Don't just save them, keep, show and tell
This week, Sotheby's was forced to suspend auction of ancient relics linked to the Buddha's remains after GoI threatened legal action. Rightly so. The 334 gems - excavated from Piprahwa, believed to be the ancient city of Kapilavastu, in UP - aren't just historical artefacts; they are sacred fragments of India's heritage. GoI's legal notice called out the sale as 'continued colonial exploitation'. India's demand for repatriation fits into a larger global push to reclaim looted heritage. It's a campaign India has recently pursued with vigour. Over 640 antiquities have been brought back since 2014.But retrieving stolen treasures is only the beginning. Too often, artefacts brought back home are swallowed into silence - locked in storerooms, or shuffled into half-forgotten museums. Even those on public display often suffer from patchy maintenance. The Seated Buddha triumphantly returned from Australia in 2017, and now reportedly sits outside a museum director's office. Some return for glory, others for gathering dust.Systemic neglect risks making these treasures 'lost' all over again - this time not to colonial looters but to our own apathy. Poor documentation, underfunded conservation and low public visibility remain serious challenges. It's one thing to demand the return of history. It's quite another to prove worthy custodianship. So, while GoI's intervention at Sotheby's is welcome, it must not stop there. India needs a clear, ambitious plan - to not just store relics safely but to showcase them widely, proudly and professionally, like it was done in Khajuraho during the G20 summit. Proper conservation, modern site museums and maximum public access must be the goal. Bringing our history home is just the start.
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Hindustan Times
an hour ago
- Hindustan Times
Chasing Dalit vote without addressing the social divide
At the 15th Convention of the Uttar Pradesh Scheduled Caste Federation held at the Ramlila ground in Agra on March 18, 1956, BR Ambedkar shared the reasoning behind his assertion that the Scheduled Castes (SC) were not Hindus. He said, 'If we had been Hindus, then we would not have been untouchables. Instead, we would have been pujaris (priests) in the temples.' Ambedkar's words continue to echo, given that untouchability, on a much-diminished scale though, remains a social reality seven decades after it was abolished and its practice in any form declared a punishable offence. Ironically, eradicating untouchability or social isolation of Dalits is no longer a major agenda of any political party though the scheduled castes are a much-wooed vote bloc. In March this year, Agra, where Ambedkar had installed a statue of Buddha (his ashes are kept near the statue), saw caste tensions escalate after the Rajasthan-based Karni Sena ransacked the house of Samajwadi Party MP and a Dalit, Ramji Lal Suman over his unwarranted remarks about a mediaeval-era Rajput ruler, Rana Sanga. Since then, reports of Dalit wedding processions in UP, Rajasthan, and Madhya Pradesh being attacked or stopped in areas dominated by the upper castes have become frequent. The contradiction between Dalits being wooed in the electoral battlefield and rejected in the social space is not new. Dalits first emerged as a political constituency in northern India in the 1980s. The 1990s saw growing Dalit assertiveness under the leadership of the Bahujan Samaj Party, which even formed the government in Lucknow twice. At the same time, renting a house in UP on a non-Dalit street was a challenge for Dalits. In the mid-1990s, a Banaras Hindu University (BHU) professor had to hide his caste from the landlady to rent her premises in Varanasi. A Dalit intellectual, who had returned from the US to be with his aging parents, had to run from pillar to post to get decent accommodation in New Delhi. The scenario has not changed much. In 2025, a businessman in Agra failed to get a decent house, while a landlord in Prayagraj returned the advance payment after knowing the caste of the tenant. Ashok Bharti, chairman of National Confederation of Dalit and Adivasi Organisations, says, 'Being a Dalit in India means a life of challenges. Wherever, whichever direction Dalits go, caste is the monster that crosses their path. They can't buy or rent a house in a colony dominated by upper castes, Dalit children in schools can't get water or mid-day meals. In colleges, they are humiliated for accessing reservations and, in employment, their caste reaches before they join. However, the situation is improving. Dalit assertion is compelling and with the support of many progressive savarnas, they can now be seen in all places.' Untouchability infuriates Dalits, of course, but does it influence their political choices? The issue is absent in the poll agenda of even Dalit parties such as BSP, RPI, and Dalit Panthers even though they have been advocating social empowerment via political empowerment. But all political parties are pursuing the Dalit voter: Since the political preferences of major castes and communities are known, the scramble is for non-aligned Dalit voters. The success of the PDA (pichra or backward, Dalit, and