Cambodia to file complaint with ICJ over Thai border dispute
PHNOM PENH: Cambodia will file a complaint with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over border disputes with Thailand, Prime Minister Hun Manet said on Monday (Jun 2), after a Cambodian soldier was killed in a recent frontier clash.
"Cambodia hopes that the Thai side will agree with Cambodia to jointly bring these issues to the International Court of Justice ... to prevent armed confrontation again over border uncertainty," Hun Manet said during a meeting between MPs and senators.
Military clashes between the Southeast Asian neighbours erupted in 2008 and have led to several years of sporadic violence, resulting in at least 28 deaths.
The most recent occurred on Wednesday, when a Cambodian soldier was killed in a location known as the Emerald Triangle - a joint border area between Cambodia, Thailand and Laos.
The day after, Cambodia's foreign ministry sent a letter to the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh demanding "an immediate and thorough investigation" into the "unprovoked attack".
Describing the incident as "a violation of Cambodian sovereignty", Phnom Penh said it remained committed to resolving the issue through "peaceful and diplomatic avenues".
Prime Minister Hun Manet said that even if the Thai side did not agree on bringing the issue to the ICJ, Cambodia would still file the complaint.
He added that the border dispute was being "incited by small extremist groups in both countries", which could lead to further clashes.
Thailand's ministry of foreign affairs did not immediately respond to a request for comment from AFP.
Cambodia's military had said they were attacked first in Wednesday's incident, while the Thai side said their soldiers were responding to gunshots.
The Thai and Cambodian militaries met the following day, agreeing to ease tensions.
Thailand says a Joint Boundary Committee will meet in the next two weeks to resolve the issue.
The Emerald Triangle is among the areas that will be named in the ICJ complaint, Hun Manet said.
Another is Ta Moan Thom Temple, the backdrop for a video posted on social media earlier this year showing a woman singing a patriotic Khmer song which led to Bangkok lodging a formal protest to Phnom Penh.
Cambodia and Thailand have long been at odds over their more than 800km-long border, which was largely drawn during the French occupation of Indochina.
The 2008 military clashes erupted over a patch of land next to Preah Vihear Temple, a 900-year-old structure near their shared border.
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CNA
40 minutes ago
- CNA
Commentary: US speech at Shangri-La Dialogue hit the right notes – but talk is cheap
SINGAPORE: Since the first Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in 2002, every sitting United States Defense Secretary has delivered an address at the summit to explain their strategic vision for the region and reassure US allies and partners. Pete Hegseth continued this long tradition with his speech on Saturday (May 31) at this year's edition of the security forum. Taken at face value, his speech hit all the right notes. But talk is cheap. His domestic talking points, his insistence that Asia spend more on defence, and inconsistencies between his statements and US actions may raise more questions than answers. BRINGING MAGA TO ASIA 'America is proud to be back in the Indo-Pacific – and we're here to stay,' Mr Hegseth proclaimed. Yet many points hinted at him not just addressing audiences in Singapore, but back in Washington too. On one hand, talking about how the US defence establishment is improving its capabilities, from raising the defence budget to over US$1 trillion to investing in American shipbuilding, supports his assertion that America is 're-establishing deterrence around the world' by building 'credible deterrence' at home. His proclamation that Washington is shunning its past 'moralistic and preachy approach' was even likely welcomed by some Southeast Asian officials in the room, given past efforts to tout liberal values were met with a mixed response. However, not all these domestic references were welcomed by international audiences. References to an 'invasion of 21 million illegals' and US President Donald Trump's electoral victory, for example, are targeted at the MAGA (Make America Great Again) crowd. An allusion to 'taking back the Panama Canal' was likely met with concern by smaller countries. Dismissing climate change as something that was 'preached' by previous governments, while politically popular with the MAGA base, underplayed what many regional governments consider an existential security issue. Perhaps