Power outage hits Gabonese capital
SEEG said it had managed to restore power to around half of its customers in the capitalFor several months last year, electricity supply was disrupted due to significant infrastructure problemsLIBERVILLE: Gabon's capital Libreville was without electricity for several hours Wednesday following a 'major technical incident,' the national energy supplier said.The early morning power outage 'resulted in the loss of all production facilities in the Libreville Interconnected Network (RIC),' the Gabonese Water and Energy Company (SEEG) said without giving further details.SEEG said it had managed to restore power to around half of its customers in the capital 'by early morning,' adding its teams were working to find and analyze the fault, which AFP reporters said also cut Internet and mobile phone coverage.On Monday, the Gabonese presidency had announced the end of an interim administration of SEEG started in August on the back of a slew of supply cuts.As of Wednesday, 'management of SEEG will be fully transferred' and it will return to its majority shareholder, the Gabonese Strategic Investment Fund (FGIS), the company stated.For several months last year, electricity supply was disrupted due to significant infrastructure problems.A rotating load shedding system was established leading to supply cuts in entire neighborhoods for hours at a time, to enable power supply for other parts of the city.A protocol signed between the Gabonese government and Turkish firm Karpowership for supply of 70 megawatts via two floating power plants to cover greater Libreville saw the situation improve in recent months.Revamping the network is a top priority for Gabon's leader Brice Oligui Nguema, a general who overthrew the Bongo dynasty and won 94.85 percent of the vote in April's election, 19 months on from his August 2023 coup.Earlier this month he vowed to provide 'universal access' to drinking water and electricity.
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