Qantas announces huge sale on first, business class seats
Luxury travellers rejoice, Qantas has announced a sweeping sale on premium cabin fares across its international network.
From Thursday, travellers will be able to access more than 80,000 discounted first class, business class and premium economy seats across almost every one of Qantas' international destinations.
Using cash or points, customers can travel across Asia, the UK, South Africa, North and South America, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands, with some destinations fetching big discounts.
Travellers making their way to New Zealand can enjoy $999 premium economy seats on return flights from Sydney to Auckland.
Qantas international chief Cam Wallace said the airline had strong interest in premium travel options on its long-haul international flights.
'This sale is one we know our customers will love, with discounted premium seats across almost our entire international network, including over peak periods like the northern hemisphere summer and Christmas holidays,' Mr Wallace said.
With the sale extending out across those peak travel periods, Australians making their way to international family or seeking a global getaway over the holidays will have access to Sydney to London return premium economy flights from $3799 and Sydney to New York from $4299.
There are further benefits for those repeat Qantas customers.
'And for our frequent flyers, it's a fantastic opportunity to maximise their points with Classic Plus seats now on sale,' Mr Wallace said.
'It's another way we're providing great value and more choice for our members to fly in premium cabins to their favourite destinations.'
The sale runs until midnight Wednesday, June 18, unless sold out earlier.
Flights can be booked up until May 2026, with some selected dates blacked out.
The fares include baggage, in-flight entertainment and food and drinks.
The full list of routes on sale is available on the Qantas website.
Originally published as Qantas announces sweeping sale on premium seats for popular international destinations
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
West Australian
30 minutes ago
- West Australian
Israel, Iran, Middle East travel warning: Smartraveller tells Australians to ‘shelter' as war erupts
Smartraveller has issued an urgent warning to Australians in the Middle East, telling them to shelter as military strikes hit Iran and Israel declares a state of emergency over possible retaliation. 'Following military strikes in Iran, Australians in Iran should shelter in place and take the advice of local authorities in affected areas. See our general advice on protecting your safety during an armed conflict,' Smartraveller said in a statement online. 'Airlines may cancel or reduce their operations to and from Iran at short notice and your options to leave may be limited. Check the latest flight status with your airline or travel provider. The Australian Government may not be able to assist with your departure.' Iran has a 'do not travel' level warning according to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade website. Australians in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories have been warned about the 'increased threat of military and terrorist attacks'. 'Following military strikes in Iran, there's an increased threat of military and terrorist attacks against Israel. In an attack or other armed conflict, you should take shelter (and) follow the advice of local authorities,' a statement from Smartraveller said. 'Monitor local media and public safety information updates through the National Emergency Portal (accessible in Israel only).' Smartraveller said the security situation in the Middle East could continue to deteriorate without notice. 'There may also be airspace closures, flight and other travel disruptions.' As the first Israeli strike on Tehran hit, the FlightRadar24 website tracked several commercial passenger planes turning around just outside Tel Aviv. Over Iran, flights quickly scattered — some even becoming untrackable — before later reappearing on the map in another location. The airspace over Iraq has also emptied. In Tel Aviv, flight boards have filled with 'cancelled' messages for both arrivals and departures. The usually bustling city is now under a state of emergency, coming at a time when tens of thousands of travellers are headed to the city to celebrate Tel Aviv Pride as part of Pride month. Smartraveller is warning Australians to stay away of possible additional attacks and armed conflict. If armed conflict breaks out, the travel safety group urges Australians to: They encourage Australians to stay in contact with friends or family where possible, follow instructions and to make plans to leave. The Australian Government warns it will not make the decision to leave or stay for Aussies caught up in war. 'If you want to leave, go early. Don't wait for help from the Government or evacuation flights. Conflict may escalate to a point where it's no longer safe to leave,' Smartraveller says. Australians should also contact their airline or travel agent. 'Airlines often cancel flights to locations affected by armed conflict, especially if it threatens the airport. Local authorities may shut the airport down or declare a no-fly zone. Opposing forces may take over the airport,' Smartraveller warns. When flights become sparse, costs for tickets can become astronomical. To contact the Australian Government in an emergency:
Perth Now
31 minutes ago
- Perth Now
‘Shelter': Urgent warning for Aussies in Middle East
Smartraveller has issued an urgent warning to Australians in the Middle East, telling them to shelter as military strikes hit Iran and Israel declares a state of emergency over possible retaliation. 'Following military strikes in Iran, Australians in Iran should shelter in place and take the advice of local authorities in affected areas. See our general advice on protecting your safety during an armed conflict,' Smartraveller said in a statement online. 'Airlines may cancel or reduce their operations to and from Iran at short notice and your options to leave may be limited. Check the latest flight status with your airline or travel provider. The Australian Government may not be able to assist with your departure.' Iran has a 'do not travel' level warning according to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade website. Australians in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories have been warned about the 'increased threat of military and terrorist attacks'. 'Following military strikes in Iran, there's an increased threat of military and terrorist attacks against Israel. In an attack or other armed conflict, you should take shelter (and) follow the advice of local authorities,' a statement from Smartraveller said. 