the clearest sign that Mr Hegseth had his mind on a domestic audience were the worrying statements made about China. In years past, Washington has claimed to engage the region on its own merits, refraining from calling out China directly. In the Biden era, China was generally framed as a 'serious competitor' with whom cooperation was necessary, with the term 'threat' reserved for North Korea and more recently, Russia. Even under Trump 1.0, officials tended to criticise 'threatening' policies and actions. Yet, Mr Hegseth seemingly discarded this facade, explicitly calling China a threat. Mr Hegseth also claimed that an invasion of Taiwan 'could be imminent,' even as Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard said – on the same day after his speech – China does not want a war. While not surprising, this stridently anti-China stance raises concerns about how the US might engage Southeast Asia. The apparent gulf between what Southeast Asian governments and Washington consider important, including a confrontational approach to China and dismissal of climate change, may hinder cooperation going forward. INSISTENCE THAT ALLIES AND PARTNERS DO MORE ON DEFENCE US officials have traditionally called on European counterparts to bear a greater portion of the financial burden for their security. This time, YetMr Hegseth called for US Asian allies and partners in Asia to follow suit with 5 per cent of their gross domestic product. No country in Asia currently spends that much on defence. According to the SIPRI military expenditure database, most ASEAN countries spent less than 1.5 per cent of their GDP on defence in 2024. Even Japan and South Korea which have been actively modernising their militaries spent 1.4 per cent and 2.6 per cent respectively. Singapore is the outlier with roughly 3 per cent, still well below Mr Hegseth's expectations. This is not to say that Asian countries are neglecting their defence capabilities. SIPRI data show that ASEAN military expenditures rose from US$20.3 billion in 2000 to US$48.3 billion in 2024. But it is unlikely that Washington's demand for 5 per cent will ever be achieved. Doing so would require a dramatic reworking of government budgets and legislation, along with potential political unrest trouble asif guns are seen to be prioritised over butternecessities and infrastructure. The flipside is that Washington may pressure Asian allies that do not spend enough – including with the pledge of US protection itself. After all, as US President Donald Trump remarked on the election trail, he would encourage Moscow to do ' whatever the hell they want ' to NATO members who do not spend enough on defence. WHAT AMERICA SAYS AND WHAT IT DOES There are also inconsistencies between Mr Hegseth's words and the US' recent actions. Most leaders in the region would welcome his acknowledgment of the 'geographic necessity' of economic cooperation with China, for example. Or promising to work with regional governments as 'partners, not dependents.' Yet, Washington has levied tariffs universally on its 'partners', including countries with whom America has signed free trade agreements. Washington is also pressuring countries such as Malaysia to Vietnam to enforce rules of origin to cut down on transshipments of Chinese goods. The inconsistencies deepen the more you look. Mr Hegseth criticised China for a 'lack of respect for neighbours' but offered no explanation for how this is different from US ambitions in Greenland and Canada. He raised, as he did in Manila and Munich, that the Indo-Pacific is America's 'priority theatre,' but did not address concerns that munitions are being redirected to the Middle East to support US strikes on the Houthis. At the core of many of these concerns is the question: Is the US serious about its pivot to Asia? The idea of a pivot was first mooted in the Obama administration, but Washington has struggled to make this concrete amid crises in the Middle East and Europe. Just as Mr Hegseth invoked Singapore's founding prime minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, in his speech, it would be helpful for US officials to recall Mr Lee's thoughts on America's strengths and weaknesses from a decade ago. While America's 'creativity, resilience and innovative spirit' allow it to confront and overcome its core problems, the US cannot simply treat Asia like a movie that it can pause and resume at will. 'It does not work like that,' he said. 'If the United States wants to substantially affect the strategic evolution of Asia, it cannot come and go.' Yes, talk is cheap. It is now up to the US to practise what it preaches and convince the region of its credibility.
