An unearthed time capsule beneath the Transamerica Pyramid shows a glimpse of San Francisco's past
Like other famous structures of similar dimensions, the 48-story Transamerica Pyramid, a revolutionary '70s modernist skyscraper and San Francisco icon, has a bit of history buried beneath its ground floor.
A recently unearthed time capsule, buried in 1974 and discovered during a recent round of renovations, offers a picture of San Francisco's past. The site of the structure—then a parking lot—was initially part of the original shoreline of the city that reeked of historical significance, from the city's growth as a shipping and banking capital. The capsule even contains a recipe for Pisco Punch, a cocktail that was invented at the nearby Bank Exchange Saloon, site of the city's original stock exchange.
Part of an exhibit in the building lobby opening May 18, the time capsule's contents are timeless: pictures of the building's steel frame beginning to stretch skyward, or vintage news clippings and images of the city after its last '60s flowering. But within the cylindrical steel capsule, which looks a bit like a large propane tank, there's also a narrative about building in America, and how that's radically changed in the last 50 years.
The battle over the permitting and construction of the Transamerica Pyramid in San Francisco from 1969 to 1972 offers a flashback to a different time in development, real estate, and construction. The tower was proposed and built in just three years, a sprint compared to the time it takes today to build a signature part of a city skyline. Construction alone for the One World Trade in New York City took eight years; the Comcast Tech Center in Philadelphia, which had issues with cracks in some of the steel frame, took five years; and the St. Regis in Chicago took four years. An analysis of high-rise buildings by Construction Physics found building speeds decreased significantly over the past century, in many cases extending the time it takes to finish by roughly 50%.
Buildings are more complex and require more permitting today, including complicated environmental review processes. This time-consuming process of development has led to backlash against what opponents call stifling building regulations. It has also led to more engagement from architects around code reform issues including elevator rules and exit stairs, and the formation of the abundance agenda, a center-left push by pundits like Ezra Klein to get the nation building fast again.
'The pace of the approval and the construction here is unbelievable,' says developer Michael Shvo, who paid $650 million to acquire the Transamerica Pyramid in 2020, at the depths of the COVID office freeze.. 'The Mayor was very determined to get this thing approved, and Transamerica was very determined to get a building built, and with all the controversy, once they got the green light, they ran as fast as possible. They built it in two years, we couldn't do that today.'
A more humane debate
Transamerica was then a massive business conglomerate with interests in banking, financial services, and insurance. According to former public relations staffer John Krizek, who worked for Transamerica during the pyramid's construction and ultimately created the time capsule, the back-and-forth between protestors and developers at the time was more humane, more respectable, and more amusing.
The conversation around the Transamerica Pyramid was, at the time, a larger debate about images, architecture, and aesthetics. The tower was not just a unique shape, but would tower above the skyline. It was to be the city's tallest building, and wouldn't be surpassed until 2018's Salesforce Tower.
Artists and community members protested the building for aesthetic reasons, and general distrust of large corporations. Posters passed around the city at the time proclaimed 'San Francisco Gets the Shaft' or 'Artists Against the Icicle.' The city's then planning director called the pyramid, designed by architect William Pereira, 'inhumane.'
During early street protests in front of the company's office, Transamerica execs sent secretaries to bring ice tea to the protestors lining up outside. During another protest, Krizek and his colleagues printed up fake fortune cookies at a nearby Chinatown bakery, frantically stuffing messages like 'Transamerica–Not a square outfit' or 'People who protest pyramid seek Che-ops publicity.'
Krizek recalled that the company was determined to break ground in December 1969. The building plan was announced in January of that year, and there was a tax break worth approximately $750,000 expiring at the end of December. Since Krizek and his coworkers knew that as soon as the company was given approval to build, there would be an appeal, they planned to move fast and break ground before paperwork was filed. To head off any challenges, they staged a tractor and truck near the site and sent someone to pick up the approval during the midday lunch break; they were able to get a time-stamped photo of someone digging at site while those opposing the project saw their appeal delayed as staffer enjoyed their lunch.