'Monitor local media and public safety information updates through the National Emergency Portal (accessible in Israel only).' Smartraveller said the security situation in the Middle East could continue to deteriorate without notice. 'There may also be airspace closures, flight and other travel disruptions.' As the first Israeli strike on Tehran hit, the FlightRadar24 website tracked several commercial passenger planes turning around just outside Tel Aviv. Over Iran, flights quickly scattered — some even becoming untrackable — before later reappearing on the map in another location. The airspace over Iraq has also emptied. A screengrab from Flightradar24 shows airlines takling a wide berth around Iran. Credit: Supplied In Tel Aviv, flight boards have filled with 'cancelled' messages for both arrivals and departures. The usually bustling city is now under a state of emergency, coming at a time when tens of thousands of travellers are headed to the city to celebrate Tel Aviv Pride as part of Pride month. Smartraveller is warning Australians to stay away of possible additional attacks and armed conflict. If armed conflict breaks out, the travel safety group urges Australians to: Stay in safe places Limit movement Be alert, especially in large crowds Keep a low profile Keep hard copy lists of emergency contacts with you They encourage Australians to stay in contact with friends or family where possible, follow instructions and to make plans to leave. The Australian Government warns it will not make the decision to leave or stay for Aussies caught up in war. 'If you want to leave, go early. Don't wait for help from the Government or evacuation flights. Conflict may escalate to a point where it's no longer safe to leave,' Smartraveller says. Australians should also contact their airline or travel agent. 'Airlines often cancel flights to locations affected by armed conflict, especially if it threatens the airport. Local authorities may shut the airport down or declare a no-fly zone. Opposing forces may take over the airport,' Smartraveller warns. When flights become sparse, costs for tickets can become astronomical. To contact the Australian Government in an emergency: Call the nearest Australian embassy, high commission or consulate Call the 24-hour Consular Emergency Centre on +61 2 6261 3305'
The Advertiser
2 hours ago
- The Advertiser
This deal was bad from the start. Now is our chance to get out
There is every reason for Australia to jump on board the idea of having a review of its AUKUS defence policy. The "America First" initiative is an opportunity to get out of a deal that was bad from the start, but it is getting seriously worse. It was, as any number of ex-prime ministers and foreign ministers, Labor and Liberal, tell us, a very bad deal, in which all the risk fell on Australia, and the goodies on offer would come too late, if indeed they came at all. The risk that they would never arrive has been increasing, although a failure to deliver on the part of either the US, or later, Britain, would not, in the very unequal deal, amount to a breach of contract. The US is bound to deliver only if some future US president decides the US has enough nuclear submarines of its own. Anthony Albanese and particularly his deputy, Richard Marles, were fools to adopt the Morrison plan. The arrival of President Donald Trump has added new layers of uncertainty to a deal that was already very iffy. Joe Biden, who signed the deal on behalf of the US, was at least committed to attempting to maintain American dominance in the western Pacific, even if outsiders considered that the rise of China made that impossible. Biden's manoeuvrings attempted to lock Australia in on the deal by extending AUKUS ties with Australia, including weapons storage and troop training. Now there is not only the problem of guessing what Trump thinks of US commitments, but how long those commitments will continue, because Trump frequently changes his mind and lets allies down. Consider, for example, his relationships with Ukraine, with Europe and in the Middle East. And with Canada, or Denmark. Trump has also produced a new hostility to Australia's economic interests, which undermines America's capacity to claim to be an alliance partner or friend. Australians no longer share the values that Trump, and Trumpism, represents. Increasingly, Trump acts as if all his old allies, except Israel, are now both his economic and his military enemies. Australian officials think we maintain a core of personal relationships with American diplomats and military personnel that transcend the eccentricities and abrupt shifts by the president and his cronies. But such relationships do not seem to have worked, except in oozing charm on a very susceptible Marles. (Nor have other countries, such as Britain, Germany, France or Canada found that similar deeply embedded relationships have tempered the problems of Trump.) A new circumstance is that it is becoming clear that the US is using AUKUS, and its suddenly announced "review" of its AUKUS commitments, as a lever with which to press Australia to increase its defence expenditure. Indeed, that may be the whole purpose of having the review. There is nothing new as such in US pressure, particularly from Trump, to increase defence spending, preferably up to 4 per cent of gross national product. But the linkage of the two, together with the implications that Australia has been freeloading on the US on defence matters, is a galling inversion of the truth. Over the years, indeed, Australia has been too much an ally of the US, joining it in all sorts of absurd adventures (and failures) not in our national interest, believing we should do them to maintain credit with the US. Such partnerships have cost us much more than blood and treasure, substantial as that has been. It has also diminished our reputation in the world and in our neighbourhood, with many nations regarding us as no more than America's poodle, unable to act independently even when its interests are manifestly different from those of America. Our slavering loyalty has not been rewarded, as witnessed when America stole our markets after Scott Morrison provoked China to the point that it punished Australia, not America, by banning imports of Australian goods. Moreover, our AUKUS commitments are neither in financial nor strategic terms much, if at all, to Australia's benefit. From the US point of view, the deal locks Australia in as a very special ally with no, or next to no, right of independence of action. It is America, not Australia, which decides whether and when