CNA
40 minutes ago
- CNA
IN FOCUS: How a string of remote Pacific islands is emerging as a new front in US-China rivalry
SINGAPORE: In the vast blue expanse of the Pacific Ocean, a new front in the great power rivalry between the United States and China is quietly taking shape. Along a string of small islands and atolls that make up what's dubbed the Second Island Chain, Washington and Beijing have stepped up military and diplomatic manoeuvring as they work to fortify their presence and deny each other unbridled access to this strategic theatre, observers note. The US under President Donald Trump is effectively doubling down on his predecessor Joe Biden's actions in this region even as a slew of other policies is rolled back, reflecting how high the area is placed on the priority list, analysts say. They add that the island chain strategy that was once a geographic footnote in Cold War strategy could now potentially recast the stakes in the contested flashpoints of the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. The regional stakes are significant, they further warn. Further militarisation of the area could lead to misunderstandings and confrontation, raising the risks of a conflict. 'Tensions will be high (in the Pacific) if China manages to secure the Second Island Chain and establish (more) military outposts or bases … especially as other regional powers, including Australia and Japan, come into the scene as well,' said Abdul Rahman Yaacob, a research fellow in the Southeast Asia Programme at the Lowy Institute. While not directly in the line of fire, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states could also come under increasing pressure to choose sides as the Sino-US divide widens - an unwelcome scenario, as the bloc's leaders have repeatedly made clear. But amid the geopolitical tussle, there could be a silver lining for Pacific island nations. They have an 'unprecedented opportunity' to leverage the geopolitical climate and 'extract benefits,' Blake Johnson, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's (ASPI) Pacific Centre, told CNA. WHAT IS THE SECOND ISLAND CHAIN? The island chain strategy stems from how US military strategists visualised defence and force projection perimeters across the Pacific during the Cold War between the US and then-Soviet Union. The First Island Chain, being closer to China's coast, was seen as a front line in any potential confrontation. The line runs down Japan, past Taiwan and the Philippines, ending at Borneo. The Second Island Chain - located further east and stretching from the Ogasarawa Islands south of Japan, through the US territories of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, down to Palau and parts of Micronesia - was designated as the second line of defence and reinforcement. The third island chain stretches from Alaska through Hawaii and down to New Zealand, marking the outermost perimeter of US strategic interest in the Pacific. While the Cold War is decades past, the terms have endured. Instead of the Soviet Union, China is now the primary target of the island chain strategy as the US looks to contain and counter Beijing's expanding military reach in the Indo-Pacific. 'Now, the competition is very much Pacific-focused, with China as the main adversary (of the US) in the theatre,' said Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst at ASPI. 'The PLA (People's Liberation Army) now is far more capable than the old PLA of the Cold War era.' Pacific territories and states along the Second Island Chain Ogasawara Islands (Japan) Remote Japanese territory ~1,000 km south of Tokyo Population: ~2,500 Land area: ~84 sq km Northern Mariana Islands (United States) US unincorporated territory Population: ~47,000 Land area: ~464 sq km Guam (United States) US unincorporated territory Population: ~170,000 Land area: ~540 sq km Federated States of Micronesia Sovereign nation in free association with the US* Population: ~115,000 Land area: ~700 sq km (total) Palau Sovereign nation in free association with the US* Population: ~18,000 Land area: ~460 sq km *Freely associated states receive US economic assistance and grant the US access to their territories for military purposes. Collapse The spotlight on the US' island chain strategy and in particular the Second Island Chain, was intensified after remarks by its Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on his inaugural Indo-Pacific tour that included Guam, Hawaii, the Philippines and Japan. During his stop in Hawaii on Mar 26, Hegseth said America's island chain strategy is designed for deterrence rather than aggression. 'The rehearsals, the exercises, the campaigns we're doing in and around the first island chain are not meant to be the precursor to an attack. We're here to deter. We're here to show strength with our allies,' he said. Hegseth, who also announced investments in Yap and Micronesia and reiterated American commitment to bolstering Second Island Chain defence, stressed that the US remains committed to avoiding conflict while maintaining a strong and ready posture in the Indo-Pacific. 'We don't want to see a conflict at all … but we're going to be postured forward and leaning forward as much as necessary to ensure (a conflict) doesn't happen,' he added. Hegseth reaffirmed Washington's strategic commitment to the island chain strategy during his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 31, as he marked his first appearance as defence secretary at the security-focused forum. He said the US is implementing a multi-pronged approach to reinforce deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, including improving its forward force posture, enhancing the defense capabilities of allies, and rebuilding its defence industrial base. 