'The emotions around this building, I've never seen this for any other building in the world,' says Shvo. 'The debates today are more practical; this structure will block my view or cast a shadow. You can't say that about this building, it was a pyramid designed to let the light down to the street level. It didn't block views, the only thing people could complain about was this idea of the Manhattanization of San Francisco.'
Originally, Pereira's design was meant for a new building for ABC in New York City. The network passed on the project, deeming the design too futuristic, and went with another architect's vision. Today, the Transamerica Pyramid stands as an icon in San Francisco, with 80% of the space leased in a challenging office market. The building ABC picked instead? It's since been demolished.
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Red Tape Isn't the Only Reason America Can't Build
The Atlantic Daily, a newsletter that guides you through the biggest stories of the day, helps you discover new ideas, and recommends the best in culture. Sign up for it here. The buzziest idea in Democratic politics right now is the 'abundance agenda,' which criticizes liberals for saddling government programs with bureaucratic red tape that delays those programs to the point of never delivering. Few examples seem to illustrate the point better than rural broadband. As part of the 2021 bipartisan infrastructure law, Congress allocated $42.5 billion in subsidies to a new Broadband Equity Access and Deployment (BEAD) program. Its required 14 procedural steps to actually get this funding to internet service providers, or ISPs—companies such as AT&T, Verizon, Charter, and Frontier—along with significant labor, environmental, and domestic-production requirements, seem to fit the pattern of a well-intentioned program that has been stuffed with too many bells and whistles. (One of us, Asad Ramzanali, worked on broadband issues including BEAD in both the House of Representatives and the White House.) Thus, three and a half years after the law passed, shovels have still not broken ground on any project funded by this program, as the New York Times columnist Ezra Klein recently explained to an incredulous Jon Stewart, who lamented the 'incredibly frustrating, overcomplicated Rube Goldberg machine that keeps people from getting broadband.' Figuring out how to provide high-speed internet to all Americans has been an important public-policy goal for decades. As the coronavirus pandemic made painfully clear, broadband is crucial to full participation in society. And multiple empirical studies have shown that increased broadband access is correlated with stronger economic growth. Yet more than 7 million homes and businesses still do not have access. But the current political debate misunderstands the nature of the problem at almost every level. When it comes to broadband, procedural simplicity on its own hasn't worked in the past and won't work in the future. The deeper issue is that the United States government has abandoned the full range of policy tools that would actually get the job done. Any effort to achieve 'abundance' must start by recognizing that red tape isn't the only reason America can't seem to build anymore. The BEAD program does seem overcomplicated. It requires the Federal Communications Commission to complete a national map of where broadband is currently missing, the Commerce Department to distribute funding to states, state-level broadband offices to allocate subgrants to internet service providers, and the ISPs to deploy cables to connect homes to the internet. The numerous intermediate steps—initial planning grants, five-year action plans, map challenges, final plans, and more—sound like the kind of red tape that blocks progress and generates distrust in government. The solution seems glaringly obvious: simplify the steps. Cut out all the middlemen and empower the FCC to provide money directly to ISPs as efficiently and quickly as possible. Any reasonable person would reach that conclusion. The first Trump administration had the same thought. In 2020, the FCC rolled out a multibillion-dollar program called the Rural Digital Opportunity Fund (RDOF). To allocate the money, the FCC quickly identified areas that had insufficient service. It then held a reverse auction of small geographic plots, awarding the subsidy to whichever ISP submitted the lowest bid for each plot. There was no notice of funding opportunity. No planning grants. No five-year action plans. No subgranting process. No state broadband offices. And no labor, environmental, small-business, or diversity requirements. ISPs quickly bid a cumulative $9.2 billion to serve high-speed broadband to 5.2 million homes and businesses. [Jerusalem Demsas: Not everyone should have a say] In many ways, RDOF was a neoliberal economist's dream—an efficient allocation of scarce public resources distributed through a competitive process. But removing bureaucratic steps turned out not to result in a better