submarines come, and the US, for that matter, seems unable to honour its promises, even if it wanted to. Australia is paying through the nose, with no guarantees, and has almost no contractual rights or independence of action. The freeloading argument must be evaluated against the fact that the US-Australian alliance has involved massive Australian purchases of US military goods, in part for the explicit purpose of having virtually interchangeable equipment and military doctrine. Most equivalent countries, particularly in Europe, are nowhere as dependent on US military technology (and the flow of dollars to the US that represents). Nor does evaluation of the costs and benefits of the relationship pay any regard to the usefulness of American bases and intelligence capacity based in Australia. Many Australians do not recognise what an unequal relationship the partnership involves. One reason for that is that much of Australia's defence and intelligence establishment, including within academia and the bureaucracy, has been captured by the US view of the world. Many of our politicians, generals, admirals and air vice-marshals, and many of our intelligence boffins have effectively transferred their loyalties to the US, and America's view of how the alliance works. It is not a selfless conversion. The Pacific Ocean is choked with the traffic of consultancies, cross-postings, post-retirement jobs, and a revolving door of appointments, including handsome jobs in defence industry to people involved in approving tenders of billions of dollars. It is a market full of potential for corruption and conflict of interest, a risk from the lack of integrity controls, the lack of service, bureaucratic and political will to enforce the pathetic ethical obstacles that exist and the poor example of senior staff. Put bluntly, many of those involved in this game lack integrity, or obvious (patriotic) focus on Australia's national interests and the public interest. For at least 50 years, I have argued the need for some serious rules on this, but to no effect. ANALYSIS: What happened the last time AUKUS was reviewed There's another new reason for an independent and open review. Our American friends have come to think that our AUKUS signature precommits us to fight alongside the US if the US goes to war with China over Taiwan. Otherwise, it would not dream of selling us its old subs. Australia has never publicly committed itself to any fight over Taiwan, and, 50 years ago it would have been unthinkable. Obviously, we would deplore a less-than-peaceful reunion, but that does not mean that we would go to war over it, any more than we would go to war to defend the human rights of the people of Gaza when they are being massacred by the Israeli state. At most, we belatedly borrowed the "strategic ambiguity" line once used by the US, by indicating that we would not decide how we would react to an invasion until after it happened. Sort of like the US commitment to the defence of Australia under the ANZUS Treaty. Willy nilly, the US, which now seems determined on war if there is an invasion, is pressing for a definite Australian commitment. Many in our military establishment now seem to take it for granted that we would be involved, and our intelligence establishment, many of them shills for Taiwan when moonlighting from their US duties, works long and hard to press it as if it were an alliance obligation, though whether to the US or Taiwan is never made clear. Our hardheads might have strong sympathies for Taiwan, but do not want to get involved because their research shows that the US cannot win a war over Taiwan. Nor can we, but it would deliver us a higher class of determined and vengeful enemy. The Chinese may have failed to notice Australians in Korea and were probably highly amused at how we got bogged down in losing struggles in Vietnam, the Middle East and Afghanistan. But the merest Australian assistance to the US would provoke serious retaliation we do not need and make Australia an equal partner with the US in any vengeance doled out. We should not throw our young men and women into a conflict we cannot win. There is another argument for an independent and open Australian review. We have never had a proper debate on the AUKUS relationship, or even of the suitability of ANZUS arrangements for the present day. A debate is not a matter for a few inside experts, not a jamboree by a few retired insider politicians. It is one for the community, including the third of the nation which does not accept the consensus of insiders and directors of arms companies. Their credibility is low, and some of them, however involved in the defence gravy train, are not closely involved in Australia's image in the world. I would rate the current knowledge, the political instincts, and the feel for the thinking of ordinary Australians found in Paul Keating, or Malcolm Turnbull, or Gareth Evans against any number of former politicians now in cosy diplomatic jobs in London and Washington. And that's regardless of the number of "high-level briefings", site visits, golf games and the fine mind and communications skills of a Richard Marles. MORE JACK WATERFORD: It reflects seriously on the Prime Minister that he never encouraged a widespread public debate, or, for that matter, a population well educated on the issues at stake. Perhaps he felt insecure when he had a narrow majority, and a crossbench generally hostile to the comfy consensus of the Labor and Liberal parties. But he is not in that position now and must feel that he has nothing to apologise for. Compulsive secrecy, efforts to control the extent of the debate and the information to which it is allowed access, will not be enough to unite the population around what he quaintly called "a progressive patriotism where we are proud to do things our own way". At the press club on Tuesday, Albanese even sketched out how it could be - should be - done. He talked about popular frustration, "drawn from people's real experiences, the feeling that government isn't really working for them. "To counter this, we have to offer a practical and positive alternative ... We want a focused dialogue and constructive debate that leads to concrete and tangible actions ... Change that is imposed unilaterally rarely endures. The key to lasting change is reform that Australians own and understand. Reform that serves a national purpose and the national interest. Change that empowers and engages people, with a sense of choice and urgency. Change that generates its own momentum and builds its own staying power." This is not how Albanese has hitherto managed the defence debate, or the argument about Australia's place in the world. But he is