'So first, the Department of Defense is prioritising forward-postured, combat credible forces in the Western Pacific to deter by denial along the first and second island chains,' he said. He highlighted a key example from his visit to the Philippines in March, where the US pledged to deploy more advanced military assets. 'We announced the inaugural overseas deployment of NMESIS, a US Marine Corps mobile anti-ship missile system, to the Philippines,' he said. The system, deployed jointly with the Philippines' military to the Batanes Islands near the Taiwan Strait, 'enhanced our interoperability and improved our readiness on cutting-edge platforms where we need them, and when we need them'. BOLSTERING AMERICA'S PACIFIC PRESENCE The US under Trump has made clear it intends to augment its Pacific presence, digging in on actions overseen by the previous administration, even as the businessman-turned-president seeks to undo Biden's other policies. Abdul Rahman Yaacob from the Lowy Institute pointed to the late-April deployment of the USS Ohio - a nuclear-powered, guided-missile submarine - to the western Pacific. The US Navy stated that it was the third deployment of an Ohio-class submarine to the region in less than a year. The move highlights Washington's drive to bolster its undersea deterrence in the Pacific amid escalating maritime competition with Beijing, Abdul Rahman said. A month before that, Hegseth, the US defence chief, reaffirmed Washington's commitment to a strong regional deterrence posture during a visit to Guam. While there, he met with President Wesley Simina of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), a country of about 110,000 people situated along the strategic path of the Second Island Chain. According to the US Department of Defense, both men reached a 'mutual understanding' for it to begin 'planning and construction on key infrastructure projects' in Yap, one of FSM's four states. The department said that its future investments in FSM are estimated to exceed US$2 billion. 'These projects are designed to provide strategic operational and exercise capabilities for US forces,' it said. These include airfield modernisation and seaport development, improvements to a commercial port and harbour infrastructure enhancements. The move expands an already substantial US military footprint across the Southwest Pacific, which includes air and naval bases in Guam, a ballistic missile defence test site in the Marshall Islands, and a high-frequency radar system under development in Palau. EXPANDING CHINESE OUTREACH Chinese state media, including the Global Times, have consistently framed the US' island chain strategy as a relic of Cold War-era geopolitics, arguing that it is designed to contain China's rise and undermine regional stability. The Chinese narrative portrays the strategy as part of a broader US effort to stifle China's peaceful development through military build-ups, alliance networks, and operations under the banner of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. 'The so-called 'first island chain' is a product of Cold War geopolitics. Any attempt to block and contain China is nothing but wishful thinking,' said Wu Qian, spokesperson for China's Ministry of National Defense, at a press briefing on Apr 12 last year. In the meantime, China has equally been buttressing its Pacific presence, making inroads in a region traditionally within the US sphere of influence. While much of the strategic attention has traditionally focused on the first island chain, Beijing has quietly laid the groundwork for influence and access further east, said Ridzwan Rahmat, principal defence analyst at Janes, an intelligence firm specialising in military and national security. Steps taken include expanding satellite tracking and intelligence-gathering capabilities, and deepening ties through economic aid, infrastructure financing, and training exchanges. China has increasingly leveraged economic and infrastructure initiatives to deepen its influence among Pacific Island nations, including those situated along the Second and Third Island Chains. In countries like Vanuatu and Kiribati - both situated along or near the Third Island Chain - Beijing has invested in critical infrastructure projects, such as port developments and airstrip renovations, which analysts suggest could serve dual civilian and military purposes. In Vanuatu, for instance, China holds a significant portion of the nation's sovereign debt and has attempted to establish a military base. Similarly, in Kiribati, China has made plans to revitalise an airstrip, which some observers have viewed as efforts to project the PLA's power into the South Pacific. Diplomatically, China has also made concerted efforts to shift allegiances in the Pacific, persuading several nations to switch recognition from Taiwan to Beijing. China has also been building up its maritime presence in the Pacific. It currently ranks third in the Pacific, behind only the US and Australia, according to Anne-Marie Brady, a specialist in Chinese, Pacific and polar politics at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. Last year, it registered 26 China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels to operate within the jurisdiction of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. Analysts have said the CCG is often deployed in grey-zone operations in contested waters. This gives the designated CCG vessels legal authority to board foreign fishing ships operating on the high seas within an expansive area covering nearly 20 per cent of the Earth's surface. Notably, this area encompasses all three of the island chains. CCG vessels have frequently been deployed to assert Beijing's maritime claims in contested areas of the South China Sea, including near Philippine-held features. Their presence has often led to tense standoffs, with Manila accusing them of blocking resupply missions and using water cannons against Filipino boats. TUSSLE FOR STRATEGIC DOMINANCE A tussle for strategic dominance underlies the actions by the US and China in the Second Island Chain and overall Pacific, observers say. China's push into the Second Island Chain has been deliberate and multi-faceted, particularly in safeguarding what it sees as core national interests, said Ridzwan from Janes. 