alpsankhyak or minority) formula of the Samajwadi Party in the 2024 general election has intensified the wooing. This has alarmed the Sangh Parivar which has been struggling to unite the Hindu population (80% of India's population) under the Hindutva banner. It is in this context that the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) chief Mohan Bhagwat recently gave a call for social harmony — Bhagwat had been on a month-long tour of UP in April 2025. He reiterated the message in an RSS resolution — one temple, one well, and one cremation ground for all in villages to end untouchability. The 2017 resolution also noted that words and wishful thinking would not be enough. Pravin Togadia, then international working president of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), had asked 'every non-Dalit Hindu to befriend at least one Dalit family.' But these statements have survived mostly as gestures. As RSS cadres and BJP functionaries fan out to the rural areas to explain their commitment to the constitutional rights of Dalits, the latter reiterate Ambedkar's words: 'If RSS really wants to abolish untouchability, they should appoint Dalit pujaris (priests) in temples and start inter-caste marriages (called roti-beti ka rishta in common parlance).' That said, there is a churn within the Dalit political community. Dalits worship Ambedkar and get protective about the Constitution, but the Dalit vote is neither a consolidated bloc nor is it the monopoly of any one party. With all political parties promising them the moon, the Dalit vote bloc has disintegrated. Welfare schemes of the Union government have attracted many to the BJP. Ambedkar had said Dalits don't worship Hindu idols, but some Dalit sub-castes are making a beeline for Ayodhya and Kashi. Jatavs, the largest chunk among the Dalits, are, however, embracing Buddhism. In this melee, younger Dalits are weighing their political options. They are restless, aggressive, and aware of their rights. On May 25, Dalits of a village in UP's Etah district sent a clear message to the authorities by refusing to allow a shobha yatra to pass through their village in retaliation to the district administration's alleged discriminatory act of not granting them permission for their procession on Ambedkar Jayanti in April. The message is clear: Do not take us for granted. It is this fault line the BJP will need to address if it wants to win over Dalits and defuse caste tensions in the states under the party. The views expressed are personal.
Hindustan Times
5 hours ago
- Hindustan Times
China and the US at the upcoming G7 summit
If the G7 once stood as the West's economic command centre, today it is a stage for the world's most consequential rivalry: The US and China. The 2025 Kananaskis summit arrives not as a celebration of unity, but as a crucible, testing both the G7's cohesion and its capacity to respond to a world reordered by Beijing's rise and Washington's anxieties. In this context, the G7 is forced to grapple with the reality that its own cohesion is increasingly defined by how it manages the China question. The summit's agenda, though broad, is inevitably shaped by the undercurrents of this strategic contest. Every policy proposal, from digital standards to global health, is now filtered through the lens of US-China competition. The G7's ability to adapt, innovate, and present a credible alternative to China's growing influence will be scrutinised more closely than ever before. Let's acknowledge the elephant in the room: The G7 was created in the 1970s to manage western economic crises, with the US as its undisputed conductor. Fast-forward to 2025, and the G7's very relevance is under scrutiny not least because of the US's own internal divisions and the relentless ascent of China. The G20 was once hailed as the premier forum for global economic coordination, precisely because the G7's old formula could no longer contain the ambitions of China, India, and the wider Global South. Yet, as the G20 has stumbled, mired in geopolitical paralysis, Russian aggression, and China's assertiveness, the G7 has tried to reassert itself as the last redoubt of liberal democracy and economic order. But with the US now led by a president openly sceptical of alliances, tariffs weaponized as policy, and unity fraying, the G7 faces an existential crisis at its own doorstep. The irony is thick: the very institutions designed to manage western dominance now find themselves wrestling with the limits of that dominance. The G7's attempts to reassert itself are both a response to and a symptom of a shifting global order, where old alliances are tested and new alignments are uncertain. The summit thus becomes not just a meeting of leaders, but a barometer of the West's willingness to reinvent itself in the face of profound change. The US enters Kananaskis less as the first among equals and more as the unpredictable uncle at the family reunion. President Trump's return to the summit table brings a familiar playbook: Scepticism of multilateralism, open disdain for the EU, and a willingness to use tariffs as both carrot and cudgel. The US's stance on the climate crisis has reversed course yet again, leaving Europe and Japan to