A caste cannot be classified in different groups for providing reservation in education and employment: Karnataka High Court
A community/caste will have to be classified under the same group for providing reservation for both educational and employment purposes, and cannot classified in two different groups, said the High Court of Karnataka.
The court also said that when a particular community is stated to be socially and educationally backward, it cannot be the case that such classes of citizens are adequately represented in the services under the State.
'Needless to say that for a person to be engaged in services under the State, such a person has to be educated and possess the requisite educational qualifications. If a class or community is socially and educationally backward for purposes of education, then the question of such socially and educationally backward classes being adequately represented in the services under the State would not arise,' the court made it clear.
Justice Suraj Govindaraj made these observations while allowing a petition filed by V. Sumitra, a government primary school teacher in Mysuru, who belong to Balajiga/Banajiga community.
What the petitioner said
She had questioned cancellation of caste certificate issued to her in 1996 for the reason that she had declared that she belonged to Group-B of other backward classes (OBCs) though her community is listed under Group-D for public employment purpose. She had stated that she was not aware of classification of her caste under two different categories for educational and employment purposes.
It is probably for the same reason that the framers of the Constitution firstly introduced Article 15(4), providing for reservation to be made for socially and educationally backward classes of citizens for admission to educational institution, and thereafter under Article 16(4) provided reservation for employment, the court said.
Meanwhile, the court also said the classification of the Balajiga/Banajiga community for the purpose of employment being different from that for the purpose of education, is discriminatory and illegal and void ab initio and violative to Article 14 of the Constitution.
Rectify classification
While directing the government to reclassify Balajiga/Banajiga community under Article 16(4) under Group-B instead of Group-D, the court said that petitioner belonging to Balajiga/Banajiga community would be entitled to reservation for employment, under Group-B and as such her employment as a primary school teacher has to be continued.
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The Hindu
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