outcome. Without accurate mapping data to understand where need existed, RDOF allowed ISPs to bid on serving such locations as an empty patch of grass, industrial-park storage tanks, and a luxury resort that already had broadband. Without proper due diligence, other providers committed to projects that were not technically or financially feasible. As a result, the RDOF program still hasn't delivered much broadband to Americans. More than one-third of the bids have already been deemed in default, according to the FCC. In other words, nearly 2 million of the 5.2 million promised locations will never get service under the program, and that number is likely to keep growing. Worse, many of these locations may not get service from BEAD, either, because RDOF was assumed to cover them. Within that context, Congress's approach to the BEAD program—making sure that broadband maps are accurate; that state governments, who know their residents and needs best, develop thorough plans that will ensure long-lasting service; and that communities have opportunities to provide input—is less baffling. With the benefit of hindsight, the process should have been simpler. But Congress was clearly responding to the failures of RDOF, which meant more checks in the system. Why is internet service a problem that the government needs to solve, anyway? The answer is that private-sector companies seek to maximize profits, but in many rural areas, building networks is unprofitable. There might not be enough customers to offset the onetime costs of construction or even the ongoing costs of repairs, customer service, and overhead. To date, the federal government's approach to promoting service in unprofitable areas has almost exclusively been to subsidize private companies. The first federal broadband subsidies go back to at least 1995. Since then, the U.S. has put more than $100 billion into broadband expansion, primarily into rural areas, across more than 100 federal programs. Like RDOF, many of these programs have severely underperformed. This is what happens when government loses the ability, or the will, to undertake more direct interventions in the market and to challenge, not merely subsidize, corporations. A century ago, America faced a problem almost identical to the broadband shortage: rural electrification. Well into the 20th century, life in much of rural America was little changed from the 19th. Without electric appliances—refrigerators, washing machines, even lamps—running a farm was backbreaking, round-the-clock work. By 1935, private providers had electrified more than 80 percent of nonfarm households but only 11 percent of farm households. That year, as part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, Congress created the Rural Electrification Administration to address this problem. At first, REA Administrator Morris Cooke hoped to partner with private electricity companies, not unlike our current subsidy-heavy approach for broadband. However, those companies argued that rural electrification would not be financially self-sustaining. Even with government support, they proposed building out to only 351,000 new customers, which would leave millions unconnected. The New Dealers recognized that subsidies to private firms could only go so far. So they turned to three other strategies. First, when the private sector was unable to serve all Americans, the REA organized communities across the country to develop their own, cooperatively owned electricity-distribution networks, funded by the federal government. The REA encouraged state laws to charter these cooperatives, provided engineering support to build infrastructure, and assisted cooperatives in negotiating for sources of electrical power. Second, the New Deal created public options. Federal government–owned providers, most famously the Tennessee Valley Authority, were established to generate electricity at affordable rates. These public options functioned as an important 'yardstick,' in Roosevelt's words, to evaluate the performance of the private sector. If the private sector refused to offer electricity at affordable rates, the TVA could step in to sell electricity directly to cooperatives instead. Third, private-sector electricity providers were classified as public utilities subject to strict regulation. The government couldn't build public plants to generate power across the entire country or successfully organize every community. So it required electric companies to expand services to cover everyone in their existing and adjacent service areas, even households that were unprofitable to serve. These utilities were required to set prices that allowed them to turn reasonable but not excessive profits. [George Packer: How Virginia took on Dominion Energy] The REA was a success. By 1940, a quarter of farm households were electrified, and by 1953, that figure had risen to 90 percent. That same year, retail rural electricity rates approximated rates found in urban areas. A similar approach could be applied to rural broadband