'China imports 80 per cent of its energy sources via the sea. The land connection that it has with Russia and Pakistan is not enough to keep up with this demand for energy imports,' he said. 'It's very easy for the Americans to cut off China's sea lines of communication that are beyond the First Island Chain. So I think that's the emphasis on the Second Island Chain - to make sure that its sea lines of communication remain open.' Davis from ASPI believes China isn't just concerned about protecting its communication channels - it also wants to open up offensive options. 'It's about laying the groundwork for a future presence that could cut critical sea lines of communication between Australia and the US, as well as those running south of Australia through the Coral Sea up to Japan,' he told CNA. Against this backdrop, he said the US has ramped up its efforts in Micronesia to maintain control over key sea lines of communication and check China's expanding Pacific footprint. Davis described the back and forth as a 'game of geostrategic wei qi', referencing the Chinese name for the board game Go. In Go, players often disperse stones across the board to build influence and flexibility, rather than overcommitting in a concentrated area. Davis said this mirrors the US strategy of spreading forces across the Second Island Chain to reduce vulnerability and maintain operational resilience against a concentrated strike. At the same time, growing American emphasis on the defence line in the western Pacific is driven by mounting concerns over China's increasingly sophisticated anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, he said. A2/AD is a military strategy aimed at preventing an adversary from entering or operating freely within a specific region. Tools include long-range missiles, air defences and naval assets, as well as cyber attacks and electronic warfare. China's growing wartime capabilities are making it increasingly challenging for the US and its allies to operate effectively or hold ground within the first island chain - China's immediate maritime buffer - should a conflict break out, Davis said. 'China is extending its counter-intervention capabilities further (beyond its shores) and developing more effective A2/AD capabilities, to the point where the potential cost of deploying within its near seas is becoming too costly,' he said. 'So, the US (wants) to make use of the Second Island Chain - centred on Guam - to project power from, and also to deny China the ability to project power beyond the island chain out into the far seas.' The new infrastructure and anticipated deployment of air defence systems in FSM's Yap will further solidify the US' position within the Second Island Chain, said Abdul Rahman from the Lowy Institute. 'If all your key assets are within the First Island Chain, and they are taken out by the Chinese, you will not be able to respond against the Chinese, so you'll be a sitting duck,' he said. Abdul Rahman added that the US is shifting towards a strategy of force dispersal across the Pacific, deploying smaller, more agile units throughout the region. 'Deploying in a place like (Micronesia) will enable them to be able to strike against China in return in the event of (a conflict) … having forces deployed (along the Second Island Chain) will make it a bit difficult for the Chinese to take down your forces at the same time.' China's accelerating military modernisation - especially in long-range precision strike capabilities - is reshaping the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific region, noted Ridzwan from Janes. According to a 2024 Pentagon report, Beijing has been expanding its missile arsenal with systems designed to reach deep into the Pacific. This includes intercontinental ballistic missiles like the Dongfeng-31AG, which can strike targets as far afield as Hawaii, and intermediate-range missiles such as the Dongfeng-26, capable of striking US bases in Guam. China test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile into the Pacific Ocean in September last year, the first such launch in 44 years. But Ridzwan said questions remain about the real-world effectiveness of China's advanced missile systems. 'One of the biggest weaknesses that the Chinese face is that this hardware developed over the past few years has never really been tested in actual operational conflict,' he told CNA. 'Compared to the American military, which has gone to war many times - from Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan - the Chinese have not had this opportunity to operationally test their weapon systems or combat systems against a proper, true adversary,' Ridzwan noted. 'The kind of data you get from training is not as valuable as what you collect in real combat scenarios.' Before becoming US defence chief in January, Hegseth had already sounded the alarm over China's growing military capabilities. Speaking on a podcast in November 2024, he warned that the PLA was being built 'specifically dedicated to defeating the United States of America'. He claimed that China's hypersonic missiles could destroy all of America's aircraft carriers 'within the first minutes of a potential conflict', and pointed out that in classified Pentagon war games simulating a clash with China, 'the US lost every time'. While Hegseth's remarks focused on China's growing edge in hypersonic missile capabilities - an area where the US currently lags in - Abdul Rahman pointed out that Washington's broader posture in the Pacific goes beyond countering specific threats. Stationing forces and assets across Pacific island states, he said, allows them to function as critical command-and-control hubs, backup airfields, and logistical nodes for fuel and munitions. 