Reserved seats case: Constitutional interpretation required, says counsel for SIC
ISLAMABAD: The Sunni Ittehad Council's (SIC's) lawyer accepted that constitutional interpretation is required in the reserved seats case.
Justice Aminuddin Khan, heading a 11-member Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court, inquired from Faisal Siddiqui, counsel SIC, whether he accept the constitutional interpretation in this 'lis'. He replied, yes.
The bench on Monday was hearing the review petitions of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, Pakistan Peoples' Party and the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP).
Reserves seats review hearings: SC urged to include original bench judges
Hamid Khan appearing on behalf of SIC informed that he has filed three applications and Advocate on Record (AOR) must be knowing whether those have been numbered or not? However, the bench told him that they have not received his applications, and directing him to check about the applications.
Hamid later on informed that the Registrar's Office neither accepted the application nor returned to them. He; however, said that the office considers the application scandalous.
Faisal Siddiqui, another counsel of SIC, raised objections on the constitution of the bench. Firstly, that a same numerical strength of the bench, which heard the original case, should hear the review petitions, secondly two judges, who had dismissed the review petition, should not be excluded. In support of his arguments he cited the Supreme Court Rules and the judgments. He told that such situation had also emerged in the past when the two members had recused from the bench.
Justice Amin said that on the desire of two members the bench was reconstituted, adding their dissenting note would be made part of the final judgment. Justice Mazhar said that propriety demands that their votes would be counted. He; however, questioned that after dismissing the review petitions what they will say, adding will they be sitting in the bench as 'silent spectator'.
Justice Hilali said they (two judges) have refused and declined to sit in the bench. She inquired from Faisal why he now wanted them to be in the bench. Justice Amin then said the two judges have accepted the jurisdiction of the bench and one of the members, who had rescued, was also not part of the original bench.
Faisal argued that the judgment under review was passed by a 13 judge bench, adding it is the fundamental principle that review should be heard by the same number of judges who had passed the judgment. 'I have not heard of any jurisdiction that lesser bench hears the review petitions,' he added.
Justice Mazhar then asked him to draw distinction between the Supreme Court Rules and the Article 191A of the constitution. He said that Article 191A has given overriding effect on Article 185.
Faisal contended that there are many judgments of the apex court on review that based upon the SC Rules. He said that the basis of fundamental principles is the conventions.
Justice Mandokhail questioned after the 26th Amendments whether the SC Rules are binding upon the constitutional bench. Whether the Rules have backing of the constitution, he questioned and said the Article 191A supports the hearing of matter by the constitutional bench.
He said the Judicial Commission of Pakistan gives panel of judges for the constitutional bench, while the Committee, set up under Article 191A decide about the constitutional benches. He remarked whether anyone likes it not, but the 26th Amendment is the law of the land now.
Faisal Siddiqui proposed that if those two judges could not be included in the bench, then at two more judges be made part of the constitutional bench in order to complete the strength of the bench; i.e., 13.
Justice Mazhar then asked what would be status of two judges' order, as they have dismissed the review petitions. What will happen about the decision of two judges? He further inquired if those two judges sit in the bench then would they review their order?
The case was adjourned until today (Tuesday).
Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
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