right about the need to bring the public along. He must bring a new personality, a new attitude and a new confidence in the common sense of Australians. Otherwise, he won't be promoting a society Australians will clamour to defend. There is every reason for Australia to jump on board the idea of having a review of its AUKUS defence policy. The "America First" initiative is an opportunity to get out of a deal that was bad from the start, but it is getting seriously worse. It was, as any number of ex-prime ministers and foreign ministers, Labor and Liberal, tell us, a very bad deal, in which all the risk fell on Australia, and the goodies on offer would come too late, if indeed they came at all. The risk that they would never arrive has been increasing, although a failure to deliver on the part of either the US, or later, Britain, would not, in the very unequal deal, amount to a breach of contract. The US is bound to deliver only if some future US president decides the US has enough nuclear submarines of its own. Anthony Albanese and particularly his deputy, Richard Marles, were fools to adopt the Morrison plan. The arrival of President Donald Trump has added new layers of uncertainty to a deal that was already very iffy. Joe Biden, who signed the deal on behalf of the US, was at least committed to attempting to maintain American dominance in the western Pacific, even if outsiders considered that the rise of China made that impossible. Biden's manoeuvrings attempted to lock Australia in on the deal by extending AUKUS ties with Australia, including weapons storage and troop training. Now there is not only the problem of guessing what Trump thinks of US commitments, but how long those commitments will continue, because Trump frequently changes his mind and lets allies down. Consider, for example, his relationships with Ukraine, with Europe and in the Middle East. And with Canada, or Denmark. Trump has also produced a new hostility to Australia's economic interests, which undermines America's capacity to claim to be an alliance partner or friend. Australians no longer share the values that Trump, and Trumpism, represents. Increasingly, Trump acts as if all his old allies, except Israel, are now both his economic and his military enemies. Australian officials think we maintain a core of personal relationships with American diplomats and military personnel that transcend the eccentricities and abrupt shifts by the president and his cronies. But such relationships do not seem to have worked, except in oozing charm on a very susceptible Marles. (Nor have other countries, such as Britain, Germany, France or Canada found that similar deeply embedded relationships have tempered the problems of Trump.) A new circumstance is that it is becoming clear that the US is using AUKUS, and its suddenly announced "review" of its AUKUS commitments, as a lever with which to press Australia to increase its defence expenditure. Indeed, that may be the whole purpose of having the review. There is nothing new as such in US pressure, particularly from Trump, to increase defence spending, preferably up to 4 per cent of gross national product. But the linkage of the two, together with the implications that Australia has been freeloading on the US on defence matters, is a galling inversion of the truth. Over the years, indeed, Australia has been too much an ally of the US, joining it in all sorts of absurd adventures (and failures) not in our national interest, believing we should do them to maintain credit with the US. Such partnerships have cost us much more than blood and treasure, substantial as that has been. It has also diminished our reputation in the world and in our neighbourhood, with many nations regarding us as no more than America's poodle, unable to act independently even when its interests are manifestly different from those of America. Our slavering loyalty has not been rewarded, as witnessed when America stole our markets after Scott Morrison provoked China to the point that it punished Australia, not America, by banning imports of Australian goods. Moreover, our AUKUS commitments are neither in financial nor strategic terms much, if at all, to Australia's benefit. From the US point of view, the deal locks Australia in as a very special ally with no, or next to no, right of independence of action. It is America, not Australia, which decides whether and when submarines come, and the US, for that matter, seems unable to honour its promises, even if it wanted to. Australia is paying through the nose, with no guarantees, and has almost no contractual rights or independence of action. The freeloading argument must be evaluated against the fact that the US-Australian alliance has involved massive Australian purchases of US military goods, in part for the explicit purpose of having virtually interchangeable equipment and military doctrine. Most equivalent countries, particularly in Europe, are nowhere as dependent on US military technology (and the flow of dollars to the US that represents). Nor does evaluation of the costs and benefits of the relationship pay any regard to the usefulness of American bases and intelligence capacity based in Australia. Many Australians do not recognise what an unequal relationship the partnership involves. One reason for that is that much of Australia's defence and intelligence establishment, including within academia and the bureaucracy, has been captured by the US view of the world. Many of our politicians, generals, admirals and air vice-marshals, and many of our intelligence boffins have effectively transferred their loyalties to the US, and America's view of how the alliance works. It is not a selfless conversion. The Pacific Ocean is choked with the traffic of consultancies, cross-postings, post-retirement jobs, and a revolving door of appointments, including handsome jobs in defence industry to people involved in approving tenders of billions of dollars. It is a market full of potential for corruption and conflict of interest, a risk from the lack of integrity controls, the lack of service, bureaucratic and political will to enforce the pathetic ethical obstacles that exist and the poor example of senior staff. Put bluntly, many of those involved in this game lack integrity, or obvious (patriotic) focus on Australia's national interests and the public interest. For at least 50 years, I have argued the need for some serious rules on this, but to no effect. ANALYSIS: What happened the last time AUKUS was reviewed There's another new reason for an independent and open review. Our American friends have come to think that our AUKUS signature precommits us to fight alongside the US if the US goes to war with