'These locations also play a key role in facilitating the flow of troops and supplies from the US mainland to East Asia,' he added. PACIFIC STATES CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE As the Sino-US contest spills increasingly over into the blue waters of the Pacific, island nations there find themselves caught in the middle. Analysts say they have a chance to seize on the current situation and eke out gains as Washington and Beijing look to court them. China leverages economic incentives and development aid to encourage nations to recognise it over Taiwan, Joshua Bernard Espena, an international relations lecturer at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), told CNA. China regained its place as the second-biggest bilateral donor to the Pacific islands in 2022, displacing the US to come in behind Australia, according to a Lowy Institute report. It ramped up projects after a COVID-19 pandemic lull to fork out US$256 million in development support. This approach, Espena said, has been effective in swaying countries facing financial challenges, as they seek infrastructure development and economic support. 'China seeks to further turn Taiwan's international identity in the Pacific into rubble. Washington does not wish this to happen despite its own withdrawal from Taipei in 1979,' Espena said. China views Taiwan as part of its territory, to be brought under its control by force if necessary. Beijing sends warplanes and navy vessels near the self-ruled island regularly, and in recent years, it has stepped up the scope and scale of military exercises around Taiwan. Several Pacific island nations have shifted diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in recent years. Nauru was the latest to do so in January 2024, following similar moves by the Solomon Islands and Kiribati in 2019. These changes have reduced Taiwan's diplomatic partners in the Pacific to just three - Tuvalu, Palau and the Marshall Islands. Johnson from ASPI cautioned that drawing closer to China could have risks. 'Some are choosing to forge deeper ties with China in the economic and security space, which poses additional risks for sea lines of communication and other strategic concerns,' he said. 'It also poses risks to undermining democracy in these countries - risks that their governments might not fully appreciate.' At the same time, countries like Nauru and Tuvalu have opted for stable alignments. 'They're electing for a more comprehensive partnership with Australia to avoid the burdens of playing off competition for benefit,' Johnson said. As for the US, Espena from PUP suggested that island states like Palau could play a 'critical role' in enabling the expansion of the US military's footprint across the Pacific. He noted that they 'may be able to host dual-use runways and ports' to support a credible supply line for American and allied maritime operations - albeit on a limited scale. Espena said Taiwan's sole three diplomatic partners in the Pacific islands could serve as 'useful liaisons' for Washington to sustain unofficial lines of communication with Taipei, in line with its long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity. But analysts have warned that aid cuts and reduced climate funding under the Trump administration risk eroding goodwill among Pacific island nations - an outcome at odds with Washington's broader push to expand its regional presence. The Pacific island states are among the most vulnerable to the impact of climate change due to their geographical location and limited resources. They are also heavily reliant on foreign aid, with the US a significant donor before Trump took steps to turn off the tap. 'Nothing is more detrimental' than viewing the Freely Associated States (FAS) as merely a launchpad for military operations, said Espena, referring to the three Pacific nations of FSM, the Marshall Islands and Palau. The three countries share Compacts of Free Association with the US, arrangements that effectively give the US strategic positioning in the Pacific while providing economic and security support to the associated states. A 20-year renewal to the agreements was enacted in March last year. Espena said relative stability in the western Pacific has long depended on the US bearing the economic cost in exchange for political influence. 'While American transactionalism is now becoming the new normal, it's up to the FAS to renegotiate the terms they need to assert,' he said, adding that Washington 'must not brush off these concerns'. Echoing this, Davis from ASPI said slashing aid not only weakens America's standing but opens the door for Chinese influence. 'China will seek to exploit such cuts to Beijing's benefit,' he said. 'It may save the US some dollars, but cost them far more in the broader strategic competition that is now ongoing.' HEADING FOR CHOPPY REGIONAL WATERS? While geographically distant from much of the world and often viewed as a secondary theatre, what's playing out in the Second Island Chain could still trigger ripple effects across the broader region if tensions escalate, analysts warn. One consideration is Taiwan. Analysts have suggested that China's course of action regarding the self-ruled island hinges primarily on whether the US would intervene militarily. Noting China's steadily advancing military capabilities, Davis from ASPI said the US has had to adapt by dispersing its forces across the Pacific region. Such a move could come at a cost to existing US deployments in the region. The Wall Street Journal reported in late May, citing sources familiar with internal discussions, that the Pentagon was considering relocating around 4,500 troops from South Korea to other locations in the Indo-Pacific, including Guam. These claims, however, were swiftly dismissed by Washington. 