I've gone up against the Russians. Here's my review of the new frigate the Princess launched

Telegraph

24-05-2025

Thursday marked a significant milestone for the Royal Navy as HMS Glasgow was formally named by the Princess of Wales. Glasgow is the first of eight new Type 26 anti-submarine frigates. She is expected to be fully operational by 2028, with the remaining seven entering service at regular intervals through the early 2030s.
There is a real buzz around this ship – a sense of excitement about its potential. Some caution is required here. Spec sheets – essentially the sales brochure outlining the dozens of systems the ship is supposed to have – never tell the full story. Warships like this are so complex, with systems so intertwined they almost become living organisms, that I don't think you can truly judge their quality until they have fully settled into service.
Caution aside, I hope the optimism is justified, because there are several compelling reasons we need this ship to be a good one.
First, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) remains a cornerstone of our naval strategy. From protecting the Nuclear Deterrent to defending critical underwater infrastructure around the UK and abroad, to detecting and if necessary neutralising enemy submarines, this capability is only becoming more vital. It should be central not just to the Navy's thinking, but to the nation's.
Second, a well-built and operated ASW frigate significantly strengthens our contribution to Nato and our allies. The UK has a strong heritage in this niche. We nearly let it slip in the late '90s and early 2000s when tensions with Russia eased, and it was painful to recover. But we did, and the Type 26 is a continuation of that resurgence. If the upcoming Strategic Defence Review fails to prioritise countering Russian submarine threats in the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap, it will have missed the mark. This is what our allies expect from us – perhaps more than anything else.
Third, the general utility of the T26 as a survivable, multi-role frigate cannot be overstated. While we'll want them to mostly hunt submarines – around the UK, in the High North, or with the aircraft carrier – they'll inevitably be tasked with much more. In theory, the less capable Type 31 will take on lower-end duties like escort missions, humanitarian aid, and port visits. But with only five of those planned, the more capable and expensive T26 will share that burden. Either way, thirteen ships across both classes is not enough. Nelson wanted more frigates – and so do we. But since we're not getting them, the ones we do get must be top-tier.
To excel in its primary mission of ASW, the ship must meet several key criteria. First among these is acoustic stealth. Hull design, propeller shape, and isolated machinery must minimise underwater noise. The current, aged Type 23 is excellent in this regard – operated properly, it could effectively disappear from a submarine's passive sonar. Noisy ships, such as most destroyers, make life far easier for the enemy.
Second is the sensor suite, especially the towed array sonar and helicopter. Here, we remain world leaders with the 2087 low-frequency active sonar and the Merlin helicopter. Both are ageing but are undergoing upgrades. Submariners will tell you, Merlin gives them nightmares. From my end as a former frigate captain, having a Merlin airborne was like gaining another frigate in the fight – an incredibly fast one that the enemy often can't detect until it's too late and which cannot be torpedoed.
Detection alone isn't enough. The third piece of the puzzle is a weapons suite capable of deterring or destroying the target. This is where clarity starts to wane. The helicopter will still carry Stingray, an ageing but effective lightweight torpedo. However, the Type 26 won't have the Type 23's Magazine Torpedo Launch System (MTLS), which also fires Stingray. That's a mistake. Critics may argue the torpedo's range is too short to matter—but that overlooks the nature of ASW. Pop-up detections are real, and statistically the helicopter won't be airborne when they occur. A backup weapon is essential. Nothing will put a submariner off their stroke faster than the sound of a torpedo spinning up, even if it's not well-aimed.That brings us to the Mk 41 Vertical Launch System, a launch tube which can hold various weapons. The T26s will have 24 of these tubes. This could solve the problem – if we buy the ASROC (Anti-Submarine Rocket). An ASROC can launch from a Mk41 tube, fly to where the submarine is, and deposit a torpedo into the water. It's much better than MTLS.
But it's not clear that we'll get any ASROCs, or anything much else to go in our Mk41 tubes. The Mk 41 can house everything from ASROC to quad-packed point-defense missiles, Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles, and even the advanced and powerful SM-6 and SM-3 anti-air missiles, capable of bringing down ballistic and hypersonic threats. But these systems are expensive.
Some argue a specialist ASW ship doesn't need long-range missiles like the SM-6 or SM-3, due to its relatively limited radar. But that mindset is outdated. With increasing sensor integration and networked warfare, such arguments are losing relevance. Besides, assuming the T26 will only do ASW is unrealistic. Even so, history suggests we'll be late acquiring these weapons – and will likely start with cheaper variants. I doubt the Type 26 will be the platform to break our tradition of under-arming our ships. The real question is how big that gap will be, and how long it will last.
The fourth and final component is the ship's 'mission bay'. I've heard it's superbly designed – able to support everything from uncrewed systems to raiding craft. How we use this bay will determine whether the T26 is merely a good ASW frigate or a world-class Swiss Army knife warship. There's a lot of development in this area – which gives me hope. It will need to mature quickly, but that's true of the whole operational concept.
That said, weapons and sensors are only part of the story. The propulsion system and shafting are crucial – areas where the Type 45 destroyers and Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier got it wrong. Reliability, fuel endurance, top speed – these matter. We're often slower than our US counterparts, which can be a problem when sprinting to support a task group or avoiding fast attack craft manned or unmanned. But for ASW, stealth and endurance outweigh top speed.
Tying it all together is the command system. We've done well in this area historically, and I expect the T26 will follow suit. Its ability to evolve over a 30-year lifespan is key – here, the US Navy's Aegis system has set the gold standard since the late '80s.
Finally, a quick note on tradition. Superstitious types may have winced when the Princess of Wales said, 'God bless this ship and all who sail on her.' Royal Navy personnel traditionally serve in ships, not on them – a reflection of the intimate relationship between crew and vessel. Tradition aside, in ASW terms, this distinction matters. Success relies on the entire ship's company – from chefs to engineers – working in harmony. The enemy certainly thinks this way. We must, too.
In sum, though it's early days, I'm confident HMS Glasgow deserves a four-star review. Unless something drastic emerges in her engineering or acoustic profile (which I doubt), she's shaping up to be the backbone of our future surface fleet. The Navy desperately needs her, and so do our allies. Our enemies, especially submariners, will fear her – above all the Merlin helicopter she carries. I do think she could become a five-star asset in time, with the right weapons in her tubes and the right systems in her mission bay. She'll initially suffer from being 'fitted for but not with' – the fiscal climate ensures it. But if we overcome that quickly we might just have a world-beater.
Let's hope so. There's plenty of work to do.