today. Local governments could offer public broadband—as happened in Chattanooga, Tennessee, which has one of the fastest broadband networks in the world, run by the municipally owned electric company, a public option that competes with Xfinity and AT&T. Cooperatives could purchase internet service in the same way as they buy electricity. And public-utility regulations could require broadband providers to cover areas adjacent to their service areas at a reasonable price in exchange for rate regulation. So why has the federal government focused on subsidizing for-profit ISPs rather than using the mixed approach that worked during the New Deal era? Consider what happened in Chattanooga. After its municipal model proved successful, ISPs saw a threat and mobilized. They successfully lobbied lawmakers to pass laws restricting public options in broadband. Twenty-five states, including Tennessee, had such laws on the books in 2019, according to a report by BroadbandNow. In Congress, Democrats have repeatedly proposed federal legislation to preempt such state laws, but those proposals have languished. And although some of the state limits on public options have been repealed, 16 states still restrict municipal broadband. Lobbying from ISPs might likewise explain why the FCC has never used its existing legal authority to require ISPs to expand service at mandated affordable prices. (A conservative appeals court foreclosed that option for the FCC only recently.) The lesson of rural broadband is that some government failures are due not to procedural excess, but to giving up on regulatory tools that might antagonize Big Business. Unfortunately, learning this lesson again may now cost us $42.5 billion. Last week, the Department of Commerce rolled back many procedural hoops of the BEAD program—ostensibly with the same goals as RDOF. It's tempting to think that America can learn how to build again without having to wage difficult battles against powerful corporate interests, simply by eliminating bureaucratic red tape. But if efficient building were really so easy, we'd already be doing it. Article originally published at The Atlantic
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20 hours ago
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Red Tape Isn't the Only Reason America Can't Build
The buzziest idea in Democratic politics right now is the 'abundance agenda,' which criticizes liberals for saddling government programs with bureaucratic red tape that delays those programs to the point of never delivering. Few examples seem to illustrate the point better than rural broadband. As part of the 2021 bipartisan infrastructure law, Congress allocated $42.5 billion in subsidies to a new Broadband Equity Access and Deployment (BEAD) program. Its required 14 procedural steps to actually get this funding to internet service providers, or ISPs—companies such as AT&T, Verizon, Charter, and Frontier—along with significant labor, environmental, and domestic-production requirements, seem to fit the pattern of a well-intentioned program that has been stuffed with too many bells and whistles. (One of us, Asad Ramzanali, worked on broadband issues including BEAD in both the House of Representatives and the White House.) Thus, three and a half years after the law passed, shovels have still not broken ground on any project funded by this program, as the New York Times columnist Ezra Klein recently explained to an incredulous Jon Stewart, who lamented the 'incredibly frustrating, overcomplicated Rube Goldberg machine that keeps people from getting broadband.' Figuring out how to provide high-speed internet to all Americans has been an important public-policy goal for decades. As the coronavirus pandemic made painfully clear, broadband is crucial to full participation in society. And multiple empirical studies have shown that increased broadband access is correlated with stronger economic growth. Yet more than 7 million homes and businesses still do not have access. But the current political debate misunderstands the nature of the problem at almost every level. When it comes to broadband, procedural simplicity on its own hasn't worked in the past and won't work in the future. The deeper issue is that the United States government has abandoned the full range of policy tools that would actually get the job done. Any effort to achieve 'abundance' must start by recognizing that red tape isn't the only reason America can't seem to build anymore. The BEAD program does seem overcomplicated. It requires the Federal Communications Commission to complete a national map of where broadband is currently missing, the Commerce Department to distribute funding to states, state-level broadband offices to allocate subgrants to internet service providers, and the ISPs to deploy cables to connect homes to the internet. The numerous intermediate steps—initial planning grants, five-year action plans, map challenges, final plans, and more—sound like the kind of red tape that blocks progress and generates