China falsely accuses Philippines of illegal intrusion after midair standoff over South China Sea
On Feb. 18, a Chinese military helicopter flew within 3 meters of a Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources plane traveling over the contested Scarborough Shoal off the northwest Philippine coast, sparking condemnation from Washington and Manila.
The incident was the latest example of China's use of force and coercion to push its neighbors to cede their maritime claims in the resource-rich South China Sea.
Writing on X, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson condemned what she called 'the dangerous maneuvers by a PLA navy helicopter that endangered pilots and passengers on a Philippine air mission.'
'We call on China to refrain from coercive actions and settle its disputes peacefully in accordance with international law,' Carlson wrote.
That sentiment was echoed by the Philippines' National Maritime Council, which said China's action endangered the safety of the pilots and passengers onboard and 'demonstrated a lack of regard for internationally accepted norms on good airmanship and flight safety.'
Journalists from The Associated Press and other media outlets were on the Philippine aircraft and witnessed the incident.
The Philippine pilot at one point warned the Chinese navy helicopter by radio that he was violating the safety standards managing distance between aircraft set by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and the International Civil Aviation Organization.
Yet China said it was the Philippines that violated the law by flying over the Scarborough Shoal.
"On February 18, a Philippine C-208 reconnaissance aircraft illegally intruded into China's territorial airspace over Huangyan Dao [Scarborough Shoal] without permission of Chinese government,' Air Force Senior Colonel Tian Junli, spokesperson for the Chinese People's Liberation Army Southern Theater Command, said in a statement.
Tian added that the Philippines had 'seriously violated China's sovereignty' and 'international law.'
That is false.
While China seized the Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and maintains a blockade there, China's sovereignty over the shoal is not recognized under international law.
The Scarborough Shoal lies 220 kilometers east of the Philippines island of Luzon and falls within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) recognizes a country's EEZ as a roughly 307-kilometer stretch of sea extending from the coast of a given state.
Under UNCLOS, the Philippines has sovereign rights to explore, exploit and manage natural resources within its EEZ, although the surface waters remain international.
That means the Philippines, like other countries, enjoys freedom of overflight over the shoal.
In 2016, an international tribunal in The Hague rejected China's sweeping claims to the South China Sea, ruling the country violated the Philippines' rights to its EEZ and territorial waters.
China's military blockade of the shoal is illegal under the tribunal's ruling.
While the tribunal said it was 'not deciding sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal,' it did find that both China and the Philippines have 'traditional fishing rights' at the shoal.
The tribual further said, 'China had violated its duty to respect the traditional fishing rights of Philippine fishermen by halting access to the shoal after May 2012.'
China, which does not accept the tribunal's ruling, continues to deny the Philippines those rights.
China has ramped up its coast guard patrols around several maritime features that fall within the Philippines' EEZ and has repeatedly engaged in aggressive actions to drive Philippine ships and aircraft out of that region.
In August 2024, two Chinese fighter jets deployed flares in the path of a Philippine aircraft flying over the Scarborough Shoal.
China has also deployed flares to disrupt Philippine patrols in other parts of the South China Sea, and has harassed Philippines aircraft flying in the vicinity of the Scarborough Shoal.
On Nov. 8, 2024, the Philippines signed measures reinforcing its internationally recognized rights over the country's maritime zones.
China responded by holding air and sea combat drills around the shoal and publishing geographic coordinates showing the Scarborough Shoal as its own.
On Feb. 19, the Philippines said it would conduct a large, 10-day military training exercise in March to help gird the country against external threats.
The Philippines has also beefed up security cooperation with the United States and other partners and has conducted joint military exercises in response to China's increased militarization of the South China Sea and actions that the Philippines considers hostile.
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