In push to develop AI, more courses and projects emerge at Chinese universities
A number of Chinese universities have launched new courses and projects focused on
artificial intelligence amid a government push to develop the industry and get ahead in the
tech race against the United States.
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In Beijing, Tsinghua University plans to take on 150 undergraduate students for a new academy to 'cultivate talent in fields that integrate AI with other disciplines', official news agency Xinhua reported on Sunday.
The report said the aim was to 'serve the needs of the country's strategy and the development of society'.
A Tsinghua spokesperson said the university would allocate the appropriate resources and strengthen the faculty to ensure the success of the project.
The spokesperson said the university was already using AI-assisted teaching in a pilot programme run across 117 courses, whose students had access to an AI learning assistant. Tsinghua plans to offer another 38 general courses related to AI in the future.
05:00
Does the arrival of China's low-cost DeepSeek mean the end of Nvidia's chip dominance?
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Meanwhile, in the eastern province of Zhejiang, Hangzhou Dianzi University has launched a new course this semester titled 'AI in Practice: Mastering DeepSeek'. The course is also being offered online across 12 other higher education institutions in China, and according to a Zhejiang Daily report it has been oversubscribed.
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