 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Asia Times
4 hours ago
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Calls for moratoriums or environmental safeguards serve as tools of diplomatic leverage or political differentiation rather than as expressions of systemic restraint. The logic of extraction, once engaged, prioritizes continuity; regulatory caution is outpaced by technological momentum. This is a structurally induced outcome of a system where access is governed less by rules than by capabilities. Control over seabed minerals is increasingly a function of who can act first, remain longest and extract most efficiently. Precedent supplants principle. The seabed will be shaped through deployments, licenses and machinery already descending into the depths. For states seeking mineral security and strategic autonomy, the calculus is clear: defer the ecological reckoning and secure the resource base now. Paulo Aguiar earned a master's degree in International Relations from NOVA University Lisbon, specializing in Realism, Classical Geopolitics and Strategy. As a professional in geopolitical risk analysis and strategic foresight, Paulo regularly shares his insights through various publications and on his own Substack.
Asia Times
6 hours ago
- Asia Times
Trump's Golden Dome will make US – and world
President Donald Trump's idea of a 'Golden Dome' missile defense system carries a range of potential strategic dangers for the United States. Golden Dome is meant to protect the US from ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles, and missiles launched from space. Trump has called for the missile defense to be fully operational before the end of his term in three years. Trump's goals for Golden Dome are likely beyond reach. A wide range of studies makes clear that even defenses far more limited than what Trump envisions would be far more expensive and less effective than Trump expects, especially against enemy missiles equipped with modern countermeasures. Countermeasures include multiple warheads per missile, decoy warheads and warheads that can maneuver or are difficult to track, among others. Regardless of Golden Dome's feasibility, there is a long history of scholarship about strategic missile defenses, and the weight of evidence points to the defenses making their host country less safe from nuclear attack. I'm a national security and foreign policy professor at Harvard University, where I lead 'Managing the Atom,' the university's main research group on nuclear weapons and nuclear energy policies. For decades, I've been participating in dialogues with Russian and Chinese nuclear experts – and their fears about US missile defenses have been a consistent theme throughout. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping have already warned that Golden Dome is destabilizing. Along with US offensive capabilities, Golden Dome poses a threat of 'directly undermining global strategic stability, spurring an arms race and increasing conflict potential both among nuclear-weapon states and in the international arena as a whole,' a joint statement from China and Russia said. While that is a propaganda statement, it reflects real concerns broadly held in both countries. Golden Dome explained. Experience going back half a century makes clear that if the administration pursues Golden Dome, it is likely to provoke even larger arms buildups, derail already-dim prospects for any negotiated nuclear arms restraint, and perhaps even increase the chances of nuclear war. My first book, 35 years ago, made the case that it would be in the US national security interest to remain within the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which strictly limited US and Soviet – and later Russian – missile defenses. The United States and the Soviet Union negotiated the ABM Treaty as part of SALT I, the first agreements limiting the nuclear arms race. It was approved in the Senate 98-2. The ABM Treaty experience is instructive for the implications of Golden Dome today. Why did the two countries agree to limit defenses? First and foremost, because they understood that unless each side's defenses were limited, they would not be able to stop an offensive nuclear arms race. If each side wants to maintain the ability to retaliate if the other attacks – 'don't nuke me, or I'll nuke you' – then an obvious answer to one side building up more defenses is for the other to build up more nuclear warheads. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets installed 100 interceptors to defend Moscow – so the United States targeted still more warheads on Moscow to overwhelm the defense. Had it ever come to a nuclear war, Moscow would have been even more thoroughly obliterated than if there had been no defense at all. Both sides came to realize that unlimited missile defenses would just mean more offense on both sides, leaving both less secure than before. In addition, nations viewed an adversary's shield as going hand in hand with a nuclear sword. A nuclear first strike might destroy a major part of a country's nuclear forces. Missile defenses would inevitably be more effective against the reduced, disorganized retaliation that they knew would be coming than they would be against a massive, well-planned surprise attack. That potential advantage to whoever struck first could make nuclear crises even more dangerous. Unfortunately, President George W Bush pulled the United States out of the ABM Treaty in 2002, seeking to free US development of defenses against potential missile attacks from small states such as North Korea. But even now, decades later, the US has fewer missile interceptors deployed (44) than the treaty permitted (100). The US pullout did not lead to an immediate arms buildup or the end of nuclear arms control. But Putin has complained bitterly about US missile defenses and the US refusal to accept any limitation at all on them. He views the US stance as an effort to achieve military superiority by negating Russia's nuclear deterrent. Russia is investing heavily in new types of strategic nuclear weapons intended to avoid US missile defenses, from an intercontinental nuclear torpedo to a missile that can go around the world and attack from the south, while US defenses are mainly pointed north toward Russia. Russia maintains a large force of nuclear weapons like this mobile intercontinental ballistic missile. Photo: Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via APPEAR / The Conversation Similarly, much of China's nuclear buildup appears to be driven by wanting a reliable nuclear deterrent in the face of the United States' capability to strike its nuclear forces and use missile defenses to mop up the remainder. Indeed, China was so angered by South Korea's deployment of US-provided regional defenses – which they saw as aiding the US ability to intercept their missiles – that they imposed stiff sanctions on South Korea. Now, Trump wants to go much further, with a defense 'forever ending the missile threat to the American homeland,' with a success rate 'very close to 100%.' I believe that this effort is highly likely to lead to still larger nuclear buildups in Russia and China. The Putin-Xi joint statement pledges to 'counter' defenses 'aimed at achieving military superiority.' Given the ease of developing countermeasures that are extraordinarily difficult for defenses to overcome, odds are the resulting offense-defense competition will leave the United States worse off than before – and a good bit poorer. Putin and Xi made clear that they are particularly concerned about the thousands of space-based interceptors Trump envisions. These interceptors are designed to hit missiles while their rockets are still burning during launch. Most countries are likely to oppose the idea of deploying huge numbers of weapons in space – and these interceptors would be both expensive and vulnerable. China and Russia could focus on further developing anti-satellite weapons to blow a hole in the defense, increasing the risk of space war. Already, there is a real danger that the whole effort of negotiated limits to temper nuclear arms racing may be coming to an end. The last remaining treaty limiting US and Russian nuclear forces, the New START Treaty, expires in February 2026. China's rapid nuclear buildup is making many defense officials and experts in Washington call for a US buildup in response. Intense hostility all around means that for now, neither Russia nor China is even willing to sit down to discuss nuclear restraints, in treaty form or otherwise. In my view, adding Golden Dome to this combustible mix would likely end any prospect of avoiding a future of unrestrained and unpredictable nuclear arms competition. But paths away from these dangers are available. It would be quite plausible to design defenses that would provide some protection against attacks from a handful of missiles from North Korea or others that would not seriously threaten Russian or Chinese deterrent forces – and design restraints that would allow all parties to plan their offensive forces knowing what missile defenses they would be facing in the years to come. I believe that Trump should temper his Golden Dome ambitions to achieve his other dream – of negotiating a deal to reduce nuclear dangers. Matthew Bunn is professor of the practice of energy, national security and foreign policy, Harvard Kennedy School This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article. Thanks