China over Taiwan. Otherwise, it would not dream of selling us its old subs. Australia has never publicly committed itself to any fight over Taiwan, and, 50 years ago it would have been unthinkable. Obviously, we would deplore a less-than-peaceful reunion, but that does not mean that we would go to war over it, any more than we would go to war to defend the human rights of the people of Gaza when they are being massacred by the Israeli state. At most, we belatedly borrowed the "strategic ambiguity" line once used by the US, by indicating that we would not decide how we would react to an invasion until after it happened. Sort of like the US commitment to the defence of Australia under the ANZUS Treaty. Willy nilly, the US, which now seems determined on war if there is an invasion, is pressing for a definite Australian commitment. Many in our military establishment now seem to take it for granted that we would be involved, and our intelligence establishment, many of them shills for Taiwan when moonlighting from their US duties, works long and hard to press it as if it were an alliance obligation, though whether to the US or Taiwan is never made clear. Our hardheads might have strong sympathies for Taiwan, but do not want to get involved because their research shows that the US cannot win a war over Taiwan. Nor can we, but it would deliver us a higher class of determined and vengeful enemy. The Chinese may have failed to notice Australians in Korea and were probably highly amused at how we got bogged down in losing struggles in Vietnam, the Middle East and Afghanistan. But the merest Australian assistance to the US would provoke serious retaliation we do not need and make Australia an equal partner with the US in any vengeance doled out. We should not throw our young men and women into a conflict we cannot win. There is another argument for an independent and open Australian review. We have never had a proper debate on the AUKUS relationship, or even of the suitability of ANZUS arrangements for the present day. A debate is not a matter for a few inside experts, not a jamboree by a few retired insider politicians. It is one for the community, including the third of the nation which does not accept the consensus of insiders and directors of arms companies. Their credibility is low, and some of them, however involved in the defence gravy train, are not closely involved in Australia's image in the world. I would rate the current knowledge, the political instincts, and the feel for the thinking of ordinary Australians found in Paul Keating, or Malcolm Turnbull, or Gareth Evans against any number of former politicians now in cosy diplomatic jobs in London and Washington. And that's regardless of the number of "high-level briefings", site visits, golf games and the fine mind and communications skills of a Richard Marles. MORE JACK WATERFORD: It reflects seriously on the Prime Minister that he never encouraged a widespread public debate, or, for that matter, a population well educated on the issues at stake. Perhaps he felt insecure when he had a narrow majority, and a crossbench generally hostile to the comfy consensus of the Labor and Liberal parties. But he is not in that position now and must feel that he has nothing to apologise for. Compulsive secrecy, efforts to control the extent of the debate and the information to which it is allowed access, will not be enough to unite the population around what he quaintly called "a progressive patriotism where we are proud to do things our own way". At the press club on Tuesday, Albanese even sketched out how it could be - should be - done. He talked about popular frustration, "drawn from people's real experiences, the feeling that government isn't really working for them. "To counter this, we have to offer a practical and positive alternative ... We want a focused dialogue and constructive debate that leads to concrete and tangible actions ... Change that is imposed unilaterally rarely endures. The key to lasting change is reform that Australians own and understand. Reform that serves a national purpose and the national interest. Change that empowers and engages people, with a sense of choice and urgency. Change that generates its own momentum and builds its own staying power." This is not how Albanese has hitherto managed the defence debate, or the argument about Australia's place in the world. But he is right about the need to bring the public along. He must bring a new personality, a new attitude and a new confidence in the common sense of Australians. Otherwise, he won't be promoting a society Australians will clamour to defend. There is every reason for Australia to jump on board the idea of having a review of its AUKUS defence policy. The "America First" initiative is an opportunity to get out of a deal that was bad from the start, but it is getting seriously worse. It was, as any number of ex-prime ministers and foreign ministers, Labor and Liberal, tell us, a very bad deal, in which all the risk fell on Australia, and the goodies on offer would come too late, if indeed they came at all. The risk that they would never arrive has been increasing, although a failure to deliver on the part of either the US, or later, Britain, would not, in the very unequal deal, amount to a breach of contract. The US is bound to deliver only if some future US president decides the US has enough nuclear submarines of its own. Anthony Albanese and particularly his deputy, Richard Marles, were fools to adopt the Morrison plan. The arrival of President Donald Trump has added new layers of uncertainty to a deal that was already very iffy. Joe Biden, who signed the deal on behalf of the US, was at least committed to attempting to maintain American dominance in the western Pacific, even if outsiders considered that the rise of China made that impossible. Biden's manoeuvrings attempted to lock Australia in on the deal by extending AUKUS ties with Australia, including weapons storage and troop training. Now there is not only the problem of guessing what Trump thinks of US commitments, but how long those commitments will continue, because Trump frequently changes his mind and lets allies down. Consider, for example, his relationships with Ukraine, with Europe and in the Middle East. And with Canada, or Denmark. Trump has also produced a new hostility to Australia's economic interests, which undermines America's capacity to claim to be an alliance partner or friend. Australians no longer share the values that Trump, and Trumpism, represents. Increasingly, Trump acts as if all his old allies, except Israel, are now both his economic and his military enemies. Australian officials think we maintain a core of personal