distrust in government. The solution seems glaringly obvious: simplify the steps. Cut out all the middlemen and empower the FCC to provide money directly to ISPs as efficiently and quickly as possible. Any reasonable person would reach that conclusion. The first Trump administration had the same thought. In 2020, the FCC rolled out a multibillion-dollar program called the Rural Digital Opportunity Fund (RDOF). To allocate the money, the FCC quickly identified areas that had insufficient service. It then held a reverse auction of small geographic plots, awarding the subsidy to whichever ISP submitted the lowest bid for each plot. There was no notice of funding opportunity. No planning grants. No five-year action plans. No subgranting process. No state broadband offices. And no labor, environmental, small-business, or diversity requirements. ISPs quickly bid a cumulative $9.2 billion to serve high-speed broadband to 5.2 million homes and businesses. Jerusalem Demsas: Not everyone should have a say In many ways, RDOF was a neoliberal economist's dream—an efficient allocation of scarce public resources distributed through a competitive process. But removing bureaucratic steps turned out not to result in a better outcome. Without accurate mapping data to understand where need existed, RDOF allowed ISPs to bid on serving such locations as an empty patch of grass, industrial-park storage tanks, and a luxury resort that already had broadband. Without proper due diligence, other providers committed to projects that were not technically or financially feasible. As a result, the RDOF program still hasn't delivered much broadband to Americans. More than one-third of the bids have already been deemed in default, according to the FCC. In other words, nearly 2 million of the 5.2 million promised locations will never get service under the program, and that number is likely to keep growing. Worse, many of these locations may not get service from BEAD, either, because RDOF was assumed to cover them. Within that context, Congress's approach to the BEAD program—making sure that broadband maps are accurate; that state governments, who know their residents and needs best, develop thorough plans that will ensure long-lasting service; and that communities have opportunities to provide input—is less baffling. With the benefit of hindsight, the process should have been simpler. But Congress was clearly responding to the failures of RDOF, which meant more checks in the system. Why is internet service a problem that the government needs to solve, anyway? The answer is that private-sector companies seek to maximize profits, but in many rural areas, building networks is unprofitable. There might not be enough customers to offset the onetime costs of construction or even the ongoing costs of repairs, customer service, and overhead. To date, the federal government's approach to promote service in unprofitable areas has almost exclusively been to subsidize private companies. The first federal broadband subsidies go back to at least 1995. Since then, the U.S. has put more than $100 billion into broadband expansion, primarily into rural areas, across more than 100 federal programs. Like RDOF, many of these programs have severely underperformed. This is what happens when government loses the ability, or the will, to undertake more direct interventions in the market and to challenge, not merely subsidize, corporations. A century ago, America faced a problem almost identical to the broadband shortage: rural electrification. Well into the 20th century, life in much of rural America was little changed from the 19th. Without electric appliances—refrigerators, washing machines, even lamps—running a farm was backbreaking, round-the-clock work. By 1935, private providers had electrified more than 80 percent of nonfarm households but only 11 percent of farm households. That year, as part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, Congress created the Rural Electrification Administration to address this problem. At first, REA Administrator Morris Cooke hoped to partner with private electricity companies, not unlike our current subsidy-heavy approach for broadband. However, those companies argued that rural electrification would not be financially self-sustaining. Even with government support, they proposed building out to only 351,000 new customers, which would leave millions unconnected. The New Dealers recognized that subsidies to private firms could only go so far. So they turned to three other strategies. First, when the private sector was unable to serve all Americans, the REA organized communities across the country to develop their own, cooperatively owned electricity-distribution networks, funded by the federal government. The REA encouraged state laws to charter these cooperatives, provided engineering support to build infrastructure, and assisted cooperatives in negotiating for sources of electrical power. Second, the New Deal created public options. Federal government–owned