Changing geometries of battlefield— from machine guns in WWI to the drones of today

Indian Express

5 days ago

Ukraine's Operation Spider Web may have fundamentally transformed the geometry of the battlefield, and potentially changed the face of war for years to come.
This was a deep strike with few parallels. Rather than strategic air bombing raids or long-range missiles, the Russian bomber fleet fell victim to 150-odd relatively inexpensive quadcopter drones smuggled into Russia and launched from inside shipping containers.
Looking at the history of warfare, it is not surprising that Moscow was unprepared for this 'Trojan Horse attack': historically, militaries have struggled to keep up with technological advances, with deadly consequences.
Machine guns: scaling up the killing
While artillery was the greatest killer during World War I, it was the machine gun that shaped the way the war, the deadliest in history at the time, was fought.
Invented by the American Hiram Maxim in 1883, the machine gun was a force multiplier that made centuries of military wisdom obsolete. A single machine gun could outgun hundreds of soldiers armed with bolt-action rifles and bayonets, and a system of well-positioned machine guns could defend the frontline with a fraction of the manpower required to overrun it.
The result: a stalemate on the Western Front, and a lengthy war of attrition that bled both sides. The defensive power of machine guns made gaining ground a prohibitively costly affair.
But both sides took time to fully grasp this new reality, and began the war using outdated tactics. Thousands of men were mowed down by well-emplaced machine guns as the generals ordered wave after wave of futile frontal assaults.
'The enormous losses in August and September 1914 were never equaled at any other time, not even at Verdun: the total number of French casualties (killed, wounded, or missing) was 329,000. At the height of Verdun, the three month period February to April 1916, French casualties were 111,000,' wrote US Army Major Jack R Northstine in 'The Development of the Machine Gun and its Impact on the Great War' published in the journal Infantry in 2016.
'… Almost all of the technologies that were introduced during the war were built in order to defeat [the challenge posed by machine guns],' Maj Northstine said, adding that the weapon 'radically changed the strategies and tactics used by militaries in the future'.
Tanks & aircraft: making war mobile
Throughout the 1930s, France devoted significant resources to construct the so-called Maginot Line, an 'unbreachable' defensive line on its border with Germany. Comprising hardened fortifications and sophisticated underground communications and supply infrastructure, the Maginot Line was the logical extension of World War I trenches.
But when the Nazi invasion came, France fell in just about a month. After invading the low countries on May 10, German forces took Paris by June 15. The speed of Germany's success, and the inability of the Maginot Line to deter its offensive, were a product of German blitzkrieg (literally, 'lightning war') tactics, which combined fast-moving Panzer tank divisions, motorised infantry divisions, artillery, and Luftwaffe bombers.
The idea was to engage and win a series of quick and decisive short battles, and deliver a knockout blow to the enemy before it could fully mobilise its troops. Instead of going head on against the Maginot Line, the German attack focussed on invading France from the north — through Belgium and Luxembourg — which was not as well fortified, and moved rapidly before the French Army could regroup.
'The truth is that our classic conception of warfare has run counter to a new conception,' said French Premier Paul Reynaud in a radio broadcast on May 21, after the Germans breached the Allied line at Flanders. This conception was based on 'the massive use of armored divisions and of fighting airplanes' and sowing 'disorganisation of the enemy rear by deep raids by parachutists', he said.
Like machine guns in World War I, tanks and aircraft once again shaped the geometry of the battlefield in World War II, ushering in an era of fast, mobile warfare where the frontline was constantly changing, and the enemy could attack hundreds of kilometres beyond the lines.
Extending the range of fighting
Thus far, war was fought at close quarters. Most artillery guns did not have an effective range of more than 25 km, and 'dogfights' took place with aircraft getting dangerously close to each other, often only metres apart.
While long range bombers could inflict damage deep inside enemy territory, they still had to brave enemy air defences and fly to their targets.
Everything changed when a German V-2 rocket hit London on September 8, 1944. This was the first true 'ballistic missile' — one that has a brief period of powered flight, after which it continues on a ballistic trajectory outside the atmosphere, then curves back to strike a target on Earth. The following decades saw major advancements being made in missile technology, specifically in guidance and targeting systems.
The thrust was to be able to fight as remotely as possible. Missiles were not only harder to intercept, an interception did not mean the loss of a pilot, one of the major challenges that World War II air forces had to deal with.
Drones were the next logical development. Unlike missiles, they are usually under real-time human control, providing the flexibility of fighter aircraft without the human costs associated with them. Drones, unlike missiles, can loiter in a particular area, wait for an opportune moment, and then strike.
But like missiles and aircraft, drones too had to be launched from within one's territory — that is, before Sunday's attack. On Sunday, Ukraine made obsolete decades of air defence doctrine by launching potent attack drones from deep inside Russian territory.
This is the culmination of decades of developments in long range combat, opening up vulnerabilities that were previously believed to be non-existent. Most notably, the simplicity of the attack means that it is within the technical capabilities of almost any nation or even non-state actors.
Mick Ryan, a retired Australian general, wrote for the Sydney-based Lowy Institute that 'the proliferation of drones, open-source sensors and digital command and control systems means that long-range strike is now a commodity available to almost every nation state, and nonstate actor, with a few million dollars and the desire to reach out and strike their adversary.'