relationships with American diplomats and military personnel that transcend the eccentricities and abrupt shifts by the president and his cronies. But such relationships do not seem to have worked, except in oozing charm on a very susceptible Marles. (Nor have other countries, such as Britain, Germany, France or Canada found that similar deeply embedded relationships have tempered the problems of Trump.) A new circumstance is that it is becoming clear that the US is using AUKUS, and its suddenly announced "review" of its AUKUS commitments, as a lever with which to press Australia to increase its defence expenditure. Indeed, that may be the whole purpose of having the review. There is nothing new as such in US pressure, particularly from Trump, to increase defence spending, preferably up to 4 per cent of gross national product. But the linkage of the two, together with the implications that Australia has been freeloading on the US on defence matters, is a galling inversion of the truth. Over the years, indeed, Australia has been too much an ally of the US, joining it in all sorts of absurd adventures (and failures) not in our national interest, believing we should do them to maintain credit with the US. Such partnerships have cost us much more than blood and treasure, substantial as that has been. It has also diminished our reputation in the world and in our neighbourhood, with many nations regarding us as no more than America's poodle, unable to act independently even when its interests are manifestly different from those of America. Our slavering loyalty has not been rewarded, as witnessed when America stole our markets after Scott Morrison provoked China to the point that it punished Australia, not America, by banning imports of Australian goods. Moreover, our AUKUS commitments are neither in financial nor strategic terms much, if at all, to Australia's benefit. From the US point of view, the deal locks Australia in as a very special ally with no, or next to no, right of independence of action. It is America, not Australia, which decides whether and when submarines come, and the US, for that matter, seems unable to honour its promises, even if it wanted to. Australia is paying through the nose, with no guarantees, and has almost no contractual rights or independence of action. The freeloading argument must be evaluated against the fact that the US-Australian alliance has involved massive Australian purchases of US military goods, in part for the explicit purpose of having virtually interchangeable equipment and military doctrine. Most equivalent countries, particularly in Europe, are nowhere as dependent on US military technology (and the flow of dollars to the US that represents). Nor does evaluation of the costs and benefits of the relationship pay any regard to the usefulness of American bases and intelligence capacity based in Australia. Many Australians do not recognise what an unequal relationship the partnership involves. One reason for that is that much of Australia's defence and intelligence establishment, including within academia and the bureaucracy, has been captured by the US view of the world. Many of our politicians, generals, admirals and air vice-marshals, and many of our intelligence boffins have effectively transferred their loyalties to the US, and America's view of how the alliance works. It is not a selfless conversion. The Pacific Ocean is choked with the traffic of consultancies, cross-postings, post-retirement jobs, and a revolving door of appointments, including handsome jobs in defence industry to people involved in approving tenders of billions of dollars. It is a market full of potential for corruption and conflict of interest, a risk from the lack of integrity controls, the lack of service, bureaucratic and political will to enforce the pathetic ethical obstacles that exist and the poor example of senior staff. Put bluntly, many of those involved in this game lack integrity, or obvious (patriotic) focus on Australia's national interests and the public interest. For at least 50 years, I have argued the need for some serious rules on this, but to no effect. ANALYSIS: What happened the last time AUKUS was reviewed There's another new reason for an independent and open review. Our American friends have come to think that our AUKUS signature precommits us to fight alongside the US if the US goes to war with China over Taiwan. Otherwise, it would not dream of selling us its old subs. Australia has never publicly committed itself to any fight over Taiwan, and, 50 years ago it would have been unthinkable. Obviously, we would deplore a less-than-peaceful reunion, but that does not mean that we would go to war over it, any more than we would go to war to defend the human rights of the people of Gaza when they are being massacred by the Israeli state. At most, we belatedly borrowed the "strategic ambiguity" line once used by the US, by indicating that we would not decide how we would react to an invasion until after it happened. Sort of like the US commitment to the defence of Australia under the ANZUS Treaty. Willy nilly, the US, which now seems determined on war if there is an invasion, is pressing for a definite Australian commitment. Many in our military establishment now seem to take it for granted that we would be involved, and our intelligence establishment, many of them shills for Taiwan when moonlighting from their US duties, works long and hard to press it as if it were an alliance obligation, though whether to the US or Taiwan is never made clear. Our hardheads might have strong sympathies for Taiwan, but do not want to get involved because their research shows that the US cannot win a war over Taiwan. Nor can we, but it would deliver us a higher class of determined and vengeful enemy. The Chinese may have failed to notice Australians in Korea and were probably highly amused at how we got bogged down in losing struggles in Vietnam, the Middle East and Afghanistan. But the merest Australian assistance to the US would provoke serious retaliation we do not need and make Australia an equal partner with the US in any vengeance doled out. We should not throw our young men and women into a conflict we cannot win. There is another argument for an independent and open Australian review. We have never had a proper debate on the AUKUS relationship, or even of the suitability of ANZUS arrangements for the present day. A debate is not a matter for a few inside experts, not a jamboree by a few retired insider politicians. It is one for the community, including the third of the nation which does not accept the consensus of insiders and directors of arms companies. Their credibility is low, and some of