providers, most famously the Tennessee Valley Authority, were established to generate electricity at affordable rates. These public options functioned as an important 'yardstick,' in Roosevelt's words, to evaluate the performance of the private sector. If the private sector refused to offer electricity at affordable rates, the TVA could step in to sell electricity directly to cooperatives instead. Third, private-sector electricity providers were classified as public utilities subject to strict regulation. The government couldn't build public plants to generate power across the entire country or successfully organize every community. So it required electric companies to expand services to cover everyone in their existing and adjacent service areas, even households that were unprofitable to serve. These utilities were required to set prices that allowed them to turn reasonable but not excessive profits. George Packer: How Virginia took on Dominion Energy The REA was a success. By 1940, a quarter of farm households were electrified, and by 1953, that figure had risen to 90 percent. That same year, retail rural electricity rates approximated rates found in urban areas. A similar approach could be applied to rural broadband today. Local governments could offer public broadband—as happened in Chattanooga, Tennessee, which has one of the fastest broadband networks in the world, run by the municipally owned electric company, a public option that competes with Xfinity and AT&T. Cooperatives could purchase internet service in the same way as they buy electricity. And public-utility regulations could require broadband providers to cover areas adjacent to their service areas at a reasonable price in exchange for rate regulation. So why has the federal government focused on subsidizing for-profit ISPs rather than using the mixed approach that worked during the New Deal era? Consider what happened in Chattanooga. After its municipal model proved successful, ISPs saw a threat and mobilized. They successfully lobbied lawmakers to pass laws restricting public options in broadband. Twenty-five states, including Tennessee, had such laws on the books in 2019, according to a report by BroadbandNow. In Congress, Democrats have repeatedly proposed federal legislation to preempt such state laws, but those proposals have languished. And although some of the state limits on public options have been repealed, 16 states still restrict municipal broadband. Lobbying from ISPs might likewise explain why the FCC has never used its existing legal authority to require ISPs to expand service at mandated affordable prices. (A conservative appeals court foreclosed that option for the FCC only recently.) The lesson of rural broadband is that some government failures are due not to procedural excess, but to giving up on regulatory tools that might antagonize Big Business. Unfortunately, learning this lesson again may now cost us $42.5 billion. Last week, the Department of Commerce rolled back many procedural hoops of the BEAD program—ostensibly with the same goals as RDOF. It's tempting to think that America can learn how to build again without having to wage difficult battles against powerful corporate interests, simply by eliminating bureaucratic red tape. But if efficient building were really so easy, we'd already be doing it.
Yahoo
6 days ago
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Transamerica, SWBC Launch Pooled Plan Exchange to Simplify Access for Growing Businesses Across the Country
BALTIMORE, June 5, 2025 /PRNewswire/ -- Transamerica today launched the SWBC Retirement Plan Exchange, which was established with SWBC to help grow and offer competitive retirement benefits with less cost and hassle. The solution features two options: Retirement Plan Exchange® Solution (Exchange) – employers choose from a cost-efficient menu of features, while TAG, a national third-party administrator and a wholly owned subsidiary of Transamerica, files Form 5500 and handles day-to-day administration. Choice Pooled Employer PlanSM (PEP) – employers may elect to join a single pooled plan maintained by Transamerica Fiduciary Services as the pooled plan provider, providing one combined 5500 and streamlined fiduciary oversight. SWBC Wealth Management will serve as financial advisors, while SWBC Retirement Plan Services will offer ERISA 3(38) investment fiduciary services. TAG will provide ERISA 3(16) administrative fiduciary services to plan sponsors and participating employers in the PEP. This collaboration takes advantage of the SECURE 2.0 Act, which makes it easier and more appealing for businesses to adopt pooled plans. "Collaborating with Transamerica lets us deliver measurable value to clients," said Kyle Hittle, MBA, Wealth Advisor, SWBC Wealth Management. "Together, we can simplify plan administration and enhance employees' financial well-being across the country." SWBC Wealth Management advisors support plan sponsors by simplifying the management of retirement plans, reducing administrative burdens, and