'Reports that the DoD (US Department of Defense) will reduce US troops in the Republic of Korea (ROK) are not true,' Pentagon chief spokesperson Sean Parnell posted on social media platform X a day after the WSJ report. 'Anyone who's covered the Pentagon knows that we always evaluate force posture. That said, the US remains firmly committed to the ROK. Our alliance is ironclad,' he added. South Korea's defence ministry also responded, saying Seoul and Washington had not held any discussions about withdrawing US troops stationed in the country. When asked whether an American strategic shift to the Second Island Chain would affect Taiwan's security, Ridzwan from Janes said dispersing US forces could lead to 'weaker protection' within the First Island Chain. However, he stressed that this does not automatically leave Taiwan exposed or vulnerable, as the island's defence hinges on many other factors such as air superiority and the cost of intervention. 'China doesn't yet have the bandwidth to carry out a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. And by bandwidth, I mean the ability to deploy and sustain a large number of troops within a limited time frame - without that, any landing force can easily be repelled,' Ridzwan said. He suggested that Beijing's current objective is to isolate rather than invade Taiwan. 'The best option for the Chinese at the moment is to cut Taiwan off from its sea lines of communication. And Washington knows this. That's likely why there's now more emphasis (from China) on the Second Island Chain - to support a strategy of containment rather than direct confrontation,' he said. Meanwhile, China's efforts to expand its presence in the Pacific islands are part of a calculated, step-by-step plan aimed at first building political influence, which can later pave the way for economic and military footholds, said Abdul Rahman from the Lowy Institute. 'I think they are trying to gain some political influence first,' he said, pointing to Beijing's success in persuading several island nations to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. 'That's the first step. Once you are able to establish political influence, later on, you can have military influence, economic influence following suit. That's their strategy.' Abdul Rahman warned that the eventual goal could be access to key infrastructure. 'I'm certain that once they have strong political influence, they could have access to either port or air facilities in some of these islands,' he said. Such a scenario, he added, would carry serious strategic implications. 'If the Chinese have access to the ports and air facilities on some of these small islands, it could cut off maritime and air travels between the US and Australia, in times of a military conflict.' He added that Chinese control over the Second Island Chain could potentially limit US manoeuvrability in the event of a conflict. 'If there is a conflict in Taiwan, then it will be very difficult for the Americans to quickly assist the Taiwanese … because the Chinese will be blocking the second island chain.' However, Abdul Rahman stressed that such a scenario remains some way off. 'At this point in time, I do not think the Chinese will be able to set up any air or military outpost in the Second Island Chain in the short and medium term,' he said, noting that Beijing is still in the process of trying to 'establish strong political influence' there. Nevertheless, the extension of US-China competition into the island chains could potentially heighten the risk of confrontation - not just within those geographical lines, but across the wider Indo-Pacific region, warn analysts. For instance, increased deployments and competing military postures could exacerbate tensions in flashpoints such as the South China Sea, where overlapping claims and naval stand-offs are already common, said Ridzwan from Janes. 'I think the Philippines is a very important node in the American strategy for Second Island Chain capability,' said Ridzwan, pointing out Washington's deployment of various weapon systems in the country. The US military has deployed its NMESIS missile system to the Philippines for ongoing bilateral drills. Barely two months ago, the same system featured on Batan Island, close to the Luzon Strait, during another joint exercise. Ridzwan said this reflects a wider pattern of militarisation not only in the Pacific islands but also among South China Sea claimants. Such moves, he said, risk fuelling an arms buildup and mistrust that could raise the chances of miscalculation - particularly in contested waters where US-aligned forces and Chinese maritime assets already operate in close proximity. Countries such as the Philippines and Japan are 'understandably' wary of China's growing interest in the Second Island Chain, said Abdul Rahman from the Lowy Institute. 'The Second Island Chain actually covers the eastern part of their security zone,' he said. 'So if China manages to secure the Second Island Chain and establish either military outposts or bases, the Philippines will be stuck between the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain - and it will be similar for Japan too.' A growing Chinese military presence in the Pacific could leave Southeast Asian nations having to make hard choices, regardless of whether they want to. 'As the PLA Navy evolves into a more capable blue-water (force) and begins projecting power more frequently through Southeast Asia into the south-west Pacific, ASEAN will come under increasing pressure to choose sides,' said Davis from ASPI. 'Their space to remain non-aligned will shrink.'
CNA
7 hours ago
- CNA
Asia First - Tue 3 Jun 2025
02:27:25 Min From the opening bell across markets in Southeast Asia and China, to the biggest business interviews and top financial stories, tune in to Asia First to kick-start your business day.