pick up the slack. Intelligence-sharing, once a pillar of trust, is now a source of European anxiety. Trade, too, is a battlefield. Trump's on-again, off-again tariffs have injected uncertainty into global markets, and while G7 finance ministers might dance around the issue in public, the reality is that America's economic statecraft is now as much about managing allies as it is about confronting adversaries. The question for Kananaskis: Can the US still lead a coalition it seems intent on destabilising? The American approach to the summit is further complicated by domestic political pressures. With an eye on the upcoming election cycle, the administration is keenly aware that foreign policy gestures must resonate with domestic audiences. This dynamic risks turning the G7 into a stage for political signalling rather than substantive cooperation, with allies left to interpret shifting signals from Washington. The US's ability to balance domestic imperatives with global leadership will be a key subplot at Kananaskis. China, of course, is not at the table but it is everywhere in the conversation. The G7's agenda is saturated with China's presence: From concerns over the East and South China Seas, to the militarisation of the Taiwan Strait, to the ever-present anxiety over supply chains and critical technologies. The phrase 'free, open, prosperous, and secure Indo-Pacific' is now G7 code for containing China's influence. Yet, the G7's China policy is riven by contradictions. Europe's economic entanglement with Beijing tempers its hawkishness, while Japan and the US push for a harder line. The group will likely issue hortatory statements on peace, stability, and the rules-based order, but the real contest is about who sets the standards for Artificial Intelligence (AI), digital trade, and green technology. China's growing economic footprint in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia also complicates the G7's calculus. As Beijing deepens its Belt and Road investments and forges new trade alliances, the G7 faces the challenge of offering compelling alternatives. The summit's deliberations on infrastructure, debt relief, and technology standards will be shaped by the need to counter China's expanding influence, even as member States weigh the risks of economic decoupling. Here lies the G7's central paradox: It is united in its concern over China's rise but divided on the means and ends of responses. The US wants to de-risk supply chains and decouple where possible; Europe wants to hedge; Japan wants security guarantees without sacrificing economic ties. Meanwhile, China's absence from the summit is itself a statement: The world's second-largest economy is both the target and the test of the G7's continued relevance. This dilemma is compounded by the reality that no member can afford a full rupture with China. The interdependence of global supply chains, the need for cooperation on climate and health, and the risks of escalation in the Indo-Pacific all constrain the G7's options. The summit will thus be a study in ambiguity, with leaders seeking to project resolve while quietly managing risk. The outcome may be less about grand strategy and more about the art of muddling through. If the G7 is to avoid becoming a relic, it must do more than issue communiqués about shared values. It must reconcile its internal divisions, offer credible alternatives to China's Belt and Road, and set enforceable standards for technology, trade, and climate. The US, for its part, must decide whether it wants to lead a coalition or simply bully a bloc. The G7's future indeed, the future of western leadership may hinge on whether this summit is remembered as a turning point or a missed opportunity. The stakes could not be higher. The choices made at Kananaskis will reverberate far beyond the summit, shaping not only the trajectory of US-China relations but the architecture of global governance itself. If the G7 can rise above its divisions and articulate a compelling vision for the future, it may yet reclaim its role as a steward of stability and progress. If not, the world may look elsewhere for leadership perhaps to new coalitions, or to the very rivals it once sought to contain. Finally, the 2025 G7 summit is not just another diplomatic gathering; it is a stress test for the post-war order. The US and China may not sit at the same table, but their rivalry shapes every conversation, every alliance, every policy. The question for Kananaskis is not whether the G7 can contain China, but whether it can contain its own centrifugal forces long enough to matter. In the end, the G7's fate may rest less on who is in the room, and more on whether those present can agree on what kind of world they want to defend. In this pivotal moment, the G7's ability to adapt, innovate, and demonstrate unity will be watched not only by its adversaries but by a world searching for credible leadership. The summit's legacy will be determined by its willingness to face uncomfortable truths and make hard choices that will define the contours of global power for years to come. This article is authored by Maj Gen Dilawar Singh, senior vice president, Global Economist Forum, AO, ECOSOC, United Nations.