ensuring a smooth experience at a competitive price. They focus on increasing participation through coordinated enrollment meetings, providing investment education and guidance, conducting regular plan reviews, and suggesting enhancements to meet the needs of all participants. "Transamerica is proud to be an industry leader in retirement solutions and support hundreds of thousands of small business employees in achieving financial freedom. With our collaboration with SWBC, we are removing barriers that have kept smaller companies from offering robust retirement benefits," said Darren Zino, head of retirement distribution at Transamerica. "We want everyone to live their best life, and by giving employers a clear choice between a customizable Exchange solution and an all-in-one PEP solution, we are helping them focus more on their people—and less on paperwork." Transamerica is a leading provider of pooled retirement plan solutions, focusing on building America's leading middle market retirement and insurance company. Why it matters to small companies Stronger talent attraction: In a 2024 Transamerica survey of 412 employers (fielded Nov–Dec 2024), 44% cited recruiting or retaining staff as their top reason for choosing a pooled plan. First-time plan adoption: Nearly 47% of respondents started offering a retirement benefit only after pooled options became available. Next steps for employers Employers can learn more about the SWBC Retirement Plan Exchange by contacting SWBC's Wealth Advisor, Kyle Hittle, directly at or (210) 667-2314. About TransamericaTransamerica believes everyone deserves the opportunity to live their best life. It's what inspires us to be a champion for helping everyday Americans thrive. As a leading provider of life insurance, retirement, and investment solutions for more than 10 million Americans, we help people make the most of what's important to them. Supporting our customers' financial futures with innovative products and services has been our mission for more than 120 years. In 2024, Transamerica fulfilled its promises to customers, paying more than $62 billion in insurance, retirement, and annuity claims and benefits, including return of customer-paid annuity premiums. Transamerica is part of the Aegon group of companies. Aegon is an international financial services holding company. For more information, visit Administrative Group, LLC dba Transamerica Fiduciary Services is the Pooled Plan Provider ("PPP"), a named plan fiduciary and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Transamerica. Transamerica Retirement Solutions, LLC is the recordkeeper and may act as a plan fiduciary with respect to certain administrative services, to the extent it exercises independent discretion, and only for the proper execution of the specific and agreed-upon administrative procedures for the services. Retirement Plan Exchange® and Choice Pooled Plan Solution™ are Transamerica service marks. Retirement Plan Exchange® is a registered service mark of Transamerica. The Exchange solution is a collection of single employer-sponsored plans that may share a common plan administrator, named fiduciary, investment menu, and plan year. Unlike a multiple employer plan (MEP), certain plan qualification and ERISA requirements are applied at the individual plan level. Pooled employer plans (PEPs) are a newer type of multiple employer plan for which the Department of Labor (DOL) and IRS guidance is still pending in a number of areas. An employer participating in a PEP retains certain fiduciary responsibilities, including responsibility for retaining and monitoring the Pooled Plan Provider (PPP) and any named fiduciary, for determining the reasonableness of its plan fees, and for periodically reviewing the plan as a whole. Among other responsibilities, the PPP acts as the ERISA 3(16) Plan Administrator. About SWBC As a diversified financial services company, SWBC provides financial institutions, businesses, and individuals with a wide range of insurance, mortgages, wealth management, employee benefits, and more. Headquartered in San Antonio, Texas, SWBC has partners and divisions across all 50 states and manages businesses around the world. No matter how wide its reach, SWBC always listens to our customers' needs, analyzes their current situations, and recommends customized solutions. For more information about our innovative approach to personalized service, visit SWBC's website at Securities offered by SWBC Investment Services, LLC, member SIPC & FINRA. Advisory services offered by SWBC Investment Company, a Registered Investment Advisor, and SWBC Investment Advisory Services, LLC, d/b/a SWBC Retirement Plan Services, a registered investment adviser with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Media inquiries:Email: Hank Williams(319) 355-7789 Erin Yang(303) 383-5295 View original content to download multimedia: SOURCE Transamerica Error in retrieving data Sign in to access your portfolio Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data