them, however involved in the defence gravy train, are not closely involved in Australia's image in the world. I would rate the current knowledge, the political instincts, and the feel for the thinking of ordinary Australians found in Paul Keating, or Malcolm Turnbull, or Gareth Evans against any number of former politicians now in cosy diplomatic jobs in London and Washington. And that's regardless of the number of "high-level briefings", site visits, golf games and the fine mind and communications skills of a Richard Marles. MORE JACK WATERFORD: It reflects seriously on the Prime Minister that he never encouraged a widespread public debate, or, for that matter, a population well educated on the issues at stake. Perhaps he felt insecure when he had a narrow majority, and a crossbench generally hostile to the comfy consensus of the Labor and Liberal parties. But he is not in that position now and must feel that he has nothing to apologise for. Compulsive secrecy, efforts to control the extent of the debate and the information to which it is allowed access, will not be enough to unite the population around what he quaintly called "a progressive patriotism where we are proud to do things our own way". At the press club on Tuesday, Albanese even sketched out how it could be - should be - done. He talked about popular frustration, "drawn from people's real experiences, the feeling that government isn't really working for them. "To counter this, we have to offer a practical and positive alternative ... We want a focused dialogue and constructive debate that leads to concrete and tangible actions ... Change that is imposed unilaterally rarely endures. The key to lasting change is reform that Australians own and understand. Reform that serves a national purpose and the national interest. Change that empowers and engages people, with a sense of choice and urgency. Change that generates its own momentum and builds its own staying power." This is not how Albanese has hitherto managed the defence debate, or the argument about Australia's place in the world. But he is right about the need to bring the public along. He must bring a new personality, a new attitude and a new confidence in the common sense of Australians. Otherwise, he won't be promoting a society Australians will clamour to defend. There is every reason for Australia to jump on board the idea of having a review of its AUKUS defence policy. The "America First" initiative is an opportunity to get out of a deal that was bad from the start, but it is getting seriously worse. It was, as any number of ex-prime ministers and foreign ministers, Labor and Liberal, tell us, a very bad deal, in which all the risk fell on Australia, and the goodies on offer would come too late, if indeed they came at all. The risk that they would never arrive has been increasing, although a failure to deliver on the part of either the US, or later, Britain, would not, in the very unequal deal, amount to a breach of contract. The US is bound to deliver only if some future US president decides the US has enough nuclear submarines of its own. Anthony Albanese and particularly his deputy, Richard Marles, were fools to adopt the Morrison plan. The arrival of President Donald Trump has added new layers of uncertainty to a deal that was already very iffy. Joe Biden, who signed the deal on behalf of the US, was at least committed to attempting to maintain American dominance in the western Pacific, even if outsiders considered that the rise of China made that impossible. Biden's manoeuvrings attempted to lock Australia in on the deal by extending AUKUS ties with Australia, including weapons storage and troop training. Now there is not only the problem of guessing what Trump thinks of US commitments, but how long those commitments will continue, because Trump frequently changes his mind and lets allies down. Consider, for example, his relationships with Ukraine, with Europe and in the Middle East. And with Canada, or Denmark. Trump has also produced a new hostility to Australia's economic interests, which undermines America's capacity to claim to be an alliance partner or friend. Australians no longer share the values that Trump, and Trumpism, represents. Increasingly, Trump acts as if all his old allies, except Israel, are now both his economic and his military enemies. Australian officials think we maintain a core of personal relationships with American diplomats and military personnel that transcend the eccentricities and abrupt shifts by the president and his cronies. But such relationships do not seem to have worked, except in oozing charm on a very susceptible Marles. (Nor have other countries, such as Britain, Germany, France or Canada found that similar deeply embedded relationships have tempered the problems of Trump.) A new circumstance is that it is becoming clear that the US is using AUKUS, and its suddenly announced "review" of its AUKUS commitments, as a lever with which to press Australia to increase its defence expenditure. Indeed, that may be the whole purpose of having the review. There is nothing new as such in US pressure, particularly from Trump, to increase defence spending, preferably up to 4 per cent of gross national product. But the linkage of the two, together with the implications that Australia has been freeloading on the US on defence matters, is a galling inversion of the truth. Over the years, indeed, Australia has been too much an ally of the US, joining it in all sorts of absurd adventures (and failures) not in our national interest, believing we should do them to maintain credit with the US. Such partnerships have cost us much more than blood and treasure, substantial as that has been. It has also diminished our reputation in the world and in our neighbourhood, with many nations regarding us as no more than America's poodle, unable to act independently even when its interests are manifestly different from those of America. Our slavering loyalty has not been rewarded, as witnessed when America stole our markets after Scott Morrison provoked China to the point that it punished Australia, not America, by banning imports of Australian goods. Moreover, our AUKUS commitments are neither in financial nor strategic terms much, if at all, to Australia's benefit. From the US point of view, the deal locks Australia in as a very special ally with no, or next to no, right of independence of action. It is America, not Australia, which decides whether and when submarines come, and the US, for that matter, seems unable to honour its promises, even if it wanted to. Australia is paying through the nose, with no guarantees, and has almost no contractual rights or independence of action. The