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First Post
8 hours ago
- First Post
US trade pact gives China future leverage despite deal on rare earths export
The US and China have reached a trade pact easing rare earth export curbs, but the deal gives China the power to tighten controls later, keeping future leverage in its hands. read more US President Donald Trump meets with China's President Xi Jinping at the start of their bilateral meeting at the G20 leaders summit in Osaka, Japan, June 29, 2019. File Photo/Reuters The United States and China have reached a trade agreement under which Beijing will ease restrictions on rare earth mineral exports—critical inputs for the automotive, semiconductor, and smartphone industries—providing Washington with much-needed short-term supply relief. However, the deal includes provisions that allow China to tighten its grip again in the future. US President Donald Trump announced on Wednesday that the two countries had agreed to a truce following two days of negotiations in London. According to The Wall Street Journal, the agreement centres on the US gaining access to China's rare-earth magnets—small but vital components used in electric vehicle motors, industrial robotics, and military equipment. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Temporary relief, long-term uncertainty While the deal is expected to resume the flow of rare earths to the US, it still gives China the power to reimpose restrictions. Export licences for US companies will be valid for only six months, enabling Beijing to cut supplies again if trade tensions flare, according to sources familiar with the matter. Export curbs forced Washington back to the table China imposed rare-earth export controls in April, shortly after the US slapped a 34% tariff on Chinese goods. The move sent shockwaves through global supply chains, prompting automakers, defence contractors, and electronics manufacturers to urgently seek alternatives. China's near-total dominance in producing the world's most powerful magnets—around 90%—allowed it to use its position as leverage, pushing the US back to negotiations. Conditional licence scheme raises concerns Under the terms of the deal, China will issue export licences for six-month periods, maintaining the ability to reintroduce controls should tensions escalate. This conditional arrangement has raised concerns that Beijing could once again assert control over a critical supply chain during any future economic or diplomatic standoff. Tariff reductions on both sides As part of the agreement, the US will lower tariffs on Chinese goods from 145 per cent to 55 per cent. This revised rate includes a 10 per cent baseline tariff—currently facing legal challenges—25 per cent from the Trump administration's earlier trade measures, and 20 per cent linked to US concerns over fentanyl trafficking. In return, China will reduce its tariffs on American goods from 125 per cent to 10 per cent. Businesses still under pressure Although the deal signals a step towards de-escalation, American businesses warn that the trade environment remains strained. Retail giants such as Walmart have already indicated that price increases are likely, as tariffs continue to act as a hidden tax on US consumers. Small businesses have been especially vocal, describing the tariffs as a 'death sentence' threatening their survival and growth. A fragile truce with lingering risks While the agreement provides temporary relief, it highlights the fragile nature of US-China trade relations. With China retaining strategic leverage in the rare earths sector, the long-term stability of the deal remains uncertain.