freeloading argument must be evaluated against the fact that the US-Australian alliance has involved massive Australian purchases of US military goods, in part for the explicit purpose of having virtually interchangeable equipment and military doctrine. Most equivalent countries, particularly in Europe, are nowhere as dependent on US military technology (and the flow of dollars to the US that represents). Nor does evaluation of the costs and benefits of the relationship pay any regard to the usefulness of American bases and intelligence capacity based in Australia. Many Australians do not recognise what an unequal relationship the partnership involves. One reason for that is that much of Australia's defence and intelligence establishment, including within academia and the bureaucracy, has been captured by the US view of the world. Many of our politicians, generals, admirals and air vice-marshals, and many of our intelligence boffins have effectively transferred their loyalties to the US, and America's view of how the alliance works. It is not a selfless conversion. The Pacific Ocean is choked with the traffic of consultancies, cross-postings, post-retirement jobs, and a revolving door of appointments, including handsome jobs in defence industry to people involved in approving tenders of billions of dollars. It is a market full of potential for corruption and conflict of interest, a risk from the lack of integrity controls, the lack of service, bureaucratic and political will to enforce the pathetic ethical obstacles that exist and the poor example of senior staff. Put bluntly, many of those involved in this game lack integrity, or obvious (patriotic) focus on Australia's national interests and the public interest. For at least 50 years, I have argued the need for some serious rules on this, but to no effect. ANALYSIS: What happened the last time AUKUS was reviewed There's another new reason for an independent and open review. Our American friends have come to think that our AUKUS signature precommits us to fight alongside the US if the US goes to war with China over Taiwan. Otherwise, it would not dream of selling us its old subs. Australia has never publicly committed itself to any fight over Taiwan, and, 50 years ago it would have been unthinkable. Obviously, we would deplore a less-than-peaceful reunion, but that does not mean that we would go to war over it, any more than we would go to war to defend the human rights of the people of Gaza when they are being massacred by the Israeli state. At most, we belatedly borrowed the "strategic ambiguity" line once used by the US, by indicating that we would not decide how we would react to an invasion until after it happened. Sort of like the US commitment to the defence of Australia under the ANZUS Treaty. Willy nilly, the US, which now seems determined on war if there is an invasion, is pressing for a definite Australian commitment. Many in our military establishment now seem to take it for granted that we would be involved, and our intelligence establishment, many of them shills for Taiwan when moonlighting from their US duties, works long and hard to press it as if it were an alliance obligation, though whether to the US or Taiwan is never made clear. Our hardheads might have strong sympathies for Taiwan, but do not want to get involved because their research shows that the US cannot win a war over Taiwan. Nor can we, but it would deliver us a higher class of determined and vengeful enemy. The Chinese may have failed to notice Australians in Korea and were probably highly amused at how we got bogged down in losing struggles in Vietnam, the Middle East and Afghanistan. But the merest Australian assistance to the US would provoke serious retaliation we do not need and make Australia an equal partner with the US in any vengeance doled out. We should not throw our young men and women into a conflict we cannot win. There is another argument for an independent and open Australian review. We have never had a proper debate on the AUKUS relationship, or even of the suitability of ANZUS arrangements for the present day. A debate is not a matter for a few inside experts, not a jamboree by a few retired insider politicians. It is one for the community, including the third of the nation which does not accept the consensus of insiders and directors of arms companies. Their credibility is low, and some of them, however involved in the defence gravy train, are not closely involved in Australia's image in the world. I would rate the current knowledge, the political instincts, and the feel for the thinking of ordinary Australians found in Paul Keating, or Malcolm Turnbull, or Gareth Evans against any number of former politicians now in cosy diplomatic jobs in London and Washington. And that's regardless of the number of "high-level briefings", site visits, golf games and the fine mind and communications skills of a Richard Marles. MORE JACK WATERFORD: It reflects seriously on the Prime Minister that he never encouraged a widespread public debate, or, for that matter, a population well educated on the issues at stake. Perhaps he felt insecure when he had a narrow majority, and a crossbench generally hostile to the comfy consensus of the Labor and Liberal parties. But he is not in that position now and must feel that he has nothing to apologise for. Compulsive secrecy, efforts to control the extent of the debate and the information to which it is allowed access, will not be enough to unite the population around what he quaintly called "a progressive patriotism where we are proud to do things our own way". At the press club on Tuesday, Albanese even sketched out how it could be - should be - done. He talked about popular frustration, "drawn from people's real experiences, the feeling that government isn't really working for them. "To counter this, we have to offer a practical and positive alternative ... We want a focused dialogue and constructive debate that leads to concrete and tangible actions ... Change that is imposed unilaterally rarely endures. The key to lasting change is reform that Australians own and understand. Reform that serves a national purpose and the national interest. Change that empowers and engages people, with a sense of choice and urgency. Change that generates its own momentum and builds its own staying power." This is not how Albanese has hitherto managed the defence debate, or the argument about Australia's place in the world. But he is right about the need to bring the public along. He must bring a new personality, a new attitude and a new confidence in the common sense of Australians. Otherwise, he won't be promoting a society Australians will clamour to defend.
